# US 2015/0039910 A1 · Side channel power attack defense with pseudo random clock operation

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- Number: US 2015/0039910 A1
- Document ID: US20150039910A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 14/447,792
- Filed: 2014-07-31
- Published: 2015-02-05
- Earliest claimed: 2013-07-31
- Assignees: Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation
- Applicants: Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation
- Inventors: Robert A. Card
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20150039910A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/003: {for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA]}
- G09C 1/00: Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system (cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00)
- H04L 2209/08: Randomization, e.g. dummy operations or using noise
- H04L 2209/12: Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G09C: CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY

## Abstract

Apparatus and methods are provided for defending an electronic circuit secret algorithm and secret parameter values against a side-attack. In an example, a method can include receiving first one or more parameters for altering a clock signal of the electronic device at a non-volatile memory register, and altering a frequency of the clock signal of the electronic device during execution of an authentication routine according to the first one or more parameters.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of defending an electronic device against a side channel attack, the method comprising:
receiving first one or more parameters for altering a clock signal of the electronic device at a non-volatile memory register; and
altering a frequency of the clock signal of the electronic device during execution of an authentication routine according to the first one or more parameters.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein receiving the first one or more parameters includes receiving a first random number at an authentication circuit; and
wherein receiving first one or more parameters includes providing one or more portions of the random number to the non-volatile memory register.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein providing one or more portions of the random number includes receiving a first portion of the one or more portions at the non-volatile memory, wherein the first portion includes a frequency setpoint for a cryptographic circuit clock.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein providing one or more portions of the random number includes receiving a first portion of the one or more portions at the non-volatile memory, wherein the first portion includes a clock stretch duration setpoint for a cryptographic circuit.

### Claim 5 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein providing one or more portions of the random number includes receiving a first portion of the one or more portions at the non-volatile memory, wherein the first portion includes a clock stretch cycle number setpoint for a cryptographic circuit, the cryptographic circuit configured to monitor.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, including receiving second one or more parameters for altering a clock signal of the electronic device at the authentication circuit; and
comparing the second one or more parameters to the first one or more parameters.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, including incrementing a count parameter of the non-volatile memory register if the second one or more parameters match the first one or more parameters.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, including shutting down a communication path of the electronic device if a value of the count parameter exceeds a threshold.

### Claim 9 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, including resetting the count parameter if the second one or more parameters do not match the first one or more parameters.

### Claim 10 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, including receiving a second random number; comparing the second random number to the first random number; and
incrementing a count parameter of the non-volatile memory register if the second random number matches the first random number.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, including shutting down a communication path of the electronic device if a value of the count parameter exceeds a threshold.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, including resetting the count parameter if the second random number does not match the first random number.

### Claim 13

An apparatus comprising:
an authentication circuit configured to receive a first random number from a first device, to parse portions of the first random number to a non-volatile memory register, and to modify one or more operating characteristics of a cryptography circuit of the authentication circuit using values stored within the non-volatile memory register.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the authentication circuit is configured to set a frequency of a cryptography clock associated with the cryptography circuit using a first value stored within the non-volatile memory register.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the authentication circuit is configured to set a clock stretch duration for a cryptography clock associated with the cryptography circuit using a first value stored within the non-volatile memory register.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the authentication circuit is configured to set a clock stretch cycle number associated with the cryptography circuit using to a first value stored within the non-volatile memory register.

### Claim 17 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13 wherein the authentication circuit is configured to receive a second random number and to compare portions of the second random number to the parsed portions of the first random number.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The apparatus of claim 17, wherein the authentication circuit is configured to increment a count parameter of the non-volatile memory register if the portions of the second random number match the parsed portions of the first random number.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The apparatus of claim 18, wherein the authentication circuit is configured to reset the count parameter of the non-volatile memory register if the portions of the second random number do not match the parsed portions of the first random number.

### Claim 20 (depends on 18)

The apparatus of claim 18, wherein the authentication circuit is configured to shut down a communication path of the electronic device if a value of the count parameter exceeds a threshold.
