Fault tolerant combinatorial auctions for tasks having time and precedence constraints with bonuses and penalties
AssigneeXerox Corporation
InventorsHaengju Lee, Yu-An Sun
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AssigneeXerox Corporation
InventorsHaengju Lee, Yu-An Sun
Estimating the term…
There is disclosed a method of conducting an auction under execution uncertainty to satisfy incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and efficiency by leveraging bonuses and penalties. A buyer posts a task including multiple sub-tasks. The buyer specifies temporal and precedence relationships among the sub-tasks. The buyer also specifies the time interval for the sub-tasks. Suppliers submit bids including their interested sub-tasks, prices, and proposed schedules. A winner determination problem is formulated based on bid prices, suppliers' success probabilities in delivering the sub-tasks, and the suppliers' schedules of undertaking sub-tasks. Having decided the winners, suppliers who delivered with success will be granted bonuses and those who were not able to deliver will be imposed penalties. The bonuses and penalties are formulated under a verification assumption. The combinatorial mechanism using the formulated winner determination rule and payment rule including bonuses and penalties satisfy economic properties such as incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and efficiency.
A method for conducting an auction comprising:
A system for conducting an auction comprising:
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.