# US 2014/0208123 A1 · Privileged cryptographic services in a virtualized environment

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- Number: US 2014/0208123 A1
- Document ID: US20140208123A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 13/746,924
- Filed: 2013-01-22
- Published: 2014-07-24
- Earliest claimed: 2013-01-22
- Assignees: Amazon Technologies, Inc.
- Inventors: Gregory Branchek Roth; Nachiketh Rao Potlapally
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20140208123A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/72: in cryptographic circuits
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F 21/64: Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A privileged cryptographic service is described, such as a service running in system management mode (SMM). The privileged service is operable to store and manage cryptographic keys and/or other security resources in a multitenant remote program execution environment. The privileged service can receive requests to use the cryptographic keys and issue responses to these requests. In addition, the privileged service can measure the hypervisor at runtime (e.g., either periodically or in response to the requests) in an attempt to detect evidence of tampering with the hypervisor. Because the privileged service is operating in system management mode that is more privileged than the hypervisor, the privileged service can be robust against virtual machine escape and other hypervisor attacks.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computing device, comprising:
at least one processor;
memory including instructions that are executed by the at least one processor of the device to implement:
a hypervisor that manages one or more virtual machines, each virtual machine associated with a respective customer and operable to execute customer-provided code; and
a privileged service that is capable of suspending the hypervisor and running in system management mode (SMM) on the host computing device, the privileged service operable to:
receive a cryptographic key associated with a customer and store the cryptographic key on the host computing device;
receive a request to use the cryptographic key from at least one of: the hypervisor or the one or more virtual machines, the request generated by initiating a system management interrupt (SMI);
measure one or more values associated with the hypervisor;
determine whether the hypervisor was altered based on the one or more values; and
generate a response to the request if the one or more values indicate that the hypervisor was not altered, the response based at least in part on the cryptographic key stored on the host computing device.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein the host computing device stores a second cryptographic key for a second customer, and wherein the customer-provided code of the customer that is executing in a context of the hypervisor is prevented from extracting the second cryptographic key stored on the host computing device for the second customer.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, wherein measuring the one or more values associated with the hypervisor further comprises:
measuring one or more values associated with the hypervisor obtained at boot time of the host computing device;
measuring the one or more values associated with the hypervisor at runtime; and
determining whether the hypervisor was altered based at least in part on comparing the one or more values measured at boot time with the one or more values measured at runtime.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computing device of claim 1, further comprising:
a trusted platform module (TPM) configured to store the cryptographic key, wherein the privileged service is further operable to obtain exclusive access to the TPM and manage access to the cryptographic key stored on the TPM.

### Claim 5

A computing device, comprising:
at least one processor; and
memory including instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the computing device to implement:
a hypervisor that manages one or more virtual machines and having access to a first portion of memory; and
a privileged service having access to at least a second portion of memory that is inaccessible to the hypervisor, the privileged service operable to:
store a key on the computing device;
receive a request to use the key from at least one of: the hypervisor or the one or more virtual machines; and
generate a response to the request, the response based at least in part on the key stored on the computing device.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein the privileged service is executed using at least one of:
a cryptographic processor, a remote management card, a baseboard management controller (BMC), a component executing in system management mode (SMM), or a manageability engine.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein the second portion of memory is at least one of: a portion of main memory partitioned using one or more range registers, memory internal to one or more co-processors, memory attached to one or more co-processors, registers dedicated to one or more modes, or specific cryptographic key registers.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein the privileged service is further operable to:
measure one or more values associated with the hypervisor;
detect whether the hypervisor has been altered based at least in part on the one or more values associated with the hypervisor.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The computing device of claim 8, wherein the privileged service is further operable to:
notify an external entity in response to detecting that the hypervisor has been altered; or
delete the cryptographic key in response to detecting that the hypervisor has been altered.

### Claim 10 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, further comprising:
a component configured to submit the request to the privileged service by using a system management interrupt (SMI), the component residing in at least one of: the hypervisor or the virtual machine.

### Claim 11 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, further comprising:
a trusted platform module (TPM) configured to store the key, wherein the privileged service is further operable to obtain exclusive access to the TPM.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The computing device of claim 11, wherein the privileged service is further operable control access to the key stored in the TPM by the hypervisor and the one or more virtual machines.

### Claim 13 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein the privileged service is further operable to:
measure a first set of values associated with the hypervisor at boot time to verify the hypervisor.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The computing device of claim 13, wherein the privileged service is further operable to:
receive a first system management interrupt (SMI) from a virtual machine on the host computing device to verify the hypervisor;
measure, by an SMI handler, a second set of values associated with the hypervisor;
compare the second set of values with the first set of values by the SMI handler;
verify the hypervisor by the SMI handler if the second set of values match the first set of values measured at boot time; and
receive, from the virtual machine, a second SMI to retrieve the key or to store a new key.

### Claim 15 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein the privileged service is further operable to:
expose a virtual TPM to the one or more virtual machines, wherein the one or more virtual machines are operable to use a system managed interrupt (SMI) to access the key, the key being inaccessible to the hypervisor.

### Claim 16 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein generating the response is further based on authorization information associated with the cryptographic key.

### Claim 17 (depends on 5)

The computing device of claim 5, wherein the request to use the key further includes at least one of:
a request that one or more computations be performed using the key; or
a request to transmit one or more messages encrypted or signed using the key.

### Claim 18

A computer implemented method, comprising:
under the control of one or more computer systems configured with executable instructions,
storing, by a privileged service, a key on a host computing device, the host computing device including a hypervisor that manages one or more virtual machines, the privileged service having access to at least a portion of memory inaccessible to the hypervisor;
receiving, by the privileged service, a signal that requests to use the key, the signal received from at least one of: the hypervisor or the one or more virtual machines; and
generating, by the privileged service, a response to the request, the response based at least in part on the key stored on the computing device.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The computer implemented method of claim 18, wherein the privileged service is executed on the host computing device using at least one of:
a cryptographic processor, a remote management card, a baseboard management controller (BMC), a component executing in system management mode (SMM), a manageability engine, or one or more processors of the host computing device that do not execute the hypervisor.

### Claim 20 (depends on 18)

The computer implemented method of claim 18, further comprising:
measuring one or more values associated with the hypervisor;
detecting whether the hypervisor was altered based at least in part on the one or more values.

### Claim 21 (depends on 20)

The computer implemented method of claim 20, further comprising: in response to detecting that the hypervisor was altered, performing at least one of:
sending a notification to an external entity, the notification indicating that the hypervisor has been altered; or
deleting the key.

### Claim 22 (depends on 18)

The computer implemented method of claim 18, wherein storing the key further includes:
storing the key in a trusted platform module (TPM), wherein the privileged service is configured to have exclusive access to the TPM.

### Claim 23

A non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing one or more instructions executable by one or more processors to cause a computing system to:
store, by a privileged service, a key on a host computing device, the host computing device including a hypervisor that manages one or more virtual machines, the privileged service having access to at least a portion of memory inaccessible to the hypervisor;
receive, by the privileged service, an signal that requests to use the key, the signal received from at least one of: the hypervisor or the one or more virtual machines; and
generate, by the privileged service, a response to the request, the response based at least in part on the key stored on the computing device.

### Claim 24 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 23, further comprising instructions that cause the computing system to:
expose a virtual TPM to the one or more virtual machines, wherein the one or more virtual machines are operable to use a system managed interrupt (SMI) to access the key, the key being inaccessible to the hypervisor.

### Claim 25 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 23, wherein the privileged service is operable to use authorization information related to the key to generate the response to the request.

### Claim 26 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 23, wherein the request to use the key further includes at least one of:
a request that one or more computations be performed using the key; or
a request to transmit one or more messages encrypted or signed using the key.

### Claim 27 (depends on 23)

The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 23, further comprising instructions that cause the computing system to:
measure a first set of values associated with the hypervisor at boot time to verify that a trusted hypervisor was launched.

### Claim 28 (depends on 27)

The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 27, further comprising instructions that cause the computing system to:
receive, at runtime, a first system management interrupt (SMI) from a virtual machine on the host computing device;
measure a second set of values associated with the hypervisor by an SMI handler;
compare the second set of values with the first set of values by the SMI handler;
verify the hypervisor by the SMI handler if the second set of values matches the first set of values measured at boot time; and
receive, from the virtual machine, a second SMI to retrieve the key or to store a new key.
