Protecting Secret State from Memory Attacks
AssigneeMicrosoft Corporation
InventorsPatrick J. Colp, Himanshu Raj, Stefan Saroiu, Alastair Wolman
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AssigneeMicrosoft Corporation
InventorsPatrick J. Colp, Himanshu Raj, Stefan Saroiu, Alastair Wolman
Estimating the term…
Described is a technology by which classes of memory attacks are prevented, including cold boot attacks, DMA attacks, and bus monitoring attacks. In general, secret state such as an AES key and an AES round block are maintained in on-SoC secure storage, such as a cache. Corresponding cache locations are locked to prevent eviction to unsecure storage. AES tables are accessed only in the on-SoC secure storage, to prevent access patterns from being observed. Also described is securely preparing for an interrupt-based context switch during AES round computations and securely resuming from a context switch without needing to repeat any already completed round or round of computations.
In a computing environment, a method comprising:
A system comprising, on-SoC secure storage, unsecure memory, and state protection logic coupled to the on-SoC secure storage, the state protection logic configured to maintain AES secret state comprising a key, and during AES encryption rounds to maintain a round block in the on-SoC secure storage, and the state protection logic further configured to prevent the secret state from entering the unsecure memory.
One or more computer-readable media having computer-executable instructions, which when executed perform steps, comprising, protecting secret state from entering unsecure memory, including locking a cache line of an on-SoC cache, and writing the secret state into the cache line only after locking the cache line.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.