# US 2013/0159718 A1 · Updating signature algorithms for strong name binding

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- Number: US 2013/0159718 A1
- Document ID: US20130159718A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 13/330,260
- Filed: 2011-12-19
- Published: 2013-06-20
- Earliest claimed: 2011-12-19
- Assignees: Microsoft Corporation
- Inventors: Shawn Farkas; Mueez Siddiqui; Reid Martin Borsuk; Andrew Dai; Arun Moorthy
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20130159718A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- G06F 21/51: at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
- H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

The present invention extends to methods, systems, and computer program products for updating signature algorithms used for signing an assembly with a strong name without changing the identity of the assembly. The present invention enables an assembly that has already been given an identity (via strong name signing with an identity public/private key pair) to be resigned with a different public/private key pair without changing the original identity that was based on the identity public/private key pair. This is accomplished by including a counter signature within the assembly that links the original identity of the assembly to the new signature key pair.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for using an updated signature key to sign an assembly with a strong name without modifying the identity of the assembly after the assembly has been released for use within a runtime, the method comprising:
receiving an assembly;
signing the assembly with a strong name using an identity public/private key pair by:
assigning an identity to the assembly, the identity comprising an identifier of the assembly and the identity public key;
creating a cryptographic digest of the contents of the assembly;
creating a digital signature of the cryptographic digest using the identity private key;
storing the identity and the digital signature in the assembly;
releasing the assembly with the assigned strong name;
signing the assembly with an updated strong name using a signature public/private key pair without modifying the identity of the assembly by:
creating an updated digital signature of the cryptographic digest of the assembly using the signature private key;
creating a counter signature for the assembly that includes the signature public key and a digital signature of the signature public key using the identity private key; and
storing within the assembly the identity, the updated digital signature of the cryptographic digest, and the counter signature; and
releasing the assembly with the updated strong name.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the identifier of the assembly comprises a name and a version of the assembly.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic digest comprises a hash of the contents of the assembly.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the identity and the digital signature are stored as metadata to each assembly.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising distributing a notification that the identity public key is no longer a valid identity for the assembly.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the notification causes any assembly, having an identity that includes the identity public key, to be prevented from being loaded at runtime.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein creating a digital signature of the cryptographic digest using the identity private key comprises using the identity private key in a first signature algorithm to sign the cryptographic digest; and
wherein creating an updated digital signature of the cryptographic digest of the assembly using the signature private key comprises using the signature private key in a second signature algorithm to sign the cryptographic digest.

### Claim 8

A method for validating the identity of an assembly that has an updated strong name, the method comprising:
receiving an assembly, the assembly having an identity comprising an identifier of the assembly and an identity public key of an identity public/private key pair, the assembly having an updated strong name comprising a digital signature of a cryptographic digest of the contents of the assembly using a signature private key of a signature public/private key pair;
verifying the identity of the assembly by:
extracting the identity public key from the identity of the assembly and a counter signature from the assembly, the counter signature comprising the signature public key and a digital signature of the signature public key using the identity private key;
using the identity public key to verify that the digital signature of the signature public key was generated using the identity private key;
after verifying that the digital signature of the signature public key was generated using the identity private key, decrypting the digital signature of the cryptographic digest of the contents of the assembly using the signature public key;
creating a cryptographic digest of the contents of the assembly;
comparing the created cryptographic digest to the decrypted cryptographic digest; and
validating the identity of the assembly upon determining that the created cryptographic digest is the same as the decrypted cryptographic digest.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the method is performed at run-time and further comprises after validating the identity of the assembly, loading the assembly

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 further comprising receiving a notification that the identity public key is no longer valid; and
in response to the notification, failing to load the assembly.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, further comprising:
in response to the notification, failing to load any assembly having an identity that includes the identity public key unless the assembly includes a valid counter signature.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, wherein loading of the assembly is failed until a version of the assembly with an updated identity is received.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the identifier of the assembly comprises a name and a version of the assembly.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the cryptographic digest comprises a hash of the contents of the assembly.

### Claim 15 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
prior to receiving the assembly, accessing a manifest of another assembly;
determining that the manifest includes an identification of the identity of the assembly; and
retrieving the assembly using the identity.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The method of claim 15, wherein the manifest is created during a build of the other assembly, the build being performed against a copy of the assembly that has the same identity but was signed with a strong name other than the updated strong name.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, the strong name comprises a digital signature of the cryptographic digest of the contents of the assembly using the identity private key.

### Claim 18

A framework, comprising computer executable instructions stored on one or more computer storage devices, which, when executed, use an updated signature key to sign an assembly with a strong name without modifying the identity of the assembly after the assembly has been released for use within a runtime by:
receiving an assembly;
signing the assembly with a strong name using an identity public/private key pair by:
assigning an identity to the assembly, the identity comprising an identifier of the assembly and the identity public key;
creating a cryptographic digest of the contents of the assembly;
creating a digital signature of the cryptographic digest using the identity private key;
storing the identity and the digital signature in the assembly;
releasing the assembly with the assigned strong name;
signing the assembly with an updated strong name using a signature public/private key pair without modifying the identity of the assembly by:
creating an updated digital signature of the cryptographic digest of the assembly using the signature private key;
creating a counter signature for the assembly that includes the signature public key and a digital signature of the signature public key using the identity private key; and
storing within the assembly the identity, the updated digital signature of the cryptographic digest, and the counter signature; and
releasing the assembly with the updated strong name.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The framework of claim 18, further comprising distributing a notification that the identity public key is no longer a valid identity for the assembly.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The framework of claim 19, wherein the notification causes any assembly having an identity that includes the identity public key to be prevented from being loaded at runtime.
