# US 2013/0156189 A1 · Terminating SSL connections without locally-accessible private keys

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- Number: US 2013/0156189 A1
- Document ID: US20130156189A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 13/714,656
- Filed: 2012-12-14
- Published: 2013-06-20
- Earliest claimed: 2011-12-16
- Assignees: Akamai Technologies, Inc.
- Inventors: Charles E. Gero; Jeremy N. Shapiro; Dana J. Burd
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20130156189A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0471: {applying encryption by an intermediary, e.g. receiving clear information at the intermediary and encrypting the received information at the intermediary before forwarding}
- G06F 16/2255: {Hash tables}
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/083: {involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]}
- H04L 9/0838: {Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these (network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061)}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 63/0435: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06)}
- H04L 63/0485: {Networking architectures for enhanced packet encryption processing, e.g. offloading of IPsec packet processing or efficient security association look-up}
- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04L 63/166: {at the transport layer}
- H04L 2209/76: Proxy, i.e. using intermediary entity to perform cryptographic operations
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

An Internet infrastructure delivery platform (e.g., operated by a service provider) provides an RSA proxy “service” as an enhancement to the SSL protocol that off-loads the decryption of the encrypted pre-master secret (ePMS) to an external server. Using this service, instead of decrypting the ePMS “locally,” the SSL server proxies (forwards) the ePMS to an RSA proxy server component and receives, in response, the decrypted pre-master secret. In this manner, the decryption key does not need to be stored in association with the SSL server.

## Claims

### Claim 1

Apparatus, comprising:
a processor;
computer memory holding program code adapted to be executed by the processor, the program code configured as a client component of a proxy server, comprising:
code to establish a secure connection to a remote server component of the proxy server;
code to receive and forward an encrypted pre-master secret associated with a new SSL handshake request from a client to the remote server component of the proxy server via the secure connection, the encrypted pre-master secret adapted to be decrypted using a decryption key that is maintained at the remote server component of the proxy server and not otherwise accessible to the client component; and
code to receive a decrypted pre-master secret from the remote server component of the proxy server via the secure connection, the pre-master secret having been decrypted by the decryption key maintained at the remote server component of the proxy server.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The apparatus as described in claim 1 further including code to use the decrypted pre-master secret to generate a master secret.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The apparatus as described in claim 2 further including code to return the master secret to the client for use to secure communications between the client and the apparatus.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The apparatus as described in claim 1 wherein the pre-master secret is established using asymmetric RSA encryption.

### Claim 5

A method to secure a communication, comprising:
receiving a handshake request that includes an encrypted secret data value, the secret data value having been generated at a client;
proxying the encrypted secret data value over a secure connection to a computational entity at which a decryption key may be applied to the encrypted secret data value to recover the secret data value;
receiving from the computational entity, over the secure connection, the secret data value; and
using the secret data value to generate a key to be used for encrypting a connection back to the client.

### Claim 6

A system, comprising:
at least one machine in a first network-accessible location and that includes an RSA proxy server software program that executes on hardware;
at least one machine in a second network-accessible location and that includes an RSA proxy client software program that executes on hardware;
the RSA proxy server software program and the RSA proxy client software program each including code to establish and maintain a secure connection there-between;
the RSA proxy client software program adapted to receive and forward to the RSA proxy server software program over the secure connection an encrypted pre-master secret associated with a new SSL handshake request from a client;
the RSA proxy server software program adapted to receive the encrypted pre-master secret forwarded from the RSA proxy client software program and to decrypt the encrypted pre-master secret using a decryption key that is maintained at the RSA proxy server software program and not otherwise accessible to the RSA proxy client software program;
the RSA proxy server software program further adapted to return a decrypted pre-master secret to the RSA proxy client software program over the secure connection;
the RSA proxy client software program receiving the decrypted pre-master secret and using it to generate a symmetric key to complete the new SSL handshake.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The system as described in claim 6 wherein the first network-accessible location is a data center associated with an entity, the second network-accessible location being a physical location remote from the first network-accessible location.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The system as described in claim 7 wherein, as between the data center and the physical location, the data center has a higher degree of security.

### Claim 9 (depends on 6)

The system as described in claim 6 wherein the RSA proxy server software program is associated with a data store, the data store storing encrypted pre-master secrets from at least the RSA proxy client software program.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The system as described in claim 9 wherein the RSA proxy server software wherein the data store is a cache of encrypted pre-master secrets.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The system as described in claim 10 wherein the RSA proxy server software receives an encrypted pre-master secret, generates a hash of the received encrypted pre-master secret, and uses the hash as an index into the cache to determine whether the encrypted pre-master secret is present in the cache.

### Claim 12

Apparatus, comprising:
a processor;
computer memory holding program code adapted to be executed by the processor, the program code comprising:
code to establish a secure connection to a client component of a proxy server;
code to receive from the client component of the proxy server an encrypted pre-master secret associated with a new SSL handshake request, the SSL handshake request having been received at the client component of the proxy server from a client, the encrypted pre-master secret being received via the secure connection;
code to decrypt the encrypted pre-master secret using a decryption key that is not otherwise accessible to the client component of the proxy server; and
code to return a decrypted pre-master secret to the client component of the proxy server via the secure connection.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The apparatus as described in claim 12 further including a data store, the data store storing encrypted pre-master secrets from at least the client component of the proxy server.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The apparatus as described in claim 13 wherein the data store is a cache of encrypted pre-master secrets.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The apparatus as described in claim 14 wherein the program code receives an encrypted pre-master secret, generates a hash of the received encrypted pre-master secret, and uses the hash as an index into the cache to determine whether the encrypted pre-master secret is present in the cache.

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

The apparatus as described in claim 12 wherein the pre-master secret is established using asymmetric RSA encryption.

### Claim 17 (depends on 1)

The apparatus as described in claim 1 wherein the secure connection is a mutually-authenticated SSL connection.

### Claim 18 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5 wherein the secure connection is a mutually-authenticated SSL connection.

### Claim 19 (depends on 6)

The system as described in claim 6 wherein the secure connection is a mutually-authenticated SSL connection.

### Claim 20 (depends on 12)

The apparatus as described in claim 12 wherein the secure connection is a mutually-authenticated SSL connection.
