# US 2012/0084863 A1 · Method and system for identifying compromised nodes

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- Number: US 2012/0084863 A1
- Document ID: US20120084863A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 13/375,567
- Filed: 2010-05-28
- Published: 2012-04-05
- Earliest claimed: 2009-06-02
- Assignees: Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.
- Inventors: Oscar Garcia Morchon; Klaus Kursawe
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20120084863A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/083: {involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]}
- H04L 63/0884: {by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity}
- H04W 12/086: using security domains
- H04W 12/12: Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- H04L 2463/144: Detection or countermeasures against botnets
- H04W 12/04: Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W 12/63: Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
- H04W 84/18: Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

The invention relates to a method for identifying compromised nodes in a ZigBee network comprising a general trust center, divided in at least two security domains, each security domain corresponding to a spatial or temporal area, and being associated with a different root keying material, and each node being identified by an identifier, the method comprising: upon detection of a node (U1) entering into a security domain (SD), the general trust center (TC) distributing to the node at least one keying material share corresponding to the entered security domain, and upon detecting corruption of at least two security domains, determining, for each security domain, based on information registered by the base station (BTS), a respective set of nodes having received keying material corresponding to said security domain,—comparing the respective sets of nodes and identifying the common nodes as being compromised.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for identifying compromised nodes in a ZigBee network comprising a general trust center (TC), divided in at least two security domains (SD1, SD2), each security domain being associated with a different root keying material, and each node being identified by an identifier, the method comprising:
entering a security domain (SD) upon detecting a node (U1), the general trust center (TC) distributing to the node at least one keying material share corresponding to the entered security domain, and
upon detecting corruption of at least two security domains,
determining, for each security domain, based on information registered by the base station (BTS), a respective set of nodes having received keying material corresponding to said security domain,
comparing the respective sets of nodes and identifying the common nodes as being compromised.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method as recited in claim 1, wherein the network is a telecommunication network, and wherein:
the node entering into the security domain is detected by a base station of the network based on information of a mobile phone carried by the user,
the general trust center distributing at least one keying material share based on the root keying material corresponding to the security domain.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method as recited in claim 1, further comprising:
determining a time where a security domain is considered corrupted, and
determining the nodes belonging to the security domain at the time of corruption.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method as recited in claim 1, wherein the network is divided into N security domains, N≧2, and wherein B security domains are determined as being broken at different times t1 to tB, the method further comprising:
determining a search window of width W and determining, based on information, only the respective set of nodes for the security domains corrupted between time t1 and time tw.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method as recited in claim 1, further comprising distributing a new set of keying material to all nodes belonging to a security domain at a given time.

### Claim 6 (depends on 4)

The method as recited in claim 4, wherein an identifier of a node comprises a fixed part and a variable part, and when distributing new keying material to the system, modifying the variable part of the identifier.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method as recited in claim 6, wherein the variable part of the identifier further limits the number of possible compromised nodes.

### Claim 8

A system for identifying compromised nodes in a network, divided in at least two security domains S1 and S2, each security domain being associated with a root keying material, and each node being identified by an identifier, the system comprising:
a general trust center for generating, based on a root keying material and an identifier of a node, keying material shares to be transmitted to a node,
a base station
for detecting entry of a node into a security domain,
registering location information of a user, and
transmitting keying material from the general trust center to the nodes,
wherein the general trust center determines for each security domain, based on location information registered by the base station, a respective set of nodes having received keying material corresponding to said security domain, and comparing respective sets of nodes.
