Method for mitigating on-path attacks in mobile ip network

A method performed by a correspondent node (CN) of a mobile internet protocol (MIP) network to prevent an attacker on a path between a home agent (HA) associated with the MN and a correspondent node (CN) to hijack a session between the MN and the CN, the method comprising the steps of:

• transmitting and receiving first messages to and from the HA and the MN as part of participating in a first return routability procedure, including generating a first binding management key (Kbm);
• generating a first proof of knowledge (PoK) by hashing the first Kbm;
• transmitting and receiving second messages to and from the HA and the MN as part of participating in a second return routability procedure, including generating a second Kbm;
• generating a first binding update and binding acknowledgement (BU/BA) key by hashing the second Kbm and the first PoK;
• in response to a first binding update (BU) message from the MN, authenticating the first BU message using the first BU/BA key;
• and
• upon having successfully authenticated the first BU message, transmitting a first binding acknowledgement (BA) message to the MN, wherein the first BA message is authenticated by the MN using the first BU/BA key that is independently derived by the MN, whereby the attacker is prevented from hijacking the session without possessing the first PoK.

A method performed by a mobile node (MN) of a mobile internet protocol (MIP) network to prevent an attacker on a path between a home agent (HA) associated with the MN and a correspondent node (CN) to hijack a session between the MN and the CN, the method comprising the steps of:

• transmitting and receiving messages to and from the HA and CN as part of participating in a current return routability procedure, generating a current binding management key (Kbm);
• generating a current binding update and binding acknowledgement (BU/BA) key by hashing the current Kbm and a previous proof-of-knowledge (PoK), wherein the previous PoK was generated by hashing a previous Kbm generated during a previous return routability procedure with the HA and CN;
• transmitting a binding update (BU) message to the CN, the BU message including the BU/BA key;
• and
• in response to a binding acknowledgement (BA) message received from the CN, authenticating the BA message using the BU/BA key, whereby the attacker is prevented from hijacking the session without possessing the previous PoK.

A data processing system, comprising:

• a processor;
• and
• a memory coupled to the processor for storing instructions, which when executed from the memory, cause the processor to
• transmit and receive first messages to and from a home agent (HA) and a correspondent node (CN) as part of participating in a first return routability procedure, including generating a first binding management key (Kbm),
• generate a first proof of knowledge (PoK) by hashing the first Kbm,
• transmit and receive second messages to and from the HA and the CN as part of participating in a second return routability procedure, including generating a second Kbm,
• generate a first binding update and binding acknowledgement (BU/BA) key by hashing the second Kbm and the first PoK,
• transmit a first binding update (BU) message to the CN with the first BU/BA key, wherein the second BU message is authenticated by the CN using the first BU/BA key that is independently derived by the CN, and
• in response to a first binding acknowledgement (BA) message received from the CN, authenticate the first BA message using the first BU/BA key, whereby the attacker is prevented from hijacking the session without possessing the first PoK.