# US 2010/0303230 A1 · Secure Identity Binding (SIB)

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- Number: US 2010/0303230 A1
- Document ID: US20100303230A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 12/718,912
- Filed: 2010-03-05
- Published: 2010-12-02
- Earliest claimed: 2009-05-29
- Assignees: eBay Inc.
- Inventors: Sebastien Taveau; Hadi Nahari
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20100303230A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/35: communicating wirelessly
- G06Q 20/02: involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
- G06Q 20/32: using wireless devices
- G06Q 20/3552: {Downloading or loading of personalisation data}
- G06Q 20/382: {insuring higher security of transaction}
- G06Q 20/3825: {Use of electronic signatures}
- G06Q 20/3829: {involving key management}
- G06Q 20/405: {Establishing or using transaction specific rules}
- H04L 9/3218: {using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs}
- H04L 9/3234: {involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853)}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 2209/56: Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
- H04L 2209/805: Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- G06Q: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A system includes a tag having a machine readable tag identifier (Tag ID) configured to be read by a reader; and a device to be identified by the tag, in which: the device is configured to communicate with the reader; the device has access to a secure Tag ID; and the device communicates a verification to the reader if the machine readable Tag ID communicated to the device from the reader matches the secure Tag ID. A method includes: reading a Tag ID from a tag attached to a device; communicating the Tag ID read from the tag to the device; comparing a secure Tag ID of the device to the Tag ID read from the tag; and responding with a “match” or “no-match” message from the device, according to which the device is either trusted or not trusted as being identified by the Tag ID. A method of verifying a trusted agent (TA) on a device includes: storing a digital signature of the TA in a secure vault of the device; and verifying the TA by verifying the digital signature of the TA each time the TA is used.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A system comprising:
a tag having a machine readable tag identifier (Tag ID) configured to be read by a reader; and
a device to be identified by the tag, wherein:
the device is configured to communicate with the reader;
the device has access to a secure Tag ID; and
the device communicates a verification to the reader if the machine readable Tag ID communicated to the device from the reader matches the secure Tag ID.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein:
the device further comprises a secure vault, and
the secure Tag ID is the machine readable Tag ID which has been read and stored in the secure vault of the device.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein:
the secure Tag ID is the machine readable Tag ID which has been read and stored in a financial service provider (FSP) infrastructure; and
the FSP communicates identifying information about the device to the reader if the machine readable Tag ID communicated to the device from the reader matches the secure Tag ID.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, further comprising:
a secure vault included in the device;
a trusted agent (TA) included in the device;
a digital signature of the TA, wherein:
the digital signature is stored in the secure vault; and
a hash of a public key is stored in the secure vault, wherein:
the hash is used to verify the public key; and
the public key is used for verifying the digital signature; and
a software component V for verifying the digital signature, wherein the V is stored in the secure vault.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, further comprising:
a trusted agent (TA) included in the device; and
a trusted entity, wherein:
the trusted entity has a public key;
the trusted entity provides a digital signature for the TA, the digital signature verifiable using the public key of the trusted entity.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, further comprising:
a secure vault included in the device, wherein:
the secure Tag ID is protected by the secure vault;
a trusted agent (TA) included in the device;
a digital signature of the TA provided by a trusted entity, wherein:
the digital signature of the TA is stored in the secure vault;
the trusted entity has a public key;
the trusted entity provides a digital signature for the TA, the digital signature verifiable using the public key of the trusted entity;
a hash of the public key, wherein:
the hash of the public key is stored in the secure vault;
the hash is used to verify the public key; and
the public key is used for verifying the digital signature; and
a software component V for verifying the digital signature, wherein:
the V is stored in the secure vault; and
the TA has access to the secure Tag ID if and only if V verifies the digital signature of the TA.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the tag is incorporated in the device.

### Claim 8

A method comprising:
reading a Tag ID from a tag that is attached to a device;
communicating to the device the Tag ID that was read from the tag;
comparing a secure Tag ID belonging to the device to the Tag ID read from the tag; and
responding:
with a “match” message from the device if the comparison finds a match, wherein the device is trusted as being identified by the Tag ID; and
with a “no-match” message from the device if the comparison does not find a match, wherein the device is not trusted as being identified by the Tag ID.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
verifying the integrity of a trusted agent (TA); and
using the TA to store the Tag ID read from the tag in a secure vault of the device.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
storing the Tag ID read from the tag in a financial service provider (FSP) infrastructure; and
communicating identifying information about the device if the Tag ID read from the tag and communicated to the device matches the Tag ID stored in the FSP infrastructure.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
putting a trusted agent (TA) on the device;
storing a digital signature of the TA in a secure vault of the device, wherein the digital signature is verifiable using a public key;
storing a software component V in the secure vault; and
verifying the TA by executing V to verify the digital signature using the public key.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
putting a trusted agent (TA) on the device;
storing a digital signature of the TA in a secure vault of the device, wherein the digital signature is verifiable using a public key;
storing a hash of the public key in the secure vault′
storing a software component V in the secure vault; and
verifying the TA by:
verifying the public key by calculating the hash of the public key and comparing to the hash of the public key stored in the secure vault; and
executing V to and verify the digital signature using the verified public key.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
putting a trusted agent (TA) on the device; and wherein:
the communicating comprises communicating the Tag ID to the TA; and
the TA is verified before comparing the secure Tag ID of the device to the Tag ID read from the tag.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
if the comparison does not find a match, responding by putting the device on a hold state.

### Claim 15 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
associating the tag having the Tag ID to the device so that the tag remains in physical proximity to the device.

### Claim 16

A method of verifying a trusted agent (TA) on a device, the method comprising:
storing a digital signature of the TA in a secure vault of the device; and
verifying the TA by verifying the digital signature of the TA each time the TA is used.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, further comprising:
calculating a first hash function of the TA; and wherein:
the digital signature of the TA comprises a digital signature of the first hash function of the TA.

### Claim 18 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, wherein:
the digital signature of the TA is provided by a trusted entity having a public key;
a second hash function of the public key is calculated and stored in the secure vault of the device; and
verifying the TA comprises verifying the public key by calculating the second hash function of the public key and comparing to the second hash function of the public key stored in the secure vault.

### Claim 19 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, further comprising:
storing a software component V in the secure vault of the device, and wherein:
verifying the TA comprises executing V on the digital signature of a first hash function of the TA using a public key provided from a trusted entity, wherein a second hash function of the public key stored in the secure vault is used to verify the public key.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The method of claim 19, wherein:
V returns an indication whether or not the TA is to be trusted, and
TA is executed if and only if V has indicated that the TA is to be trusted.
