# US 2010/0169650 A1 · Storage minimization technique for direct anonymous attestation keys

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- Number: US 2010/0169650 A1
- Document ID: US20100169650A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 12/347,581
- Filed: 2008-12-31
- Published: 2010-07-01
- Earliest claimed: 2008-12-31
- Inventors: Ernest F. Brickell; Jiangtao Li
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20100169650A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/3066: {involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves}
- H04L 2209/42: Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A storage minimization technique for direct anonymous attestation (DAA) keys is presented. In one embodiment, the method includes deriving a random portion of a (DAA) private key from a device's fuse key, computing a point on an elliptical curve from the derived random portion and a master private key, and storing only one coordinate of the point in fuses within the device. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
deriving a random portion of a direct anonymous attestation (DAA) private key from a device's fuse key;
computing a point on an elliptical curve from the derived random portion and a master private key; and
storing only one coordinate of the point in fuses within the device.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the device comprises a chipset.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the one coordinate of the point comprises 256 bits.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein deriving a random portion of a direct anonymous attestation (DAA) private key from a device's fuse key comprises computing x=Hash(FK, “ECC-DAA”) mod p.

### Claim 5

A method comprising:
deriving a random portion of a direct anonymous attestation (DAA) private key from a device's fuse key;
reconstructing a point on an elliptical curve from a single coordinate stored in fuses in the device;
verifying that a private key composed of the random portion and the point on an elliptical curve is a valid DAA private key; and
storing the DAA private key in a memory.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the device comprises a chipset.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, further comprising signing a message using the DAA private key.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the single coordinate stored in fuses in the device comprises 256 bits.

### Claim 9 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein deriving a random portion of a direct anonymous attestation (DAA) private key from a device's fuse key comprises computing x=Hash(FK, “ECC-DAA”)mod p.

### Claim 10 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the memory comprises flash memory.

### Claim 11 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein verifying that a private key composed of the random portion and the point on an elliptical curve is a valid DAA private key comprises verifying e(A, wg2x)=e(g1, g2).

### Claim 12 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein reconstructing a point on an elliptical curve from a single coordinate stored in fuses in the device comprises solving the equation A.y2=A.x2+a A.x+b(mod q) for A.y.

### Claim 13

An apparatus comprising:
a memory;
a fuse key;
a minimized direct anonymous attestation (DAA) private key stored in fuses, wherein the fuse-stored minimized DAA private key only includes one coordinate of a point on an elliptical curve; and
authentication logic to:
derive a random portion of a direct anonymous attestation (DAA) private key from the fuse key;
reconstruct a point on an elliptical curve from the fuse-stored minimized DAA private key;
verify that a private key composed of the random portion and the point on an elliptical curve is a valid DAA private key; and
store the DAA private key in the memory.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the apparatus comprises a chipset.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising the authentication logic to sign a message using the DAA private key.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the fuse-stored minimized DAA private key comprises 256 bits.

### Claim 17 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the authentication logic to derive a random portion of a direct anonymous attestation (DAA) private key from the fuse key comprises the authentication logic to compute x=Hash(FK, “ECC-DAA”) mod p.

### Claim 18 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the memory comprises flash memory.

### Claim 19 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the authentication logic to verify that a private key composed of the random portion and the point on an elliptical curve is a valid DAA private key comprises the authentication logic to verify e(A, wg2x)=e(g1, g2).

### Claim 20 (depends on 13)

The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the authentication logic to reconstruct a point on an elliptical curve from the fuse-stored minimized DAA private key comprises the authentication logic to solve the equation A.y2=A.x2+a A.x+b (mod q) for A.y.
