# US 2010/0169640 A1 · Method and system for enterprise network single-sign-on by a manageability engine

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- Number: US 2010/0169640 A1
- Document ID: US20100169640A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 12/319,065
- Filed: 2008-12-30
- Published: 2010-07-01
- Earliest claimed: 2008-12-30
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Ned Smith; Purushottam Goel
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20100169640A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/335: {for accessing specific resources, e.g. using Kerberos tickets}
- G06F 21/31: User authentication
- G06F 21/33: using certificates
- G06F 21/41: where a single sign-on provides access to a plurality of computers
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- G06F 21/72: in cryptographic circuits
- G06F 21/80: in storage media based on magnetic or optical technology, e.g. disks with sectors (preventing unauthorised reproduction or copying of disc-type recordable media G11B20/00)
- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- H04L 9/083: {involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]}
- H04L 9/3213: {using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos (network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807)}
- H04L 63/0807: {using tickets, e.g. Kerberos (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213)}
- H04L 63/0815: {providing single-sign-on or federations}
- G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system
- G06F 2221/2103: Challenge-response
- G09G 2358/00: Arrangements for display data security
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G09G: ARRANGEMENTS OR CIRCUITS FOR CONTROL OF INDICATING DEVICES USING STATIC MEANS TO PRESENT VARIABLE INFORMATION (arrangements for transferring data between digital computers and displays G06F3/14; static indicating arrangements comprising an association of a number of separate sources or light control cells G09F9/00; static indicating arrangements comprising integral associations of a number of light sources H01J, H01K, H10H, H05B33/12; scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission, details thereof H04N1/00)

## Abstract

A manageability engine (ME) receives an authentication response from a user during pre-boot authentication and registers the user with a key distribution center (KDC), indicating that the user has successfully authenticated to the PC. The KDC supplies the ME with single-sign-on credentials in the form of a Key Encryption Key (KEK). The KEK may later be used by the PC to obtain a credential used to establish secure access to Enterprise servers.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A secure access method using a manageability engine comprising:
receiving an authentication response from a user during a pre-boot operation;
employing a protocol to register with a key distribution center (KDC); and
receiving single-sign-on credentials in the form of a key encryption key (KEK), wherein the KEK is later used to obtain a credential used to establish secure access to Enterprise servers.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the protocol comprises a Kerberos protocol and the KDC comprises a Kerberos KDC.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein registering with the KDC indicates that the user has successfully authenticated with a personal computer.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the protocol comprises Kerberos, SAML, Card Space, Liberty Alliance, Public Key, or any other identity management infrastructure.

### Claim 5

A manageability engine (ME) secure access method comprising:
receiving user authentication credentials from a pre-boot authentication module (PBAM);
requesting a key encryption key (KEK) from an Enterprise;
receiving the KEK if the user is authenticated by the Enterprise and securely storing the KEK;
enabling a BIOS to proceed with booting of an operating system (OS);
receiving a request for the KEK from a shim used to intercept an OS login process;
retrieving the KEK from secure storage; and
sending the KEK to the OS, wherein the shim, upon receipt of the KEK suppresses the OS login prompt and completes booting of the OS;
wherein when the OS requires access to the Enterprise server, the OS retrieves the KEK from the ME to obtain a ticket specific to the Enterprise server.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein a user authenticates to the PBAM through a BIOS.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the PBAM provides an authentication challenge to a user to authenticate the user, the authentication challenge requiring the user to enter the user authentication credentials.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the user authentication comprises a user identification and a user password.

### Claim 9 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein requesting a key encryption key (KEK) from an Enterprise comprises opening a connection to an Enterprise network and requesting the KEK from an Enterprise Key Distribution Center (KDC).

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the KDC verifies that the user is a known entity with the Enterprise network by querying a directory using the user authentication credentials to verify the authenticity of the user.

### Claim 11 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein when the KEK is securely stored, the KEK is under the control of the manageability engine and has the authority granted to obtain a service specific ticket to Enterprise servers.

### Claim 12 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein when the KEK is securely stored, the user is logged on to the ME using Enterprise single-sign-on credentials.

### Claim 13 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein loading the OS invokes a user authentication module to authenticate the user to the OS.

### Claim 14 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein suppressing the user login prompt enables the user authentication to only request a single-sign-on.

### Claim 15

An article comprising: a storage medium having a plurality of machine accessible instructions, wherein when the instructions are executed by a processor, the instructions provide for receiving an authentication response from a user during a pre-boot operation;
employing a protocol to register with a key distribution center (KDC); and
receiving single-sign-on credentials in the form of a key encryption key (KEK), wherein the KEK is later used to obtain a credential used to establish secure access to Enterprise servers.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The article of claim 15, wherein the protocol comprises a Kerberos protocol and the KDC comprises a Kerberos KDC.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The article of claim 15, wherein registering with the KDC indicates that the user has successfully authenticated with a personal computer.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The article of claim 15, wherein the protocol comprises Kerberos, SAML, Card Space, Liberty Alliance, Public Key, or any other identity management infrastructure.

### Claim 19

An article comprising: a storage medium having a plurality of machine accessible instructions, wherein when the instructions are executed by a processor, the instructions provide for receiving user authentication credentials from a pre-boot authentication module (PBAM);
requesting a key encryption key (KEK) from an Enterprise;
receiving the KEK if the user is authenticated by the Enterprise and securely storing the KEK;
enabling a BIOS to proceed with booting of an operating system (OS);
receiving a request for the KEK from a shim used to intercept an OS login process;
retrieving the KEK from secure storage; and
sending the KEK to the OS, wherein the shim, upon receipt of the KEK suppresses the OS login prompt and completes booting of the OS;
wherein when the OS requires access to the Enterprise server, the OS retrieves the KEK from the ME to obtain a ticket specific to the Enterprise server.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein a user authenticates to the PBAM through a BIOS.

### Claim 21 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein the PBAM provides an authentication challenge to a user to authenticate the user, the authentication challenge requiring the user to enter the user authentication credentials.

### Claim 22 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein the user authentication comprises a user identification and a user password.

### Claim 23 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein instructions for requesting a key encryption key (KEK) from an Enterprise comprises instructions for opening a connection to an Enterprise network and requesting the KEK from an Enterprise Key Distribution Center (KDC).

### Claim 24 (depends on 23)

The article of claim 23, wherein the KDC verifies that the user is a known entity with the Enterprise network by querying a directory using the user authentication credentials to verify the authenticity of the user.

### Claim 25 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein when the KEK is securely stored, the KEK is under the control of the manageability engine and has the authority granted to obtain a service specific ticket to Enterprise servers.

### Claim 26 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein when the KEK is securely stored, the user is logged on to the ME using Enterprise single-sign-on credentials.

### Claim 27 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein loading the OS invokes a user authentication module to authenticate the user to the OS.

### Claim 28 (depends on 19)

The article of claim 19, wherein suppressing the user login prompt enables the user authentication to only request a single-sign-on.
