# US 2010/0166177 A1 · Method for protecting a cryptographic device against spa, dpa and time attacks

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- Number: US 2010/0166177 A1
- Document ID: US20100166177A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 12/649,567
- Filed: 2009-12-30
- Published: 2010-07-01
- Earliest claimed: 2008-12-31
- Assignees: Incard S.A.
- Inventors: Giovanni Di Sirio; Giovanni Fontana
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20100166177A1

## CPC

- G06F 7/00: Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled (logic circuits H03K19/00)
- H04L 9/003: {for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA]}
- G06F 2207/7266: Hardware adaptation, e.g. dual rail logic; calculate add and double simultaneously
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A method is for operating a cryptographic device to reduce effects of power analysis and time attacks. The method may include executing a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a first crypto-processor of the cryptographic device. The first set of cryptographic algorithm computations may provide encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key stored in the cryptographic device. The method may further include executing a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a second crypto-processor of the cryptographic device for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with a second different secret key.

## Claims

### Claim at position 1

1-10. (canceled)

### Claim 11

A method of operating a cryptographic device to reduce effects of power analysis attacks, the method comprising:
executing a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a first crypto-processor of the cryptographic device, the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations providing encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key; and
executing a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations with at least one second crypto-processor of the cryptographic device for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with a second different secret key.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The method according to claim 11 wherein the first secret key is stored in the cryptographic device.

### Claim 13 (depends on 11)

The method according to claim 11 wherein the second different secret key is generated in the cryptographic device.

### Claim 14 (depends on 11)

The method according to claim 11 wherein the execution of the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations and the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations switches between the first crypto-processor and the at least one second crypto-processor.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The method according to claim 14 wherein the switching is random.

### Claim 16 (depends on 11)

The method according to claim 11 wherein the second different secret key is randomly generated.

### Claim 17 (depends on 11)

The method according to claim 11 wherein the at least one second crypto-processor comprises a plurality thereof.

### Claim 18 (depends on 11)

The method according to claim 11 wherein the execution of the first and second sets of cryptographic algorithm computations are simultaneous with each other.

### Claim 19 (depends on 11)

The method according to claim 11 wherein the at least one second crypto-processor independently generates the second different secret key; wherein the cryptographic device randomly selects one of the first crypto-processor and the at least one second crypto-processor for executing the computations with the second different secret key while the non-selected crypto-processor executes the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.

### Claim 20

A method of operating a cryptographic device to reduce effects of power analysis attacks, the method comprising:
executing a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a first crypto-processor of the cryptographic device, the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations providing encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key stored in the cryptographic device;
independently generating a second different secret key in the cryptographic device; and
executing a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations with at least one second crypto-processor of the cryptographic device for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with the second different secret key, the execution of the first and second sets of cryptographic algorithm computations being simultaneous with each other.

### Claim 21 (depends on 20)

The method according to claim 20 wherein the execution of the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations and the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations switches between the first crypto-processor and the at least one second crypto-processor.

### Claim 22 (depends on 21)

The method according to claim 21 wherein the switching is random.

### Claim 23 (depends on 20)

The method according to claim 20 wherein the second different secret key is randomly generated.

### Claim 24 (depends on 20)

The method according to claim 20 wherein the at least one second crypto-processor comprises a plurality thereof.

### Claim 25 (depends on 20)

The method according to claim 20 wherein the cryptographic device randomly selects one of the first crypto-processor and the at least one second crypto-processor for executing the computations with the second different secret key while the non-selected crypto-processor executes the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.

### Claim 26

An integrated circuit (IC) card to be inserted into a cryptographic device, the IC Card comprising:
a first cypto-processor configured to execute a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations for providing encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key; and
at least one second crypto-processor configured to execute a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with a second different secret key.

### Claim 27 (depends on 26)

The IC card according to claim 26 wherein the first secret key is stored in the cryptographic device.

### Claim 28 (depends on 26)

The IC card according to claim 26 further comprising a central processing unit (CPU) configured to switch execution of the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations and the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations between said first crypto-processor and said at least one second crypto-processor.

### Claim 29 (depends on 28)

The IC card according to claim 28 wherein said CPU is configured to randomly switch the execution of the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations and the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.

### Claim 30 (depends on 28)

The IC card according to claim 28 wherein said CPU is configured to randomly generate the second different secret key.

### Claim 31 (depends on 26)

The IC card according to claim 26 wherein said at least one second crypto-processor comprises a plurality thereof, each configured to execute the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.

### Claim 32 (depends on 26)

The IC card according to claim 26 wherein said first cypto-processor and said at least one second cypto-processor execute the first and second sets of cryptographic algorithm computations simultaneous with each other.

### Claim 33 (depends on 26)

The IC card according to claim 26 wherein said at least one second crypto-processor is configured to independently generate the second different secret key; wherein said CPU is configured to randomly select one of said first crypto-processor and said at least one second crypto-processor for executing the computations with the second different secret key while the non-selected crypto-processor executes the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.

### Claim 34

A circuit on an integrated circuit (IC) card to be inserted into a cryptographic device, the circuit comprising:
a first cypto-processor configured to execute a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations for providing encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key; and
at least one second crypto-processor configured to execute a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with a second different secret key.

### Claim 35 (depends on 34)

The circuit according to claim 34 wherein the first secret key is stored in the cryptographic device.

### Claim 36 (depends on 34)

The circuit according to claim 34 further comprising a central processing unit (CPU) configured to switch execution of the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations and the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations between said first crypto-processor and said at least one second crypto-processor.

### Claim 37 (depends on 36)

The circuit according to claim 36 wherein said CPU is configured to randomly switch the execution of the first set of cryptographic algorithm computations and the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.

### Claim 38 (depends on 36)

The circuit according to claim 36 wherein said CPU is configured to randomly generate the second different secret key.

### Claim 39 (depends on 34)

The circuit according to claim 34 wherein said at least one second crypto-processor comprises a plurality thereof, each configured to execute the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.

### Claim 40 (depends on 34)

The circuit according to claim 34 wherein said first cypto-processor and said at least one second cypto-processor execute the first and second sets of cryptographic algorithm computations simultaneous with each other.

### Claim 41 (depends on 34)

The circuit according to claim 34 wherein said at least one second crypto-processor is configured to independently generate the second different secret key; wherein said CPU is configured to randomly select one of said first crypto-processor and said at least one second crypto-processor for executing the computations with the second different secret key while the non-selected crypto-processor executes the second set of cryptographic algorithm computations.
