# US 2008/0313460 A1 · System and method for guaranteeing software integrity via combined hardware and software authentication

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- Number: US 2008/0313460 A1
- Document ID: US20080313460A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 12/134,134
- Filed: 2008-06-05
- Published: 2008-12-18
- Earliest claimed: 2007-06-18
- Assignees: International Business Machines Corporation
- Inventors: Jeffrey B. Lotspiech
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20080313460A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3249: {using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme}
- G06F 21/64: Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
- G06Q 10/087: Inventory or stock management, e.g. order filling, procurement or balancing against orders
- H04L 9/302: {involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes}
- H04L 9/3236: {using cryptographic hash functions}
- H04L 2209/127: Trusted platform modules [TPM]
- H04L 2209/56: Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
- H04L 2209/603: Digital right managament [DRM]
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- G06Q: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR

## Abstract

A system, method, and computer program product enabling individual user devices to authenticate and validate a digital message sent by a distribution center, without requiring transmissions to the distribution center. The center transmits the message with an appended modulus that is the product of two specially selected primes. The transmission also includes an appended authentication value that is based on an original message hash value, a new message hash value, and the modulus. The new message hash value is designed to be the center's public RSA key; a corresponding private RSA key is also computed. Individual user devices combine a digital signet, a public modulus, preferably unique hardware-based numbers, and an original message hash to compute a unique integrity value K. Subsequent messages are similarly processed to determine new integrity values K′, which equal K if and only if new messages originated from the center and have not been corrupted.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A system for guaranteeing message integrity, comprising:
a distribution center that transmits a message and at least one appended value; and
a user device that receives said transmission and computes an integrity value K′ that depends on said transmission and at least one stored value, where K′ selectively enables successful further processing of said message.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said appended values include a modulus pq and an authentication value s.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The system of claim 2 wherein said authentication value s is an encrypted version of an original hash value h0, said modulus pq, and a private RSA key z, where s=h0z mod pq.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The system of claim 3 wherein said modulus pq is a product of two prime numbers p and q, neither of said prime numbers p and q being separately included in said transmission.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The system of claim 4 wherein said prime numbers p and q are selected by said distribution center such that the likelihood of a product (p−1)(q−1) and an odd-valued correct hash value h1 of said transmitted message having a greatest common denominator other than 1 is substantially zero, whereby h1z=1 mod Φ(pq), where Φ(pq)=(p−1)(q−1), and said correct hash value h1 is a public RSA key corresponding to said private RSA key z.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The system of claim 5 wherein said integrity value K′ equals g1xg2a mod M, where x=sh mod pq, h is a hash value of said message computed by said user device in a similar manner as said correct hash value h1, M is a public modulus, a is a stored digital signet, and g1 and g2 are preferably unique stored values.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The system of claim 6 wherein said integrity value K′ is a value required to enable successful further processing of said message if and only if said hash value h matches said correct hash value h1, guaranteeing the integrity of said message.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said message comprises a software program.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said message comprises a software program portion.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said message comprises a software program that controls access to protected information.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said message includes a software program portion, and said integrity value K′ includes another software program portion, and said message and said integrity value K′ together comprise a complete software program.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said message comprises protected information intended for use only by authorized recipients.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The system of claim 12 wherein said protected information comprises at least one of: a text file, an audio file, a video file, an application, a database.

### Claim 14 (depends on 5)

The system of claim 5 wherein said correct hash value h1 is forced to be odd, if initially even, by predetermined means.

### Claim 15 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said stored values are stored in tamper-resistant hardware.

### Claim 16 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1 wherein said stored values include a predetermined integrity value K=g1h0g2a mod M, where a is a digital signet, M is a public modulus, and g1 and g2 are preferably unique values.

### Claim 17

A system for guaranteeing message integrity, comprising:
a user device having at least one stored integrity value related to an additional integrity value h0; and
a distribution center that transmits a message and an encryption of said additional integrity value h0, where said encryption uses a key based on a hash of said message.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The system of claim 17 wherein said stored integrity values are digital signet values, and said additional integrity value h0 is a digital signet user number.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The system of claim 18 wherein said digital signets allow the calculation of values used in a content protection scheme.

### Claim 20 (depends on 17)

The system of claim 17 wherein said encryption of said additional integrity value h0 is an RSA encryption, and the distribution center additionally transmits an RSA modulus pq.

### Claim 21 (depends on 17)

The system of claim 17 wherein said message comprises a software program and associated data.

### Claim 22

A computer program product for guaranteeing message integrity, comprising a computer-readable medium tangibly embodying computer-executable code means thereon, said code means including:
a first code means for transmitting a message and at least one appended value from a distribution center;
a second code means for receiving said transmission with a user device; and
a third code means for computing an integrity value K′ that depends on said transmission and at least one stored value, where K′ selectively enables successful further processing of said message.

### Claim 23

A method for guaranteeing message integrity, comprising:
transmitting a message together with an encrypted integrity value h0, said encrypted integrity value h0 being encrypted with a key based on the hash of said message;
decrypting said encrypted integrity value h0;
using said integrity value h0 together with stored integrity values to perform an integrity calculation; and
using the result of said integrity calculation for further processing.

### Claim 24 (depends on 23)

The method of claim 23 wherein said encryption is an RSA encryption and an RSA modulus is also transmitted.

### Claim 25 (depends on 23)

The method of claim 23 wherein said integrity calculation is a digital signet calculation.

### Claim 26 (depends on 25)

The method of claim 25 wherein results of said digital signet calculation are values used in a content protection scheme.

### Claim 27 (depends on 23)

The method of claim 23 wherein said message comprises a software program and associated data.

### Claim 28

A method for conducting electronic commerce, comprising:
transmitting a message and at least one appended value from a distribution center;
receiving said transmission with a user device; and
computing an integrity value K′ that depends on said transmission and at least one stored value, where K′ selectively enables successful further processing of said message,
wherein said further processing completes an electronic commerce transaction.

### Claim 29

A method for guaranteeing message integrity, comprising:
transmitting a message and at least one appended value from a distribution center;
receiving said transmission with a user device;
computing an integrity value K′ that depends on said transmission and at least one stored value, where K′ selectively enables successful further processing of said message.

### Claim 30 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said appended values include a modulus pq and an authentication value s.

### Claim 31 (depends on 30)

The method of claim 30 wherein said authentication value s is an encrypted version of an original hash value h0, said modulus pq, and a private RSA key z, where s=h0z mod pq.

### Claim 32 (depends on 31)

The method of claim 31 wherein said modulus pq is a product of two prime numbers p and q, neither of said prime numbers p and q being separately included in said transmission.

### Claim 33 (depends on 32)

The method of claim 32 wherein said prime numbers p and q are selected by said distribution center such that the likelihood of a product (p−1)(q−1) and an odd-valued correct hash value h1 of said transmitted message having a greatest common denominator other than 1 is substantially zero, whereby h1z=1 mod Φ(pq), where Φ(pq)=(p−1)(q−1), and said correct hash value h1 is a public RSA key corresponding to said private RSA key z.

### Claim 34 (depends on 33)

The method of claim 33 wherein said integrity value K′ equals g1xg2a mod M, where x=sh mod pq, h is a hash value of said message computed by said user device in a similar manner as said correct hash value h1, M is a public modulus, a is a stored digital signet, and g1 and g2 are preferably unique stored values.

### Claim 35 (depends on 34)

The method of claim 34 wherein said integrity value K′ is a value required to enable successful further processing of said message if and only if said hash value h matches said correct hash value h1, guaranteeing the integrity of said message.

### Claim 36 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said message comprises a software program.

### Claim 37 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said message comprises a software program portion.

### Claim 38 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said message comprises a software program that controls access to protected information.

### Claim 39 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said message includes a software program portion, and said integrity value K′ includes another software program portion, and said message and said integrity value K′ together comprise a complete software program.

### Claim 40 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said message comprises protected information intended for use only by authorized recipients.

### Claim 41 (depends on 40)

The method of claim 40 wherein said protected information comprises at least one of: a text file, an audio file, a video file, an application, a database.

### Claim 42 (depends on 33)

The method of claim 33 wherein said correct hash value h1 is forced to be odd, if initially even, by predetermined means.

### Claim 43 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said stored values are stored in tamper-resistant hardware.

### Claim 44 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29 wherein said stored values include a predetermined integrity value K=g1h0g2a mod M, where a is a digital signet, M is a public modulus, and g1 and g2 are preferably unique values.
