# US 2008/0270786 A1 · Apparatus and method for direct anonymous attestation from bilinear maps

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- Number: US 2008/0270786 A1
- Document ID: US20080270786A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 11/778,804
- Filed: 2007-07-17
- Published: 2008-10-30
- Earliest claimed: 2007-04-30
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Ernest F. Brickell; Jiangtao Li
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20080270786A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3073: {involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing}
- H04L 9/3255: {using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures}
- H04L 2209/42: Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A method and apparatus for direct anonymous attestation from bilinear maps. In one embodiment, the method includes the creation of a public/private key pair for a trusted membership group defined by an issuer; and assigning a unique secret signature key to at least one member device of the trusted membership group defined by the issuer. In one embodiment, using the assigned signature key, a member may assign a message received as an authentication request to prove membership within a trusted membership group. In one embodiment, a group digital signature of the member is verified using a public key of the trusted membership group. Accordingly, a verifier of the digital signature is able to authenticate that the member is an actual member of the trusted membership group without requiring of the disclosure of a unique identification information of the member or a private member key to maintain anonymity of trusted member devices. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computation comprising:
requesting verification that an anonymous hardware device is a trusted member device of a trusted membership group;
authenticating a received verification from the anonymous hardware device according to published cryptographic information from the trusted membership group; and
verifying that the anonymous hardware device remains a trusted member device of the trusted platform group according to a private member key component of a private signature key of the hardware device and a rogue list of compromised member keys without determining the private member key or any unique device identification information of the hardware device to enable a trusted member device to remain anonymous to the verifier.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 1, wherein requesting verification further comprises:
issuing a message to the anonymous hardware device to request the verification that the anonymous hardware device is a trusted member device of the trusted membership group; and
receiving a group digital signature from the anonymous hardware device, the group digital signature generated by the anonymous hardware device using the private signature key of the anonymous hardware device to sign the issued message, the private signature key including the private member key and a group membership certificate of the anonymous hardware device.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 1, wherein authenticating the received verification further comprises:
identifying a group public key of the trusted membership group; and
authenticating a received group digital signature according to the group public key of the trusted membership group, the group digital signature generated by the anonymous hardware device using the private signature key of the anonymous hardware device to sign a message issued to the anonymous hardware, the private signature key including the private member key and a group membership certificate of the anonymous hardware device.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 1, further comprising:
denying authentication of the anonymous hardware device if the private member key component of the private signature key of the hardware device matches a revoked private member key from the rogue list of compromised member keys.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 4, wherein denying authentication further comprises:
determining whether the group digital signature of the hardware device was generated with a private signature key having a revoked member key component; and
if the group digital signature was created with a revoked member key, identifying the hardware device as an untrusted hardware device.

### Claim 6 (depends on 4)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 4, wherein denying authentication further comprises:
(a) selecting a revoked member key from the rogue list;
(b) verifying that a pseudonym, cryptographic parameter, K, of the group digital signature of the hardware device was not created with the selected revoked member key if K≠Bfi, where fi is the selected, revoked member key, B is a cryptographic parameter of the of the group digital signature of the hardware device, i is an integer from 1 to n, n is an integer greater than 1 and K is of the form K=Bf, where f is the private member key of the hardware device;
(c) repeating (a)-(b) for each revoked member key, fi, listed in the rogue list; and
(d) if the group digital signature was created with a revoked member key from the rogue list, identifying the hardware device as an untrusted hardware device.

### Claim 7

A method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations comprising:
creating a group public/private key pair for a trusted membership group defined by an issuer;
verifying that an anonymous hardware device possesses has generated a secret member key component of a secret signature key without disclosure of the secret member key of the hardware device to the issuer;
assigning a unique group membership certificate to the hardware device to render the hardware device a trusted member device of the trusted membership group, the private signature key including the private member key and the group membership certificate of the anonymous hardware device; and
publishing the group public key to enable a verifier to verify that the anonymous hardware device is a trusted member device of the trusted membership group, the group public key to verify a group digital signature generated with the secret signature key to enable a trusted member device to remain anonymous to the verifier.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 7, wherein the issuer is a certifying manufacturer of the trusted hardware device.

### Claim 9 (depends on 7)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 7, wherein verifying further comprises:
receiving a pseudonym, F, of the form F=gf, where f is the private member key and g is a cryptographic parameter of the group public key;
receiving a proof from the hardware device to verify that the private member key is stored within the hardware device, the proof comprising a proof of knowledge of the form logg F.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 9, further comprising:
selecting, by the issuer, a random value, r;
computing, by the issuer, a=gr, b=ay, and c=ax Frxy, where (x, y) is the private key of the issuer, and (a, b, c) is the group membership certificate.

### Claim 11 (depends on 7)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 7, wherein assigning a group membership certificate comprises:
sending, by the issuer, (a, b, c) to a host of the trusted member device as the group membership certificate, where a=gr, b=ay, and c=ax Frxy, (x, y) is the private key of the issuer, F is a pseudonym of the form F=gf, f is the private member key and g is a cryptographic parameter of the group public key; and
forwarding, by the host the group membership certificate (a, b, c) to the trusted member device, wherein (f, a, b, c) is the secret signature key of the trusted member device.

### Claim 12

A method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations comprising:
signing, by an anonymous hardware device, a message received from a verifier, the message signed using a private signature key of the anonymous hardware device;
transmitting a digitally signed message, including a group digital signature of the anonymous hardware device to a verifier, the verifier to authenticate the group digital signature to verify that the anonymous hardware device is a trusted member device of a trusted membership group using a group public key of the trusted platform group; and
receiving a denial of revocation if a private member key component of the private signature key of the anonymous hardware device does not match any revoked member keys from a rogue list of compromised member keys without disclosing the private member key or any unique device identification information of the anonymous hardware device to enable a trusted member device to remain anonymous to the verifier.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 12, wherein prior to signing, the method comprises:
receiving a denial of verification if the private member key of the anonymous hardware device matches a revoked member key from the rogue list of compromised member keys.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 12, wherein prior to signing, the method further comprises:
deriving a random, secret value, f, according to an attestation seed;
computing a value, F, of the form F=gf, where g is a cryptographic parameter of a group public key of a trusted membership group;
sending the value, F, to an issuer of the trusted platform group as a request to join the trusted platform group;
sending a proof to the issuer to verify that a private member key is stored within the hardware device, the proof comprising a proof of knowledge of the form logg F; and
receiving a group membership certificate (a, b, c) if the issuer verifies the correctness of the proof of knowledge, where the random, secret value, f, is the private member key component of the private signature key (f, a, b, c) of the trusted member device and is verified according to the group public key to enable the trusted member device to remain anonymous to any verifiers.

### Claim 15 (depends on 12)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 12, wherein signing further comprises:
selecting, by a trusted platform module (TPM) of the anonymous hardware device, a base value, B;
computing, by the TPM, a pseudonym, K, of the form K=Bf, where f is the private member key of the anonymous hardware device;
sending, by the TPM, two random numbers r and r′ to a host of the anonymous hardware device;
computing, by the host, a′=ar′, b′=br′, and c′=cr′r, where a, b and c are cryptographic parameters of a group membership certificate of the trusted membership group; and
computing, by the host, vx=e(X, a′), vxy=e(X, b′), and vs=e(g, c′), where X and Y are cryptographic parameters of a group public key of the trusted membership group, q is a prime number, G and GT are groups of order q, e: G×G→GT is an efficiently computable bilinear map function, g is the generator of group G and gT is the generator of group GT.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The method for anonymous attestation using elliptic curve computations of claim 15, further comprising:
receiving, from the host, (a′, b′, c′, vx, vxy, vs);
computing, by the TPM, a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of (ri, f) such that vsri=vx vxyf and K=Bf without revealing ri and f, where ri is an inverse of r modulo q; and
sending (a′, b′, c′, B, K, Σ) to the verifier as the digital signature of the anonymous hardware device, where Σ denotes the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.

### Claim 17

An apparatus, comprising:
a flash memory to store a private signature key assigned to the apparatus by an issuer; and
a trusted platform module to sign a message received from a verifier, the message signed using the private signature key and to transmit a digitally signed message including a group digital signature of the apparatus to the verifier, the verifier to authenticate the group digital signature to verify that the anonymous hardware device is a trusted member device of a trusted membership group and to perform a denial of revocation according to a private member key component of the private signature key of the anonymous hardware device and a rogue list of compromised member keys without disclosing the private member key or any unique device identification information of the anonymous hardware device to enable a trusted member device to remain anonymous to the verifier using elliptic curve computations.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The apparatus of claim 17, wherein the apparatus comprises an identification card having an integrated circuit including the TPM.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The apparatus of claim 18, wherein the identification card is a state driver's license and the issuer is the state department of motor vehicles.

### Claim 20

A system, comprising:
a verifier platform coupled to a network; and
an anonymous prover platform coupled to the network comprising:
a bus,
a processor coupled to the bus,
a chipset coupled to the bus, including a trusted platform module, the trusted platform module to sign a message received from the verifier platform, the message signed using a private signature key of the prover platform and to transmit a digitally signed message including a group digital signature of the prover platform to the verifier platform, the verifier to authenticate the group digital signature to verify that the anonymous prover platform is a trusted member device of a trusted membership group,
wherein the verifier platform to verify that the anonymous prover platform remains a trusted member device of the trusted membership group according to a private member key component of the private signature key of the prover platform and a rogue list of compromised member keys without determining the private member key or any unique device identification information of the prover platform to enable a trusted member device to remain anonymous to the verifier using elliptic curve computations.

### Claim 21 (depends on 20)

The system of claim 20, wherein the verifier platform comprises:
authentication logic to determine whether the group digital signature of the prover platform was generated with a revoked member key and to identify the hardware device as an untrusted hardware device if the group digital signature was created with the revoked member key.

### Claim 22 (depends on 20)

The system of claim 20, wherein the prover platform receives a denial of revocation from the verifier if the private member key of the anonymous hardware device does not match any revoked private member keys from a rogue list of compromised member keys without disclosing the private member key or any unique device identification information of the anonymous prover platform to enable a trusted member device to remain anonymous to the verifier.

### Claim 23 (depends on 20)

The system of claim 20, wherein the prover platform comprises:
key logic to generate a secret member key, f, according to a predetermined seed value;
join logic to compute cryptographic parameters for receiving a group membership certificate (a, b, c) of the prover platform, the private signature key (f, a, b, c) of the prover platform including the secret member key f and cryptographic parameter (a, b, c) of the group membership certificate of the prover platform.

### Claim 24 (depends on 20)

The system of claim 20, wherein the chipset comprises a graphics controller.

### Claim 25 (depends on 20)

The system of claim 20, wherein the network comprises a wide area network work.
