# US 2008/0187137 A1 · Method and Apparatus for Ensuring Privacy in Communications Between Parties

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- Number: US 2008/0187137 A1
- Document ID: US20080187137A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 11/883,879
- Filed: 2006-02-10
- Published: 2008-08-07
- Earliest claimed: 2005-02-11
- Assignees: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ)
- Inventors: Pekka Nikander; Jari Arrko; Mats Naslund
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20080187137A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0414: {during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication}
- H04L 9/0844: {with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys}
- H04L 63/164: {at the network layer}
- H04W 12/02: Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L 63/0272: {Virtual private networks}
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- H04W 12/04: Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

A method of improving privacy by hiding, in an ordered sequence of messages M[x(1), D(1)], M[x(2), D(2)], etc, communicated between a first and at least one second party sharing a key k, metadata x(i) descriptive of message processing, wherein D(i) denotes payload data. The method comprises the first and the second party agreeing on a pseudo random mapping depending on a shared key k, Fk, mapping at least x(i) to y(i), and the first party modifying the messages by replacing x(i) by y(i) in each message M(x(i), D(i)). The first party then transmits the modified messages maintaining their original order, and on reception of a message M(y(m), D), the second party uses a mapping Gk to retrieve position m of received value and the original value x(m).

## Claims

### Claim at position 1

1-24. (canceled)

### Claim 25

A method of improving the privacy of parties in a communications network by hiding, in an ordered sequence of messages M[x(1), D(1)], M[x(2), D(2)], etc, communicated between a first and at least one second party sharing a key k, metadata x(i) descriptive of message processing, wherein D(i) denotes payload data, the method comprising:
said first and said second party agreeing on a pseudo random mapping depending on a shared key k, a function Fk, mapping at least x(i) to y(i);
said first party modifying the messages by replacing x(i) by y(i) in each message M(x(i), D(i)),
said first party transmitting the modified messages maintaining their original order,
on reception of a message M(y(m), D(m)), the second party using a mapping Gk to retrieve position m of received value and the original value x(m).

### Claim 26 (depends on 25)

A method according to claim 25 comprising said second party utilizing a window [NI, NI+t] of values that it accepts, the window size t being predefined, and wherein said mapping Gk is computed by applying said mapping Fk to at least one Nm-value in said window and comparing the result to said y(m).

### Claim 27 (depends on 25)

The method according to claim 25, wherein Gk is the inverse of Fk and said step of retrieving the original value x(i) is performed by computing Gk(y(i)).

### Claim 28 (depends on 25)

The method according to claim 25, wherein there is a known relation r between position in sequence and original value x such that i−>x(r(i)).

### Claim 29 (depends on 28)

The method according to claim 28, wherein r(i)=i.

### Claim 30 (depends on 25)

A method according to claim 25, wherein each party uses a counter or agreed arithmetic function r to generate input values for a function capable of generating said pseudo-random sequence of values, each counter value or function result r(i) producing a corresponding value in the pseudo-random sequence according to Fk:{r(i),x(i)}−>y(i).

### Claim 31 (depends on 30)

A method according to claim 30 wherein x(i) is constant throughout the sequence of messages.

### Claim 32 (depends on 25)

A method according to claim 25, wherein said metadata x(i) is a monotonically increasing sequence.

### Claim 33 (depends on 25)

A method according to claim 25, wherein said metadata x(i) describes security processing of messages M(i).

### Claim 34

A method of ensuring privacy in communications between a first party and one or more second parties over a communications network, the method comprising:
making the same pseudo-random sequence of values available to each of the first and second parties, and maintaining a mapping between the sequence or the values and a value which is used by a party receiving a message sent by the first party to handle the message or its contents;
in messages to be sent between said first party and a second party, using a value from said sequence in place of the value to which the sequence is mapped; and
at the or each receiving party, identifying the replaced value on the basis of the substituted value, and handling the message accordingly,
wherein the value used from said sequence is changed from message to message or periodically.

### Claim 35 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein the second party authenticates the first party by verifying that a sequence value contained in a communication is within a window of successive pseudo-random values.

### Claim 36 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein the step of making the same pseudo-random sequence of values available to each of the first and second parties comprises, at each of the parties, using a shared secret as an input to a function capable of generating a pseudo-random sequence of values.

### Claim 37 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein said sequence of values is a sequence of consecutive values in a hash chain.

### Claim 38 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein the replaced value is not a permanent identity of a party, but is dynamically and/or temporarily allocated to a party.

### Claim 39 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein the replaced value is a value which changes between messages in a manner that can be predicted by third parties.

### Claim 40 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein the replaced value is an IKE or IPSec Security Parameter Index.

### Claim 41 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein the replaced value is one of a:
MAC (Media Access Control) address
IP address
Interface identifier part of the IPv6 address
Port number
Cryptographic key
Hash chain; and
Sequence numbers

### Claim 42 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34 and comprising generating a sequence of pseudo-random values at a third party, and providing this sequence to one or both/all of the first and second parties.

### Claim 43 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein each party uses a counter or agreed arithmetic function to generate input values for a function capable of generating said pseudo-random sequence of values, each counter value or function result producing a corresponding value in the pseudo-random sequence.

### Claim 44 (depends on 43)

A method according to claim 43 and comprising defining a window of acceptable first party values at each second party, this window corresponding to a range of counter values.

### Claim 45 (depends on 34)

A method according to claim 34, wherein the replaced value is a value used to demultiplex the packets at the receiving end.

### Claim 46

A method of operating a mobile terminal or network node, the method comprising:
making a pseudo-random sequence of values available to the terminal or node, and maintaining a mapping between the sequence or the values and a value which is used by a party receiving a message sent by the terminal or node to handle the message or its contents; and
in each of an ordered sequence of messages to be sent between the terminal or node and a second party, using a corresponding value from said pseudo-random sequence in place of the value to which the sequence is mapped.

### Claim 47

A method of operating a mobile terminal or network node, the method comprising:
making a pseudo-random sequence of values available to the terminal or node, and maintaining a mapping between the sequence or the values and a value which is used by a party receiving a message sent by the terminal or node to handle the message or its contents; and
for each of an ordered sequence of messages received at the terminal or node from a second party, mapping a sequence value contained in the message to said mapped value and using the mapped value to handle the message or its contents.

### Claim 48

A method of generating a sequence of public keys for use in securing communications between parties, the method comprising:
providing a first public key to first and second parties;
agreeing a shared secret between the first and second parties;
providing the first and second parties with means for generating a sequence of further public keys using said first public key and said shared secret, such that the values of said sequence are pseudo-random in nature; and
using public keys of said sequence to secure communications between the parties.
