# US 2006/0242411 A1 · Deliver-upon-request secure electronic message system

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- Number: US 2006/0242411 A1
- Document ID: US20060242411A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 11/231,855
- Filed: 2005-09-22
- Published: 2006-10-26
- Earliest claimed: 2005-04-22
- Inventors: Gerard Lin
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20060242411A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L 51/00: User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A method of delivering electronic mail messages upon requests and managing public-secret key pairs of public key cryptography in an electronic message system. A sending party sends an intend-to-deliver associated with an electronic mail message to an intended receiving party. The intended receiving party responds with a request-for-mail-content to request for the electronic mail message if the intended receiving party determines to do so. The sending party will not deliver the electronic mail message to the intended receiving party if the intended receiving party does not send the request-for-mail-content. A host computer is assigned with a unique name that is registered with authoritative organizations and can be used for establishing a connection to the host computer. The host computer provides the public keys of its account holders to the public. The initial public key of an account holder is certified by the host computer using an account password. The account holder may regenerate a public-secret key pair as often as needed. The new public key is certified by the host computer using the old public key of the account holder and becomes effective for providing to the public.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of delivering an electronic mail message from a sending party to a receiving party, comprising:
sending an intend-to-deliver containing some basic information of the electronic mail message by the sending party to the receiving party;
responding to the intend-to-deliver with a request-for-mail-content containing instructions of delivery by the receiving party to the sending party if the receiving party determines to do so; and
responding to the request-for-mail-content with the electronic mail message by the sending party to the receiving party.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, whereby the receiving party can avoid receiving the electronic mail message by not sending the request-for-mail-content.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, whereby the sending party can be identified as the source of the electronic mail message.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 further comprising:
providing a public key of public key cryptography by the receiving party to the sending party upon receipt of the intend-to-deliver;
providing authentication information, which is a series of data codes encrypted with a secret key associated with the public key, by the receiving party to the sending party when sending the request-for-mail-content;
decrypting the authentication information with a public key, which is a member selected from the group consisting of the public key provided by the receiving party and a source that the sending party considers to be trustworthy, by the sending party upon receipt of the authentication information; and
responding to the request-for-mail-content with the electronic mail message by the sending party if and only if the decryption of the authentication information succeeds.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method of claim 4, whereby the sending party won't respond with the electronic mail message to a party unless the party provides authentication information that the sending party can decrypt successfully.

### Claim 6

A method of managing public-secret key pairs of public key cryptography, comprising:
assigning a unique name to a host computer that administrates an account of a user, wherein the unique name is registered with authoritative organizations and can be used to establish a connection to the host computer over communication networks;
certifying a public key of the user by the host computer using an account password of the user; and
providing the public key of the user to the public by the host computer.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, whereby the host computer, which administrates the account of the user, is the most authoritative party to provide the public key to the public.

### Claim 8 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, whereby the public key is certified by the host computer that is the most authoritative party to provide the public key to the public.

### Claim 9 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, whereby the host computer, which is liable for providing the public key to the public, can be tracked down if necessary.

### Claim 10 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, whereby maintaining a huge count of people's public keys, a task impractical or impossible for a few centralized host computers to perform, is distributed to a plurality of host computers.

### Claim 11 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, whereby the host computer only needs to maintain public keys of its user accounts among all people's public keys.

### Claim 12 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, whereby people do not need to maintain other people's public keys.

### Claim 13 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, whereby people's public keys can be obtained from reachable host computers all the time.

### Claim 14 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, further comprising:
encrypting the public key of the user with a secret key of the host computer by the host computer;
obtaining the public key of the host computer by connecting to the host computer or from an authoritative organization that the host computer is registered with by a requester querying for the public key of the user; and
decrypting the encrypted public key of the user with the public key of the host computer by the requester.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, whereby the requester can ensure that the public key of the user is legitimate by authenticating the identity of the host computer.

### Claim 16 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, further comprising:
recording a key generating time whenever a public-secret key pair, which consists of a public key and a secret key of public key cryptography, is generated initially or regenerated later by the user;
reporting a public key set, which consists of a public key of the user and an associated key generating time, by the user to the host computer whenever a public-secret key pair of the user is generated;
certifying the new public key of the user by the host computer whenever a new public key set is reported;
providing a most updated public key set of the user by the host computer to the public; and
informing the user by the host computer about an event of providing a public key set of the user to a requesting party.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, where the reporting comprises:
encrypting the public key set, which contains the public key and the associated key generating time, with a last secret key of the user; and
providing the encrypted public key set to the host computer.

### Claim 18 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, where the certifying comprises:
decrypting an encrypted public key set, this is reported by the user, with a last public key of the user.

### Claim 19 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, where the informing comprises:
providing a key generating time, which is associated with the public key set provided to the requesting party, to the user by the host computer.

### Claim 20 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, whereby the user may regenerate a new public-secret key pair whenever needed and recall an old public-secret key pair so that the old public-secret key pair will become obsolete before a convict can possibly disintegrate it.

### Claim 21 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, whereby the user can identify an appropriate secret key for a pending process that was started before a public-secret key pair is regenerated.

### Claim 22 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, further comprising:
providing the unique name of the host computer to the user by the host computer;
providing the unique name and an account identification to a third-party host computer by the user;
connecting to the host computer by the third-party host computer; and
obtaining the public key of the user, this is associated with the account identification, from the host computer by the third-party host computer.

### Claim 23 (depends on 22)

The method of claim 22, whereby a third-party host computer can obtain a person's public key from a host computer that administrates an account of the person.

### Claim 24 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, further comprising:
requiring the user to encrypt information with the secret key of the user before sending the information to the host computer; and
decrypting the encrypted information with the public key of the user by the host computer.

### Claim 25 (depends on 24)

The method of claim 24, whereby the host computer can authenticate the identity of the user and ensure that the information has not been tampered.

### Claim 26 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, further comprising:
requiring the user to encrypt information with a most updated secret key of the user before sending the information to the host computer; and
decrypting the encrypted information with a public key associated with the most updated secret key of the user by the host computer.

### Claim 27 (depends on 26)

The method of claim 26, whereby the host computer can authenticate the identity of the user and ensure that the information has not been tampered while the public-secret key pair of the user is regenerated as often as needed.

### Claim 28 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, further comprising:
encrypting information with a public key of the user by the host computer;
providing the encrypted information to the user by the host computer; and
requiring the user to decrypt the encrypted information with the secret key of the user prior to performing a further action that only the user is authorized to perform.

### Claim 29 (depends on 28)

The method of claim 28, whereby the further action can be performed by the user only.

### Claim 30 (depends on 28)

The method of claim 28, whereby the user can be tracked down if the further action is performed by an unauthorized party.
