# US 2006/0085630 A1 · Enabling attestation during return from S4 state with standard TCG hardware

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- Number: US 2006/0085630 A1
- Document ID: US20060085630A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 10/967,760
- Filed: 2004-10-16
- Published: 2006-04-20
- Earliest claimed: 2004-10-16
- Assignees: International Business Machines Corporation
- Inventors: David Challener; Daryl Cromer; Joseph Freeman; Steven Goodman; James Hoff; Howard Locker; Randall Springfield; James Ward
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20060085630A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A method and system for enabling security attestation for a computing device during a return from an S4 sleep state. When the computing device enters into the S4 state following a successful boot up, the attestation log is appended to the TPM tick count and the log is signed (with a security signature). When the device is awaken from S4 state, the BIOS obtains and verifies the log created during the previous boot. The CRTM maintains a set of virtual PCRs and references these virtual PCRs against the log. If the values do not match, the return from S4 state fails and the device is rebooted.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A TCG compliant computer system comprising:
a trusted platform module (TPM) with a plurality of platform configuration registers (PCRs);
Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) logic that, during a pre-boot phase following an initial powered on of the computer system, generates a normal boot log of system parameters;
attestation logic associated with the CRTM logic that appends a current TPM tick count to said normal boot log, and signs said normal boot log with a verification signature; and
a hard disk that is utilized for storing boot control parameters utilized when the computer system is awaken from an S4 hibernation state;
S4 logic for placing said computer system in an S4 hibernation state, wherein the boot control parameters are stored on said hard disk as a S4 boot log to be utilized during a later wake up from S4 state;
verification logic that authenticates that an S4 boot log returned from the hard disk during a wake up from the S4 hibernation state is trustworthy; and
a basic input/output system (BIOS) that controls a boot process for the computer system and, when the S4 boot log is authenticated, confirms that the values stored within the S4 boot log is the same as the values of the normal boot log;
wherein, the computer system is allowed to become operational from the S4 state only when the boot log is authenticated as trustworthy and the BIOS confirms the values of the S4 boot log are the same as values of the normal boot log.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computer system of claim 1, wherein when the S4 boot log cannot be authenticated or the BIOS indicates that at least one value does not match, an S4 boot failure is registered and a full system boot is initiated.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computer system of claim 1, wherein the verification logic is a component of the CMRT logic and the verification logic completes authentication of the S4 boot log by:
verifying that a verification signature of the S4 boot log is the same as the verification signature appended to the normal boot log; and
checking that the TPM tick count of the S4 boot log is the same as the TPM tick count from the normal boot log.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The computer system of claim 3, wherein failure of either the verifying process or the checking process results in the S4 boot log being declared untrustworthy and a complete reboot initiated before handover to the BIOS occurs.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The computer system of claim 3, further comprising:
logic for retrieving the normal boot log from within the PCRs of the TPM at initiation of the wake up from S4 state.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The computer system of claim 1, further comprising:
stopping the S4 wake up process when the verification logic deems the S4 boot log untrustworthy or the BIOS finds at least one discrepancy when comparing the values; and
contemporaneously initiating a normal boot up of the computer system, wherein old PCR values are discarded and a new normal boot log is generated and signed.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The computer system of claim 1, wherein the S4 logic includes logic for:
copying the S4 boot log from the stored boot parameters onto a pre-selected hard disk;
maintaining the reset state of the PCRs during power down of the system's hardware components; and
powering down the hardware components of the computer system;
enabling the computer system to awaken without undergoing a normal boot operation, wherein the S4 boot log is provided.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The computer system of claim 1, wherein said verification logic is activated responsive to a trigger to wake up the computer system from S4 state.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The computer system of claim 8, wherein the CRTM generates virtual PCRs having the values of the PCRs within the TPM and said verification logic compares the signature, TPM tick count and values within the S4 boot log with values of the virtual PCRs generated by the CRTM to determine if the S4 boot log is trustworthy and enable a wake up from S4 state to full operating state to be completed.

### Claim 10

A device configured as a TCG compliant system, comprising:
CRMT logic for creating a normal boot log during pre-boot of the device following power-on;
trust compliance logic associated with the CRMT logic that provides a verification signature for the normal boot log and appends a current TPM tick count to the normal boot log;
a trusted platform module (TPM) with PCRs therein for storing the normal boot log along with its signature and TPM tick count appended thereto;
S4 logic for placing said device in hibernation state, wherein S4 boot parameters of the device, similar to the normal boot log, are stored on a hard disk and the hardware components of the device are shut down;
attestation and verification logic that authenticates an S4 boot log returned during a wake up from S4 state by attesting that the S4 boot log parameters are the same as the parameters of the normal boot log stored within the PCRs of the TPM.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The device of claim 10, wherein the attestation and verification logic includes logic for:
comparing a verification signature of the S4 boot log with a verification signature of the normal boot log;
comparing the TPM tick count appended to the S4 boot log with the TPM tick count of the normal boot log; and
passing a boot process to a BIOS when both the verification signature and TPM tick count are authenticated; and
halting a wake up from S4 and initiating a re-boot when either said verification signature or said TPM tick count are not correct.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The device of claim 10, further comprising:
a BIOS having logic that, when the S4 boot log parameters have been authenticated as trustworthy, takes over control of the boot process, and performs a BIOS-level attestation process including:
comparing actual values of the S4 boot log against values of the normal boot log provided within virtual PCRs created by the CRTM;
when the values match, continuing an S4 boot process with the S4 boot log; and
when at least one of the values does not match, halting the S4 boot process and initiating a complete re-boot of the device;
wherein, attestation of the computer system for reboot from the S4 state is only provided when the values match.

### Claim 13

A method comprising:
in a computer system with a TPM, CRTM, BIOS, and S4 functionality, providing a verification signature to a normal boot log during a pre-boot process after power-on of the computer system;
appending a current TPM tick count to the normal boot log;
when the computer system is placed in an S4 state, storing a copy of the normal boot log parameters as an S4 boot log within a hard disk of the computer system;
when a return from S4 state is triggered, attesting that the S4 boot log is the correct S4 boot log for that computer system with that TPM before enabling an S4 boot of the computer system; and
when the S4 boot log cannot be attested as the correct S4 boot log, failing the S4 boot of the computer system.

### Claim 14 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
appending a TPM tick count to the normal boot log during said pre-boot process; and
saving the normal boot log wit the verification signature and TPM tick count within the TPM.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, wherein said attesting comprises:
comparing a verification signature of the S4 boot log with a verification signature of the normal boot log; and
comparing the TPM tick count appended to the S4 boot log with the TPM tick count of the normal boot log.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The method of claim 15, further comprising:
passing a boot process to a BIOS when both the verification signature and TPM tick count are authenticated; and
halting a wake up from S4 and initiating a re-boot when either said verification signature or said TPM tick count are not correct.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The method of claim 16, further comprising:
comparing actual values of the S4 boot log against values of the normal boot log provided within virtual PCRs created by the CRTM;
when the values match, continuing an S4 boot process with the S4 boot log; and
when at least one of the values does not match, halting the S4 boot process and initiating the complete re-boot of the device.
