# US 2005/0238170 A1 · Method for securing a ciphered content transmitted by a broadcaster

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- Number: US 2005/0238170 A1
- Document ID: US20050238170A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 10/830,063
- Filed: 2004-04-23
- Published: 2005-10-27
- Earliest claimed: 2004-04-23
- Assignees: NagraCard S.A.
- Inventors: Rached Ksontini; Henri Kudelski; Cedric Groux
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20050238170A1

## CPC

- H04N 7/1675: {Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence (pseudo-random number generators in general G06F7/58)}
- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- H04L 9/0833: {involving conference or group key (network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065)}
- H04N 21/2347: involving video stream encryption
- H04N 21/2585: {Generation of a revocation list, e.g. of client devices involved in piracy acts}
- H04N 21/26606: {for generating or managing entitlement messages, e.g. Entitlement Control Message [ECM] or Entitlement Management Message [EMM] (arrangements for conditional access to broadcast information or to broadcast-related services H04H60/14)}
- H04N 21/26613: {for generating or managing keys in general (key distribution for secret or secure communication involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] H04L9/083; network support of key management H04L63/06; key management for network security in communication control or processing H04W12/04)}
- H04N 21/4181: {for conditional access}
- H04N 21/44236: {Monitoring of piracy processes or activities (protecting computer platforms against harmful, malicious or unexpected behaviour or activities using intrusion detection and counter measures G06F21/566; computer virus detection and handling G06F21/56)}
- H04L 2209/60: Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
- H04N: PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A method is for protecting an encrypted content, by use of at least one encryption key. The method includes generation of a temporary encryption key, encryption by the temporary key of a value allowing the determination of the encryption keys of the content, transmission of the encrypted value to a multimedia unit, and encryption and transmission of at least two cryptograms including the temporary key encrypted by an authorization key. The first cryptogram is encrypted by a first authorization key pertaining to a first security module and the second cryptogram is encrypted by a second authorization key pertaining to a group of security modules whose first security module is excluded.

## Claims

### Claim 1

Method for protecting an encrypted content by means of at least one encryption key and transmitted by a diffuser to at least one multimedia unit associated to a security module, a value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s) of this content also being transmitted to the multimedia unit by said diffuser, said security module comprising means to determine the encryption key on the basis of said value, this method comprising the following steps:
generation of a temporary encryption key (MCW),
encryption by the temporary key (MCW) of the value allowing the determination of the encryption keys (cw) of the content;
transmission of this encrypted value to said multimedia unit,
encryption and transmission of at least two cryptograms comprising the temporary key (MCW) encrypted by an authorization key (G), the first cryptogram being encrypted by a first authorization key pertaining to a first security module and the second cryptogram being encrypted by a second authorization key pertaining to a group of security modules whose first security module is excluded.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

Method according to claim 1, characterized in that said value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s) of the content is the encryption key itself.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

Method according to claim 1, characterized in that said value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s) of the content includes at least one variable element (RN) and in that said encryption key (cw) is built from this variable element (RN).

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

Method according to claim 3, characterized in that said value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s) furthermore includes an additional element (CD) related to the content (CT) in addition to the variable element (RN).

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

Method according to claim 4, characterized in that said additional element (CD) contains the conditions to access to the transmitted content (CT).

### Claim 6 (depends on 3)

Method according to claim 3, characterized in that said encryption key (cw) is built by means of a hash function applied at least to said variable element (RN).

### Claim 7 (depends on 3)

Method according to claim 3, characterized in that said encryption key (cw) is built by means of an encryption function applied at least to said variable element (RN).

### Claim 8

Method for protecting an encrypted content by means of at least one encryption key and transmitted by a diffuser to at least one multimedia unit associated to a security module, a value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s) of this content also being transmitted to the multimedia unit by said diffuser, said security module comprising means to determine the encryption key on the basis of said value, this method comprising the following steps:
generation of said value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s);
transmission of said value to the multimedia unit, allowing the deduction of the encryption key (cw) of the content,
generation of a temporary encryption key (MCW),
transformation, by the temporary key (MCW), of the value allowing the determination of the encryption keys of the content, this transformation giving as a result, said encryption key (cw) of the content;
encryption and transmission of at least two cryptograms comprising the temporary key (MCW) encrypted by an authorization key (G), the first cryptogram being encrypted by a first authorization key pertaining to a first security module and the second cryptogram being encrypted by a second authorization key which pertains to a group of security modules, whose first security module is excluded.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

Method according to claim 8, characterized in that said value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s) of the content includes at least one variable element (RN) and in that said encryption key (cw) is built from this variable element (RN).

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

Method according to claim 9, characterized in that said value allowing the determination of the encryption key(s) further includes an additional element (CD) in addition to the variable element (RN).

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

Method according to claim 10, characterized in that said additional element (CD) contains the conditions to access to the transmitted content (CT).

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

Method according to claim 8, characterized in that the transformation is a hash operation with key, the key being the temporary encryption key (MCW).

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

Method according to claim 8, characterized in that the authorization keys (G) are classified in levels, the keys of the highest level being unique and individual for one security module, the key of the lowest level being known by all the security modules and the intermediate level keys being common to a security module subset, this subset not containing all the modules.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

Method according to claim 13, intended for the revocation of one or several security modules, characterized in that, as a second authorization key (G) intended for the encryption of the temporary key, the keys common to the largest possible group of security modules are used, this group not including the revoked security module(s).

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

Method according to claim 13, characterized in that a message is sent to the security modules, indicating the level of the authorization key (G) which must be used.
