# US 2005/0097336 A1 · Cryptographic revocation method using a chip card

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- Number: US 2005/0097336 A1
- Document ID: US20050097336A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 10/501,823
- Filed: 2003-01-15
- Published: 2005-05-05
- Earliest claimed: 2002-01-17
- Assignees: France Telecom
- Inventors: Sebastien Canard; Marc Girault; Jacques Traore
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20050097336A1

## CPC

- G07F 7/1008: {Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system}
- G06Q 20/341: {Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip}
- G06Q 20/40975: {using encryption therefor}
- H04L 9/3234: {involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853)}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 2209/42: Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
- H04L 2209/56: Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
- G07F: COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS (coin sorting G07D3/00; coin testing G07D5/00; {handling coins or paper currencies apart from payment activated apparatus G07D; payment architectures, schemes or protocols G06Q20/00})
- G06Q: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A cryptographic method and a chip card which is used to carry out the method. Before any calculation is performed by a computing means of the chip card, the chip card reads (2) an integral list, in a storage means of a second entity, of identifiers of first proprietary entities of a chip card. Such list is linked to each status assigned to each of the first entities by the second entity. Subsequently, the chip card compares (3) the identifier stored in a storage means of the chip card with the contents of the list, in order to authorize (5) or prohibit (4) any calculation by the computing means depending on the result of the comparison.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A cryptographic method implemented by a smart card (30) of a set of smart cards each belonging to a first entity that may be different for each smart card, each smart card being equipped with a chip (31) comprising storage means (32) in which are stored a secret key and an identifier of the first entity that is the proprietor of the smart card (30) and calculation means (33) which execute a cryptographic algorithm whose input arguments include at least the secret key, which method is characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
before any calculation by the calculation means (33) of the chip (31) of the smart card (30), the chip (31) reads in storage means of a second entity a list of identifiers in complete form of first entities that are smart card proprietors (operation 2), said list being linked to the status assigned to each of the first entities by the second entity, and
the chip (31) compares the identifiers stored in the storage means (32) of the chip (31) and the contents of the list (operation 3) to authorize (operation 5) or prohibit (operation 4) calculation by the calculation means (33) as a function of the result of the comparison.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

A cryptographic method according to claim 1, wherein the list comprises all first entities whose status has been set to “revoked” by the second entity and the chip (31) authorizes calculation (operation 5) only if the identifier stored in the storage means (32) of the chip (31) is not in the list.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

A cryptographic method according to claim 1, wherein the list comprises all first entities whose status has been set to “non-revoked” by the second entity and wherein the chip (31) authorizes calculation (operation 5) only if the identifier stored in the storage means (32) of the chip (31) is in the list.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

A cryptographic method according to claim 1, further comprising the following steps:
at the same time as reading the list (operation 2), the chip (31) reads a signature in the list in the storage means of the second entity (operation 10), which signature was calculated beforehand by calculation means of the second entity, and
before the chip (31) authorizes calculation by the calculation means (33) (operation 5), it verifies the validity of the signature (operation 11).

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

A cryptographic method according to claim 1, further comprising the following steps:
at the same time as reading the list (operation 2), the chip (31) reads the signatures of the identifiers in the list in the storage means of the second entity (operation 12), each identifier having given rise to a signature calculated beforehand by calculation means of the second entity,
at the same time as reading the list (operation 2), the chip (31) reads in the storage means of the second entity a value of the number of identifiers listed in that list and a signature for that value (operations 13, 14), the value and its signature having been calculated beforehand by calculation means of the second entity,
before the chip (31) authorizes calculation by the calculation means (33) (operation 5), it verifies the validity of each of the signatures (operations 16, 17),
the chip (31) counts the number of identifiers contained in the read list (operation 15), and
before the chip (31) authorizes calculation by the calculation means (33) (operation 5), it verifies that the value of the counter and the read value are the same (operation 18).

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

A smart card (30) for implementing a method according to claim 1, wherein the smart card (30) is equipped with a chip (31) which comprises:
storage means (32) for storing a secret key and an identifier of a first entity that is a proprietor of the smart card,
calculation means (33) adapted to execute a cryptographic algorithm whose input arguments include the secret key,
reading means (34) for reading from storage means of a second entity via a telecommunications network, a list in complete form of identifiers of first entities that are smart card proprietors, said list being linked to each status assigned to each of the first entities by the second entity, and
means (35) for comparing the identifier stored in the storage means (32) of the chip (31) and the contents of the list to authorize or prohibit calculation by the calculation means (33) as a function of the result of the comparison.

### Claim 7

An article of manufacture for use in a computer system, including a computer usable medium, for performing a cryptographic method implemented by a smart card (30) of a set of smart cards each belonging to a first entity that may be different for each smart card, each smart card being equipped with a chip (31) comprising storage means (32) in which are stored a secret key and an identifier of the first entity that is the proprietor of the smart card (30) and calculation means (33) which execute a cryptographic algorithm whose input arguments include at least the secret key, wherein the computer usable medium comprises a computer readable code for causing:
before any calculation by the calculation means (33) of the chip (31) of the smart card (30), the chip (31) to read in storage means of a second entity a list of identifiers in complete form of first entities that are smart card proprietors (operation 2), said list being linked to the status assigned to each of the first entities by the second entity, and
the chip (31) to compare the identifiers stored in the storage means (32) of the chip (31) and the contents of the list (operation 3) in order to authorize (operation 5) or prohibit (operation 4) calculation by the calculation means (33) as a function of the result of the comparison.
