Coercion-free voting scheme
AssigneeDemoxi, Inc.
InventorC. Andrew Neff
Life of this patent
Estimating the term…
Abstract
A facility for conducting a coercion-resistant electronic collection is described. The facility receives from the voter a first voter conformation value. At a later time, the facility receives from the voter an encrypted ballot and a second voter confirmation value. Without regard for the value of the received second voter confirmation value, the facility adds the received ballot to a publicly-available list of cast ballots. After the addition, members of the public are able to verify the addition of the received ballot to the list without being able to determine whether the ballot will be counted. The facility counts the ballot if and only the second voter confirmation value received with the ballot matches the received first voter confirmation value.
Claims4
A method for conducting a coercion-resistant electronic election, comprising:
- receiving from the voter a first voter confirmation value;
- after receiving the first voter confirmation value, receiving from the voter an encrypted ballot and a second voter confirmation value;
- without regard for the value of the received second voter confirmation value, adding the received ballot to a publicly-available list of cast ballots, such that members of the public are able to verify the addition of the received ballot to the list without being able to determine whether the ballot will be counted;
- and
- counting the ballot if and only if the second voter confirmation value received with the ballot matches the received first voter confirmation value.
A computer-readable medium whose contents cause a computing system to conduct a coercion-resistant electronic election by:
- receiving from the voter a first voter confirmation value;
- after receiving the first voter confirmation value, receiving from the voter an encrypted ballot and a second voter confirmation value;
- adding the received ballot to a publicly-available list of cast ballots, such that members of the public are able to verify the addition of the received ballot to the list without being able to determine whether the ballot will be counted;
- and
- counting the ballot if and only if the second voter confirmation value received with the ballot matches the received first voter confirmation value.
One or more generated data signals collectively conveying a cast ballot data structure constructed by a voter, comprising:
- an encrypted ballot choice;
- and
- a ballot confirmation value,
- such that the ballot may be added to a publicly-accessible list of cast ballots without regard for the ballot confirmation value, and
- such that it can be determined whether to count the cast ballot based upon whether the ballot confirmation value matches an original ballot confirmation value earlier-stored for the voter.
One or more computer memories collectively containing a ballot box data structure storing cast ballots, the ballot box data structure containing, for each stored ballot,
- data reflecting a ballot choice selected by a voter who generated the ballot;
- and
- data reflecting a confirmation value selected by the voter, such that the contents of the data structure can used by a vote tabulation authority to determine whether to count the ballot, such that the contents of the data structure can used by a third party distinct from the vote tabulation authority to determine that the ballot has been stored in the ballot box, and such that the contents of the data structure cannot used by the third party to determine whether the ballot will be counted.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.