# US 12,763,944 B2 · Synchronizing devices based on a sequence number or key mismatch > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 12,763,944 B2 - Document ID: US12763944B2 - Status: Granted - Kind: B2 - Application number: 18/935,272 - Filed: 2024-11-01 - Published: 2026-05-07 - Granted: 2026-10-13 - Earliest claimed: 2024-11-01 - Assignees: Lenovo (United States) Inc. - Applicants: Lenovo (United States) Inc. - Inventors: Andreas Kunz; Sheeba Backia Mary Baskaran - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US12763944B2 ## CPC - H04L 9/088: {Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068)} - G16Y 40/10: Detection; Monitoring - H04L 67/1095: Replication or mirroring of data, e.g. scheduling or transport for data synchronisation between network nodes - H04W 12/065: Continuous authentication - H04W 12/12: Detection or prevention of fraud - H04W 12/69: Identity-dependent - H04W 12/71: Hardware identity - H04W 12/75: Temporary identity - H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M) - G16Y: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS [IoT] - H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72) ## Abstract Various aspects of the present disclosure relate to receiving a first request message comprising a first set of parameters. Aspects of the present disclosure may relate to determining, based on the first set of parameters and a corresponding set of parameters stored in an internet-of-things (IoT) device, a mismatch of a sequence number (SQN) or a security key. Aspects of the present disclosure may relate to generating a synchronization ID based on a device SQN. Aspects of the present disclosure may relate to transmitting a response message comprising at least an expected result based on a default ID of the IoT device, and the device SQN. ## Claims ### Claim 1 An internet-of-things (IoT) device for wireless communication, comprising: at least one memory; and at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the IoT device to: receive a first request message comprising a first set of parameters; determine a security parameter mismatch based on the first set of parameters and a corresponding set of parameters stored in the IoT device, wherein the security parameter mismatch comprises a mismatch of a sequence number (SQN) or a mismatch of a security key; generate a nonce in response to the security parameter mismatch; generate a synchronization identifier (ID) based on the generated nonce, a device SQN, and a shared secret parameter; generate a synchronization encryption key based on the generated nonce, the device SON, and the shared secret parameter; and transmit a response message comprising at least the device SQN, the generated nonce, and an expected result based on a default ID of the IoT device. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The IoT device of claim 1, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to: receive a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises the synchronization ID, an encrypted nonce, an updated SQN, a set of encrypted command parameters, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), wherein the encrypted nonce is different than the generated nonce. ### Claim 3 (depends on 2) The IoT device of claim 2, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to: validate the MAC-I and the synchronization ID; decipher the encrypted nonce and the command parameters using the synchronization encryption key; perform one or more actions corresponding to the command parameters; and transmit a second response message comprising an encrypted command result based on the one or more actions, wherein the command result is encrypted using the synchronization encryption key. ### Claim 4 (depends on 1) The IoT device of claim 1, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to: generate the synchronization ID and the synchronization encryption key in parallel based on the generated nonce, the device SQN, and a shared secret parameter. ### Claim 5 (depends on 1) The IoT device of claim 1, wherein the expected result comprises a security context proof based on the default ID, and wherein to generate the expected result, the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to generate the security context proof based on a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) function, using the default ID, the generated nonce, and the shared secret parameter as inputs to the HMAC function. ### Claim 6 (depends on 1) The IoT device of claim 1, wherein the response message further comprises the generated nonce, an indication of the mismatch of the SQN or the security key, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I) based on the response message. ### Claim 7 (depends on 1) The IoT device of claim 1, wherein the first set of parameters comprise a first temporary ID, a first SQN, an encrypted nonce, an encrypted command, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), and wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to: validate the MAC-I and the first temporary ID; and determine the mismatch of the SQN or the security key based on the first SQN or the encrypted nonce and command, or both, wherein the encrypted nonce is different than the generated nonce. ### Claim 8 (depends on 7) The IoT device of claim 7, wherein the first temporary ID comprises a paging identity of the IoT device, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the IoT device to register with a service provider using the default ID. ### Claim 9 A method of an internet-of-things (IoT) device, the method comprising: receiving a first request message comprising a first set of parameters; determining a security parameter mismatch based on the first set of parameters and a corresponding set of parameters stored in the IoT device, wherein the security parameter mismatch comprises a mismatch of a sequence number (SQN) or a mismatch of a security key; generating a nonce in response to the security parameter mismatch; generating a synchronization identifier (ID) based on the generated nonce, a device SQN, and a shared secret parameter; generating a synchronization encryption key based on the generated nonce, the device SQN, and the shared secret parameter; and transmitting a response message comprising at least the device SQN and an expected result based on a default ID of the IoT device. ### Claim 10 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9, further comprising: receiving a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises the synchronization ID, an encrypted nonce, an updated SQN, a set of encrypted command parameters, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), wherein the encrypted nonce is different than the generated nonce. ### Claim 11 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9, further comprising: generating the synchronization ID and the synchronization encryption key in parallel based on the generated nonce, the device SQN, and a shared secret parameter. ### Claim 12 An apparatus in a wireless communication network entity, comprising: at least one memory; and at least one processor coupled with the at least one memory and configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to: transmit a first request message comprising a first set of parameters; receive a response message comprising an indication of a mismatch of a sequence number (SQN) or a security key, wherein the response message further comprises a device SQN of an internet-of-things (IoT) device, a nonce, and an expected result; generate a synchronization identifier (ID) based on the received nonce, the device SQN, and a shared secret parameter; generate a synchronization encryption key based on the received nonce, the device SQN, and the shared secret parameter; and determine an updated SQN based on the device SQN. ### Claim 13 (depends on 12) The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to: transmit a second request message comprising a second set of parameters, wherein the second set of parameters comprises the synchronization ID, an encrypted nonce, the updated SQN, a set of encrypted command parameters, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), wherein the encrypted nonce is different than the received nonce. ### Claim 14 (depends on 13) The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to: generate the encrypted nonce and the set of encrypted command parameters using the synchronization encryption key; receive a second response message comprising an encrypted command result based on the command parameters; and decipher the command result using the synchronization encryption key. ### Claim 15 (depends on 12) The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the expected result is based on a default ID of the IoT device, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to synchronize a system SQN to the device SQN in response to a successful verification of the expected result, and wherein the updated SQN comprises an incremented system SQN. ### Claim 16 (depends on 12) The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the expected result comprises a security context proof based on a default ID of the IoT device, wherein the default ID is stored at the wireless communication network entity, and wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to verify the security context proof based on a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) function, using the default ID, the received nonce, and the shared secret parameter as inputs to the HMAC function. ### Claim 17 (depends on 12) The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the at least one processor is configured to cause the wireless communication network entity to: generate the synchronization ID and the synchronization encryption key in parallel based on the received nonce, the device SQN, and the shared secret parameter. ### Claim 18 (depends on 12) The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the first set of parameters comprise a first temporary ID, a first SQN, an encrypted nonce, an encrypted command, and a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), wherein the encrypted nonce is different than the received nonce. ### Claim 19 (depends on 18) The apparatus of claim 18, wherein the first temporary ID comprises a paging identity of the IoT device. ### Claim 20 A method performed by a wireless communication network entity, the method comprising: transmitting a first request message comprising a first set of parameters; receiving a response message comprising an indication of a mismatch of a sequence number (SQN) or a security key, wherein the response message further comprises a device SQN of an internet-of-things (IoT) device, a nonce, and an expected result; generating a synchronization identifier (ID) based on the received nonce, the device SQN, and a shared secret parameter; generating a synchronization encryption key based on the received nonce, the device SQN, and the shared secret parameter; and determining an updated SQN based on the device SQN.