Avoiding communications over risky non-terrestrial networks
AssigneeT-Mobile USA, Inc.
InventorsRaymond E. Reeves, Simon Youngs
Life of this patent
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Abstract
A wireless device receives a signal from a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN) and initiates verification of the legitimacy of the purported NTN. The wireless device detects an actual angle of arrival of the signal from the purported NTN and determines an expected angle of arrival of the signal from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device, based on the device's current location orientation, or speed. The purported NTN is legitimate if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal, and the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal.
Claims20
A wireless device comprising:
- at least one hardware processor;
- and
- at least one non-transitory memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the at least one hardware processor, cause the wireless device to:
- receive a signal identifying a transmitter of a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN), wherein the transmitter is unknown to the wireless device;
- in response to the received signal, cause the wireless device to initiate a verification of a legitimacy status of the purported NTN;
- and
- in response to the initiation of the verification of the legitimacy status of the purported NTN:
- detect an actual angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device from the purported NTN,
- determine an expected angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device,
- based on at least one of a current location of the wireless device, a current orientation of the wireless device, or a current speed of the wireless device, and
- determine a legitimacy status of the purported NTN based on a comparison between the expected angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device and the actual angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device,
- wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal, and
- wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal.
A wireless device comprising:
- at least one hardware processor;
- and
- at least one non-transitory memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the at least one hardware processor, cause the wireless device to:
- receive a signal identifying a transmitter of a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN), wherein the transmitter is unknown to the wireless device;
- in response to the received signal, cause the wireless device to initiate a verification of a legitimacy status of the purported NTN;
- and
- in response to the initiation of the verification of the legitimacy status of the purported NTN:
- detect an actual Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device from the purported NTN,
- determine an expected Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device,
- based on at least one of a current location of the wireless device, a current orientation of the wireless device, or a current speed of the wireless device, and
- determine a legitimacy status of the purported NTN based on a comparison between the expected Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device and the actual Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device,
- wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate if the actual Doppler pattern of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected Doppler pattern of the signal, and
- wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual Doppler pattern of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected Doppler pattern of the signal.
A wireless device comprising:
- at least one hardware processor;
- and
- at least one non-transitory memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the at least one hardware processor, cause the wireless device to:
- receive a signal identifying a transmitter of a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN), wherein the transmitter is unknown to the wireless device;
- in response to the received signal, cause the wireless device to initiate a verification of a legitimacy status of the purported NTN;
- and
- in response to the initiation of the verification of the legitimacy status of the purported NTN:
- detect an actual radio frequency (RF) fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device from the purported NTN,
- determine an expected RF fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device,
- based on at least one of a current location of the wireless device, a current orientation of the wireless device, or a current speed of the wireless device, and
- determine a legitimacy status of the purported NTN based on a comparison between the expected RF fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device and the actual RF fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device,
- wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate if the actual RF fingerprint of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected RF fingerprint of the signal, and
- wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual RF fingerprint of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected RF fingerprint of the signal.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.