US 12,719,846 B2Granted

Sparse domains exploitation for physical layer authentication

AssigneeVestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A. S.

InventorsHaji Muhammad Furqan Ahmed Madni, Liza Afeef Omar Shehab El Din, Amira Bendaimi, Hüseyin Arslan

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Abstract

Techniques and methods are described to perform physical layer authentication, using a received signal transmitted from a communication device that has been already authenticated previously. To identify a potential attacker, a current value of a plurality of physical layer L1 parameters of the wireless channel is determined, with said L1 parameters describe for a sparse channel. A value of the plurality of L1 parameters that have been stored at the previous authentication are obtained from a storage. Based on the current value and the stored value of the plurality of L1 parameters, the communication device is authenticated. In this way, the physical layer authentication may provide for a robust and reliable authentication of communication devices in sparse communication channels, including static and dynamic wireless environments.

Claims13

Dependent claims

An apparatus for physical layer authentication, the apparatus comprising:

a receiver configured to:
receive, over a wireless channel, a signal from a communication device after a previous authentication;
and
processing circuitry configured to:
determine, based on the received signal, current value of a plurality of physical-layer, L1, parameters of the wireless channel descriptive for a sparse channel;
obtain, from a storage, value of the plurality of L1 parameters stored at the previous authentication;
and
perform authentication of the communication device based on the current value(s) of the plurality of L1 parameters and the value(s) of the plurality of L1 parameters stored,
wherein
the plurality of L1 parameters define a signature vector within a sparse domain being any of a Doppler domain, a delay-Doppler domain, and a delay-Doppler-angle domain;
the signature vector having distance, azimuth angle, and elevation angle, each being determined from the plurality of L1 parameters;
the performing of the authentication is based on one or more of the distance, the azimuth angle, and the elevation angle;
and
wherein the wireless channel is modeled as being associated with an n-th transmission antenna with integer n=0, 1, 2, . . . , NA and with an m-th reception antenna with integer m=0, 1, 2, . . . , NB as:
h
m
,
n
,
l
(
r
)
=
∑
i
=
1
L
p
α
i
⁢
e
-
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁡
(
f
c
+
v
i
)
⁢
τ
i
⁢
e
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁢
v
i
⁢
r
⁢
T
s
⁢
e
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁡
(
f
c
+
v
i
)
⁢
n
⁢
d
c
⁢
sin
⁢
θ
i
⁢
e
-
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁡
(
f
c
+
v
i
)
⁢
m
⁢
d
c
⁢
sin
⁢
ϕ
i
⁢
δ
⁢
(
ℓT
s
-
τ
i
-
n
⁢
d
c
⁢
sin
⁢
θ
i
-
m
⁢
d
c
⁢
sin
⁢
ϕ
i
)
where r is a time index, Lp is a number of dominant propagation paths, Ts is a system sampling interval, denotes an index along a delay domain, d is an antenna spacing, c is the speed of light, fc is a carrier frequency, αi is a complex path gain, τi is a path delay, vi is a Doppler frequency, δ(⋅) denotes the Dirac delta function, θi is an angle of departure at the i-th path, and φi is an angle of arrival at the i-th path;
wherein the plurality of L1 parameters comprise at least one of the τi, Lp, θi, vi, and φi.

146 more elements

A method for physical layer authentication, comprising:

receiving, over a wireless channel, a signal from a communication device after a previous authentication;
determining, based on the received signal, current value of a plurality of physical-layer, L1, parameters of the wireless channel descriptive for a sparse channel;
obtaining, from a storage, value of the plurality of L1 parameters stored at the previous authentication;
and
performing authentication of the communication device based on the current value of the plurality of L1 parameters and the value of the plurality of L1 parameters stored, wherein
the plurality of L1 parameters define a signature vector within a sparse domain being any of a Doppler domain, a delay-Doppler domain, and a delay-Doppler-angle domain;
the signature vector having distance, azimuth angle, and elevation angle, each being determined from the plurality of L1 parameters;
the performing of the authentication is based on one or more of the distance, the azimuth angle, and/or the elevation angle and
wherein the wireless channel is modeled as being associated with an n-th transmission antenna with integer n=0, 1, 2, . . . , NA and with an m-th reception antenna with integer m=0, 1, 2, . . . , NB as:
h
m
,
n
,
ℓ
(
r
)
=
∑
i
=
1
L
p
α
i
⁢
e
-
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁡
(
f
c
+
v
i
)
⁢
τ
i
⁢
e
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁢
v
i
⁢
r
⁢
T
s
⁢
e
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁡
(
f
c
+
v
i
)
⁢
n
⁢
d
c
⁢
s
⁢
i
⁢
n
⁢
θ
i
⁢
e
-
j
⁢
2
⁢
π
⁡
(
f
c
+
v
i
)
⁢
m
⁢
d
c
⁢
s
⁢
i
⁢
n
⁢
ϕ
i
⁢
δ
⁡
(
ℓ
⁢
T
s
-
τ
i
-
n
⁢
d
c
⁢
sin
⁢
θ
i
-
m
⁢
d
c
⁢
sin
⁢
ϕ
i
)
where r is a time index, Lp is a number of dominant propagation paths, Ts is a system sampling interval, denotes an index along a delay domain, d is an antenna spacing, c is the speed of light, fc is a carrier frequency, αi is a complex path gain, τi is a path delay, vi is a Doppler frequency, δ(⋅) denotes the Dirac delta function, θi is an angle of departure at the i-th path, and φi is an angle of arrival at the i-th path;
wherein the plurality of L1 parameters comprise at least one of the τi, Lp, θi, vi, and φi.

151 more elements

Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.

Facts

Application: 18/944,151Filed 12 Nov 2024
Priority: EP 2320942713 Nov 2023
Published: US 2025/0158972 A115 May 2025
Granted: 25 Aug 2026
Term ends: Not estimatedThe source records don’t support an estimate.

Classification7 codes

H04L 63/08
Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security: for authentication of entities
H04W 12/069
Authentication: using certificates or pre-shared keys
H04L 63/16
Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security: implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
H04L 9/0875
Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords: based on channel impulse response [CIR]