Systems and methods for mutual trust establishment among components of an information handling system

A method, comprising:

• obtaining, by a platform Root-of-Trust (PROT) or a Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) bootloader of an Information Handling System (IHS), a plurality of identifiers for a plurality of Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs) or Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), wherein the plurality of identifiers comprise an identifier for a first CPLD or FPGA;
• in response to determining that a provisioning operation is needed for a second CPLD or FPGA, providing, by the PROT or BMC bootloader via a high-privileged interface (HPI) characterized, at least in part, by pre-boot access to bootloader code, to a second CPLD or FPGA, an expected handshake token for the first CPLD or FPGA, wherein the expected handshake token comprises a value based, at least in part, on the identifier for the first CPLD or FPGA;
• in response to determining that the provisioning operation is not needed, lock access to the HPI;
• and
• establishing, by the second CPLD or FPGA, trust for communication with the first CPLD or FPGA based, at least in part, on the expected handshake token.

One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media that comprise stored program instructions, that when executed on or across one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to:

• obtain a plurality of identifiers for individual ones of a plurality of Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs) or Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), wherein the plurality of identifiers comprise an identifier for a first CPLD or FPGA;
• determine whether a provision operation is needed for a second CPLD or FPGA, based, at least in part, upon a flag governed by at least one of the plurality of CPLDs or FPGAs;
• in response to a determination that the provision operation is needed, provide, via a high-privileged interface (HPI) characterized, at least in part, by pre-boot access to bootloader code, to the second CPLD or FPGA, an expected handshake token for the first CPLD or FPGA, wherein the expected handshake token comprises a value based, at least in part, on the identifier for the first CPLD or FPGA, and wherein the second CPLD or FPGA uses the expected handshake token to establish trust for communication with the first CPLD or FPGA;
• and
• in response to a determination that the provision operation is not needed, lock access to the HPI.