# US 12,602,483 B2 · Secure booting of channel cards using a management controller of a data processing system > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 12,602,483 B2 - Document ID: US12602483B2 - Status: Granted - Kind: B2 - Application number: 18/785,283 - Filed: 2024-07-26 - Published: 2026-01-29 - Granted: 2026-04-14 - Earliest claimed: 2024-07-26 - Assignees: Dell Products L.P. - Applicants: Dell Products L.P. - Inventors: Deepaganesh Paulraj; Vinod Parackal Saby - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US12602483B2 ## CPC - G06F 21/575: {Secure boot} - G06F 21/572: {Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]} - G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N) ## Abstract Methods and systems for managing operations of a data processing system are disclosed. To manage operations of the data processing system, it may be identified that firmware hosted by a channel card operably connected to the data processing system has failed verification during a secure booting procedure. A management controller of the data processing system may perform a verification procedure to obtain a channel card certificate. At least one entry may be added by the management controller to a secure booting procedure database to facilitate verification of the firmware. After the at least one entry is added, the management controller may resume the secure booting procedure. Using the at least one entry, the secure booting procedure may be completed to place the data processing system in an operable state that is conducive to providing computer-implemented services, which may then be provided. ## Claims ### Claim 1 A method for managing operation of a data processing system, the method comprising: identifying that firmware hosted by a channel card operably connected to the data processing system has failed verification during a secure booting procedure; performing, by a management controller of the data processing system, a verification procedure to obtain a channel card certificate; adding, by the management controller, at least one entry to a secure booting procedure database to facilitate verification of the firmware; after the at least one entry is added, resuming, by the management controller, the secure booting procedure; completing, using at least the at least one entry, the secure booting procedure to place the data processing system in an operable state that is conducive to providing computer-implemented services; and providing, while the data processing system is in the operable state, the computer-implemented services. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, wherein the management controller is separate from and tasked with managing operation of hardware resources of the data processing system, the hardware resources comprising at least the channel card. ### Claim 3 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, wherein performing the verification procedure comprises obtaining identifying information for the firmware: via sideband channels of the data processing system, and without the identifying information traversing an operating system of the data processing system. ### Claim 4 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, wherein the channel card certificate: is signed using a private key of a public private key pair managed by an entity with authority to authorize firmware as being trustworthy to the data processing system, and is usable to verify, at least in part, that the firmware is safe to boot. ### Claim 5 (depends on 4) The method of claim 4, wherein the at least one entry comprises: a signed hash of the firmware, the signed hash being verifiable by the data processing system using an existing trusted key. ### Claim 6 (depends on 4) The method of claim 4, wherein the at least one entry comprises: a signed hash of the firmware, the signed hash of the firmware being signed using a second private key of a second public private key pair; and the channel card certificate, the channel card certificate indicating that the second public private key pair is trustworthy. ### Claim 7 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, wherein completing the secure booting procedure comprises: obtaining, by secure booting software hosted by the data processing system, a hash of the firmware; making a determination, using at least the hash of the firmware and the secure booting procedure database, regarding whether the firmware is verified; in a first instance of the determination in which the firmware is verified: booting the firmware as a part of the secure booting procedure; and in a second instance of the determination in which the firmware is not verified: continuing the secure booting procedure without booting the firmware. ### Claim 8 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, wherein the operable state allows application software to be run by at least an operating system of the data processing system. ### Claim 9 A non-transitory machine-readable medium having instructions stored therein, which when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations for managing operation of a data processing system, the operations comprising: identifying that firmware hosted by a channel card operably connected to the data processing system has failed verification during a secure booting procedure; performing, by a management controller of the data processing system, a verification procedure to obtain a channel card certificate; adding, by the management controller, at least one entry to a secure booting procedure database to facilitate verification of the firmware; after the at least one entry is added, resuming, by the management controller, the secure booting procedure; completing, using at least the at least one entry, the secure booting procedure to place the data processing system in an operable state that is conducive to providing computer-implemented services; and providing, while the data processing system is in the operable state, the computer-implemented services. ### Claim 10 (depends on 9) The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 9, wherein the management controller is separate from and tasked with managing operation of hardware resources of the data processing system, the hardware resources comprising at least the channel card. ### Claim 11 (depends on 9) The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 9, wherein performing the verification procedure comprises obtaining identifying information for the firmware: via sideband channels of the data processing system, and without the identifying information traversing an operating system of the data processing system. ### Claim 12 (depends on 9) The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 9, wherein the channel card certificate: is signed using a private key of a public private key pair managed by an entity with authority to authorize firmware as being trustworthy to the data processing system, and is usable to verify, at least in part, that the firmware is safe to boot. ### Claim 13 (depends on 12) The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the at least one entry comprises: a signed hash of the firmware, the signed hash being verifiable by the data processing system using an existing trusted key. ### Claim 14 (depends on 12) The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the at least one entry comprises: a signed hash of the firmware, the signed hash of the firmware being signed using a second private key of a second public private key pair; and the channel card certificate, the channel card certificate indicating that the second public private key pair is trustworthy. ### Claim 15 A data processing system, comprising: a processor; and a memory coupled to the processor to store instructions, which when executed by the processor, cause the processor to perform operations for managing operation of a data processing system, the operations comprising: identifying that firmware hosted by a channel card operably connected to the data processing system has failed verification during a secure booting procedure; performing, by a management controller of the data processing system, a verification procedure to obtain a channel card certificate; adding, by the management controller, at least one entry to a secure booting procedure database to facilitate verification of the firmware; after the at least one entry is added, resuming, by the management controller, the secure booting procedure; completing, using at least the at least one entry, the secure booting procedure to place the data processing system in an operable state that is conducive to providing computer-implemented services; and providing, while the data processing system is in the operable state, the computer-implemented services. ### Claim 16 (depends on 15) The data processing system of claim 15, wherein the management controller is separate from and tasked with managing operation of hardware resources of the data processing system, the hardware resources comprising at least the channel card. ### Claim 17 (depends on 15) The data processing system of claim 15, wherein performing the verification procedure comprises obtaining identifying information for the firmware: via sideband channels of the data processing system, and without the identifying information traversing an operating system of the data processing system. ### Claim 18 (depends on 15) The data processing system of claim 15, wherein the channel card certificate: is signed using a private key of a public private key pair managed by an entity with authority to authorize firmware as being trustworthy to the data processing system, and is usable to verify, at least in part, that the firmware is safe to boot. ### Claim 19 (depends on 18) The data processing system of claim 18, wherein the at least one entry comprises: a signed hash of the firmware, the signed hash being verifiable by the data processing system using an existing trusted key. ### Claim 20 (depends on 18) The data processing system of claim 18, wherein the at least one entry comprises: a signed hash of the firmware, the signed hash of the firmware being signed using a second private key of a second public private key pair; and the channel card certificate, the channel card certificate indicating that the second public private key pair is trustworthy.