Systems and methods for trusted path secure communication

A system, comprising:

• a memory;
• and
• at least one processor coupled to the memory and configured to:
• encrypt, by a data-collection application or a security application associated with the data-collection application on the client device, a data element using a first level storage key to generate a secured object, wherein the first level storage key comprises at least one of:
• (i) a public key of the server, the public key for encrypting information to be received by the data-collection application in a transmission from the server;
• (ii) a private key of the data-collection application, the private key of the data-collection application for generating a signature for the information to be transmitted to the server from the client device;
• (iii) a public key of the data-collection application, the public key of the data-collection application for encrypting information to be transmitted from the client device to the server;
• and
• (iv) a private key of the server, the private key of the server generating a signature for information to be transmitted to the client device from the server;
• receive on the server the secured object, wherein the secured object comprises an encrypted message used by the server to authenticate the client device, wherein the encrypted message comprises within the encrypted information at least a timestamp of the time the secured object was composed, a message identifier, a digital signature of the secured object signed by a private key of the client device, and a message digest comprising at least one or more of an anti-replay header and an anti-tamper header;
• decrypt, by the server, the encrypted message;
• validate the digital signature of the decrypted message using a public key associated with the client device;
• determine, by the server and the timestamp of the secured object, that the secured object was previously received more than a set threshold period of time before the time of receipt or when an identifier cache at the server already contains the identifier or contents of the anti-replay header of the secured object;
• determine, by the server, that one or more applications on the client device were altered when a message digest at the server does not match the message digest of the secured object as is expected to be produced by untampered versions of those applications on the client device;
• and
• discard the secured object when the digital signature of the secured object cannot be verified or when the secured object is determined to have been received prior to the set threshold period, or when the message is determined to have been replayed or when the one or more applications on the client device were determined to be altered and if the object is not discarded, then
• preparing by the server, a download in reply to a validated secured object from the client device;
• digitally signing, by the server private key, the download to the client device;
• encrypting the download, by the server, using the public key associated with the client device;
• and
• receiving, by the client device, the signed and encrypted download.

A non-transitory computer-readable device having instructions stored thereon that, when executed by at least one computing device, causes the at least one computing device to perform operations comprising:

• encrypting, by a data-collection application or a security application associated with the data-collection application on the client device, a data element using a server public key to generate on the client device a secure secured object,
• to the client device from the server:
• receiving, by a server, the secured object, wherein the secured object comprises an encrypted message used by the server to authenticate a client device, wherein the encrypted message comprises within the encrypted information at least a timestamp of the time the secured object was composed, a message identifier, a digital signature of the secured object signed by a private key on the client device, and a message digest comprising at least one of an anti-replay header and an anti-tamper header;
• decrypting, by the server, the encrypted message;
• validating, by the server, the digital signature of the decrypted message using a public key associated with the client device;
• determining, by the server and the timestamp of the secured object, that the secured object was previously received more than a set threshold period of time before the time of receipt, or when an identifier cache at the server already contains the identifier or contents of the anti-replay header of the secured object of that secured object;
• determining, by the server, that one or more applications on the client device were altered when a message digest at the server does not match the message digest of the secured object as is expected to be produced by untampered versions of those applications on the client device;
• discarding the secured object when the digital signature of the secured object cannot be verified or when the secured object is determined to previously have been received prior to the set threshold period or when the message is determined to have been replayed or when the one or more applications on the client device were determined to be altered, and if the object is not discarded, then
• preparing, by the server, a download in reply to a validated secured object from the client device;
• digitally signing, by the server private key, the download to the client device;
• encrypting the download, by the server, using the public key associated with the client device;
• and
• receiving, by the client device, the signed and encrypted download.