# US 12,223,787 B2 · Methods and apparatus for validating wireless access card authenticity and proximity > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 12,223,787 B2 - Document ID: US12223787B2 - Status: Granted - Kind: B2 - Application number: 18/138,608 - Filed: 2023-04-24 - Published: 2023-08-17 - Granted: 2025-02-11 - Earliest claimed: 2021-03-11 - Assignees: STMicroelectronics S.r.l. - Applicants: STMicroelectronics S.r.l. - Inventors: Carlo Cimino; Luca Di Cosmo - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US12223787B2 ## CPC - G07C 9/22: in combination with an identity check of the pass holder - G06F 21/35: communicating wirelessly - G07C 9/00174: {Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys (mechanical locks with electric permutation E05B49/00; arrangements for sensing or reading record carriers G06K7/00; electronic switching H03K17/00)} - G07C 9/00309: {operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks} - H04W 12/06: Authentication - H04W 12/106: Packet or message integrity - H04W 12/61: Time-dependent - H04W 12/63: Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent - G06F 2221/2103: Challenge-response - G06F 2221/2111: Location-sensitive, e.g. geographical location, GPS - G07C 2009/00341: {keyless data carrier having more than one limited data transmission ranges} - G07C 2009/00555: {comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks} - G07C 2009/00769: {with data transmission performed by wireless means} - G07C 2209/63: Comprising locating means for detecting the position of the data carrier, i.e. within the vehicle or within a certain distance from the vehicle - H04W 4/80: Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication - G07C: TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE - G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N) - H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72) ## Abstract A method includes performing, by a terminal with an access card, a first relay attack check for the access card in accordance with a local value associated with the terminal and a local value associated with the access card; determining, by the terminal, that the access card has passed the first relay attack check, and based thereon, performing, by the terminal with the access card, an authentication check of the access card in accordance with the local value associated with the terminal, the local value associated with the access card, and a local challenge value associated with the terminal; and determining, by the terminal, that the access card has passed the first relay attack check and the authentication check, and based thereon, validating, by the terminal, the access card. ## Claims ### Claim 1 A method, comprising: transmitting, by a proximity coupling device to a proximity integrated circuit card, a terminal enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity coupling device, the transmitting comprising transmitting the terminal enabler value in first portions; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a remote enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity integrated circuit card, the receiving comprising receiving the remote enabler value in second portions; and detecting a relay attack in response to a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value in first portions and receiving the remote enabler value in second portions being greater than a maximum time threshold. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the enabler value of the device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device. ### Claim 3 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the enabler value of the device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the device initiating the relay attack. ### Claim 4 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with a device initiating the relay attack. ### Claim 5 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, wherein the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card are part of a system for gaining access to an automobile system, the method further comprising denying access to the automobile system in response to detecting the relay attack. ### Claim 6 (depends on 1) The method of claim 1, further comprising: receiving the remote enabler value from the proximity integrated circuit card; and authenticating the proximity integrated circuit card in response to: validating values associated with the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and a local challenge value associated with a system comprising the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card, and a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value and receiving the remote enabler value being less than or equal to a maximum time threshold. ### Claim 7 (depends on 6) The method of claim 6, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising the local challenge value; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message comprising a signature generated in accordance with a first key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the system; and verify the signature in accordance with a second key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and the local challenge value. ### Claim 8 A method, comprising: transmitting, by a proximity coupling device to a proximity integrated circuit card, a terminal enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity coupling device, the transmitting comprising transmitting the terminal enabler value in first portions; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a remote enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity integrated circuit card, the receiving comprising receiving the remote enabler value in second portions; and detecting a relay attack in response to a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value and receiving the remote enabler value being less than or equal to a minimum time threshold. ### Claim 9 (depends on 8) The method of claim 8, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the enabler value of the device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device. ### Claim 10 (depends on 8) The method of claim 8, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the device initiating the relay attack. ### Claim 11 (depends on 8) The method of claim 8, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with a device initiating the relay attack. ### Claim 12 (depends on 8) The method of claim 8, wherein the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card are part of a system for gaining access to an automobile system, the method further comprising denying access to the automobile system in response to detecting the relay attack. ### Claim 13 (depends on 8) The method of claim 8, further comprising: receiving the remote enabler value from the proximity integrated circuit card; and authenticating the proximity integrated circuit card in response to: validating values associated with the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and a local challenge value associated with a system comprising the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card, and a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value and receiving the remote enabler value being less than or equal to a maximum time threshold. ### Claim 14 (depends on 13) The method of claim 13, further comprising: transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising the local challenge value; receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message comprising a signature generated in accordance with a first key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the system; and verify the signature in accordance with a second key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and the local challenge value. ### Claim 15 A system comprising a proximity coupling device and a proximity integrated circuit card, the proximity coupling device configured to: transmit a terminal enabler value associated with the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, the transmitting comprising transmitting the terminal enabler value in first portions; receive a remote enabler value from the proximity integrated circuit card, the receiving comprising receiving the remote enabler value in second portions; and authenticate the proximity integrated circuit card in response to: valid values associated with the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and a local challenge value associated with the system, and a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value and receiving the remote enabler value being less than or equal to a maximum time threshold. ### Claim 16 (depends on 15) The system of claim 15, wherein the proximity integrated circuit card is configured to: receive the terminal enabler value from the proximity coupling device; and transmit the remote enabler value to the proximity coupling device in response to receiving the terminal enabler value. ### Claim 17 (depends on 16) The system of claim 16, wherein each of the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card is further configured to store the terminal enabler value. ### Claim 18 (depends on 16) The system of claim 16, wherein the terminal enabler value and the remote enabler value are unique randomly generated values associated with, respectively, the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card. ### Claim 19 (depends on 15) The system of claim 15, wherein the proximity coupling device is further configured to: begin a timer in response to the terminal enabler value being transmitted; and stop the timer in response to receiving the remote enabler value, wherein the duration between the transmitting the terminal enabler value and the remote enabler value is determined using the timer. ### Claim 20 (depends on 15) The system of claim 15, wherein the proximity coupling device is further configured to: transmit a first authentication message to the proximity integrated circuit card, the first authentication message comprising the local challenge value; receive a second authentication message from the proximity integrated circuit card, the second authentication message comprising a signature generated in accordance with a first key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the system; and verify the signature in accordance with a second key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and the local challenge value.