# US 12,192,363 B2 · Using signed tokens to verify short message service (sms) message bodies

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- Number: US 12,192,363 B2
- Document ID: US12192363B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 18/374,866
- Filed: 2023-09-29
- Published: 2024-01-25
- Granted: 2025-01-07
- Earliest claimed: 2020-10-26
- Assignees: Proofpoint, Inc.
- Applicants: Proofpoint, Inc.
- Inventors: Thomas Lee; Kevin San Diego
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US12192363B2

## CPC

- H04L 9/0643: {Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC}
- H04L 9/3213: {using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos (network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807)}
- H04L 9/3073: {involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 51/42: Mailbox-related aspects, e.g. synchronisation of mailboxes
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04W 4/14: Short messaging services, e.g. short message services [SMS] or unstructured supplementary service data [USSD]
- H04W 12/106: Packet or message integrity
- H04W 12/108: Source integrity
- H04W 12/128: Anti-malware arrangements, e.g. protection against SMS fraud or mobile malware
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

Aspects of the disclosure relate to message verification. A computing platform may generate a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key. The computing platform may publish, to a server, the public key. The computing platform may generate a short message service (SMS) message. The computing platform may sign, using the private key, the SMS message, which may include computing a cryptographic hash of the SMS message using the private key and embedding the cryptographic hash in an SMPP field of the SMS message. The computing platform may send, to a downstream computing system, the signed SMS message, where the downstream computing system may be configured to validate the signed SMS message using the cryptographic hash embedded in the SMPP field of the SMS message and by accessing the public key.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computing platform, comprising:
at least one processor;
a communication interface communicatively coupled to the at least one processor; and
memory storing computer-readable instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the computing platform to:
generate a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key;
publish, to a server, the public key;
generate a short message service (SMS) message; and
sign, using the private key, the SMS message, wherein signing the SMS message comprises computing a cryptographic hash of the SMS message using the private key and embedding the cryptographic hash in a short message peer-to-peer (SMPP) field of the SMS message, and wherein signing the SMS message further configures the SMS message for validation using the cryptographic hash and the public key.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, wherein signing the SMS message causes message metadata to indicate retrieval information for the public key.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, wherein the server comprises a DNS server.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, wherein the memory stores additional computer-readable instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the computing platform to perform one or more of:
store, at the computing platform, the private key, or
upload, to a Communications Platform as a Service (CPaaS) platform, the private key, wherein the private key is stored at the CPaaS platform.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The computing platform of claim 4, wherein signing the SMS message comprises signing the SMS message at one of: the computing platform or the CPaaS platform.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, wherein computing the cryptographic hash of the SMS message comprises hashing one or more of: contents of the SMS message and sender information.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, wherein the SMPP field comprises a custom SMPP tagged link value (TLV).

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, where the SMS message is additionally signed by an upstream intercarrier computing system using another public-private key combination, and wherein a downstream computing system further verifies the complete SMS message based on the upstream intercarrier computing system's signature.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, wherein the memory stores additional computer-readable instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the computing platform to:
receive, from a downstream computing system, a message indicating that a problem occurred with signature validation for the SMS message.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The computing platform of claim 9, wherein the message indicating that a problem occurred with signature validation for the SMS message may indicate that the problem comprises one or more of: a message payload modification, a message payload corruption, or an issue with truncation of payload for the SMS message during transit.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The computing platform of claim 9, wherein the memory stores additional computer-readable instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the computing platform to:
generate, based on receipt of the message indicating that the problem occurred with signature validation for the SMS message, an abuse reporting format (ARF) message, wherein the ARF message includes one or more policies indicating how downstream computing systems, including the downstream computing system, should handle messages that are unable to be validated.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The computing platform of claim 11, wherein generating the ARF message causes the computing platform to instruct the downstream computing systems to: deliver the invalid messages with a warning, quarantine the invalid messages, send the invalid message in a digest, or drop the invalid message.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

The computing platform of claim 1, wherein the memory stores additional computer-readable instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the computing platform to:
send, to a downstream computing system, the signed SMS message, wherein the downstream computing system is configured to validate the signed SMS message using the cryptographic hash embedded in the SMPP field of the SMS message and by accessing the public key from an internet Domain Name Service (DNS) server of a domain indicated by the computing platform.

### Claim 14

A method comprising:
at a computing platform comprising at least one processor, a communication interface, and memory:
generating a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key;
publishing, to a server, the public key;
generating a short message service (SMS) message; and
signing, using the private key, the SMS message, wherein signing the SMS message comprises computing a cryptographic hash of the SMS message using the private key and embedding the cryptographic hash in an SMPP field of the SMS message, and wherein signing the SMS message further configures the SMS message for validation using the cryptographic hash and the public key.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, wherein signing the SMS message causes message metadata to indicate retrieval information for the public key.

### Claim 16 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, wherein the server comprises a DNS server.

### Claim 17 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, further comprising performing one or more of:
storing, at the computing platform, the private key, or
uploading, to a Communications Platform as a Service (CPaaS) platform, the private key, wherein the private key is stored at the CPaaS platform.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The method of claim 17, wherein signing the SMS message comprises signing the SMS message at one of: the computing platform or the CPaaS platform.

### Claim 19 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, wherein computing the cryptographic hash of the SMS message comprises hashing one or more of: contents of the SMS message and sender information.

### Claim 20

One or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing instructions that, when executed by a computing platform comprising at least one processor, a communication interface, and memory, cause the computing platform to:
generate a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key;
publish, to a server, the public key;
generate a short message service (SMS) message; and
sign, using the private key, the SMS message, wherein signing the SMS message comprises computing a cryptographic hash of the SMS message using the private key and embedding the cryptographic hash in an SMPP field of the SMS message, and wherein signing the SMS message further configures the SMS message for validation using the cryptographic hash and the public key.
