# US 12,008,109 B2 · Cloud based boot integrity > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 12,008,109 B2 - Document ID: US12008109B2 - Status: Granted - Kind: B2 - Application number: 17/577,420 - Filed: 2022-01-18 - Published: 2023-07-20 - Granted: 2024-06-11 - Earliest claimed: 2022-01-18 - Assignees: Dell Products L.P. - Applicants: Dell Products L.P. - Inventors: Jean Pierre; Carol Sheridan; Shruti Shetty; Azzam Tannous; Massarrah Tannous; Huijun Xie - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US12008109B2 ## CPC - G06F 21/575: {Secure boot} - G06F 9/4416: {Network booting; Remote initial program loading [RIPL]} - G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities - G06F 21/64: Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures - G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system - G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N) ## Abstract Boot integrity of a storage platform is verified by comparing observed boot data values with expected boot data values stored in a secure remote cloud. The boot data values include hashes of software that runs at each stage of a boot sequence, e.g., BIOS, bootloader, kernel, and runlevel programs. The observed boot data values may be provided by a TPM using an AIK and nonce. If the observed boot data values fail to match the expected boot data values then a boot integrity service running on the storage platform limits functionality such as by disabling IO services, disabling remote data replication, enabling a diagnostic service, enabling a data collection service, disabling access by non-service accounts, and protecting a management database. ## Claims ### Claim 1 An apparatus comprising: a storage platform comprising at least one compute node comprising at least one general purpose processor, memory, a secure cryptoprocessor, non-volatile storage, and a boot integrity service loaded during a boot sequence, the boot integrity service configured to: obtain, from the secure cryptoprocessor, observed boot data values comprising: a first hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run BIOS POST; a second hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run bootloader; a third hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run kernel; and a fourth hash that uniquely represents the programs running at load/run runlevel programs; provide the observed boot data values comprising the first, second, third and fourth hashes as part of platform configuration register content included within a trusted platform quote along with a nonce and an attestation integrity key (AIK) signature, to a remote verifier in a secure remote network that does not contain the storage platform for comparison with expected boot data values; and responsive to a control command from the remote verifier generated in response to mismatch between the observed boot data values and the expected boot data values, limit functionality of the storage platform. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The apparatus of claim 1 wherein the boot integrity service is configured to return a nonce with the observed boot data values provided to the remote verifier. ### Claim 3 (depends on 1) The apparatus of claim 1 wherein the boot integrity service is configured to limit functionality of the storage platform by disabling IO services. ### Claim 4 (depends on 1) The apparatus of claim 1 wherein the boot integrity service is configured to limit functionality of the storage platform by disabling remote data replication. ### Claim 5 (depends on 1) The apparatus of claim 1 wherein the boot integrity service is configured to limit functionality of the storage platform by enabling a diagnostic service. ### Claim 6 (depends on 1) The apparatus of claim 1 wherein the boot integrity service is configured to limit functionality of the storage platform by enabling a data collection service. ### Claim 7 (depends on 1) The apparatus of claim 1 wherein the boot integrity service is configured to limit functionality of the storage platform by disabling access by non-service accounts. ### Claim 8 (depends on 1) The apparatus of claim 1 wherein the boot integrity service is configured to limit functionality of the storage platform by protecting a management database. ### Claim 9 A method implemented in a storage platform that comprises at least one compute node with at least one general purpose processor, memory, a secure cryptoprocessor, and non-volatile storage, the method comprising: obtaining, from the secure cryptoprocessor, observed boot data values comprising: a first hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run BIOS POST; a second hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run bootloader; a third hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run kernel; and a fourth hash that uniquely represents the programs running at load/run runlevel programs; provide the observed boot data values comprising the first, second, third and fourth hashes as part of platform configuration register content included within a trusted platform quote along with a nonce and an attestation integrity key (AIK) signature, to a remote verifier in a secure remote network that does not contain the storage platform for comparison with expected boot data values; and responsive to a control command from the remote verifier generated in response to mismatch between the observed boot data values and the expected boot data values, limiting functionality of the storage platform. ### Claim 10 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9 comprising returning a nonce with the observed boot data values provided to the remote verifier. ### Claim 11 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9 comprising limiting functionality of the storage platform by disabling IO services. ### Claim 12 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9 comprising limiting functionality of the storage platform by disabling remote data replication. ### Claim 13 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9 comprising limiting functionality of the storage platform by enabling a diagnostic service. ### Claim 14 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9 comprising limiting functionality of the storage platform by enabling a data collection service. ### Claim 15 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9 comprising limiting functionality of the storage platform by disabling access by non-service accounts. ### Claim 16 (depends on 9) The method of claim 9 comprising limiting functionality of the storage platform by protecting a management database. ### Claim 17 A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that when executed by a compute node cause the compute node to perform a method for checking boot integrity, the method comprising: obtaining, from a secure cryptoprocessor, observed boot data values comprising: a first hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run BIOS POST; a second hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run bootloader; a third hash that uniquely represents programs running at load/run kernel; and a fourth hash that uniquely represents the programs running at load/run runlevel programs; provide the observed boot data values comprising the first, second, third and fourth hashes as part of platform configuration register content included within a trusted platform quote along with a nonce and an attestation integrity key (AIK) signature, to a remote verifier in a secure remote network that does not contain the storage platform for comparison with expected boot data values; and responsive to a control command from the remote verifier generated in response to mismatch between the observed boot data values and the expected boot data values, limiting functionality of the compute node. ### Claim 18 (depends on 17) The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 17 wherein limiting functionality of the compute node comprises one or more of: disabling IO services; disabling remote data replication; enabling a diagnostic service; enabling a data collection service; disabling access by non-service accounts; and protecting a management database. ### Claim 19 (depends on 17) The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 17 comprising, responsive to a control command from the remote verifier generated in response to match between the observed boot data values and the expected boot data values, enabling functionality of the compute node. ### Claim 20 (depends on 17) The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 17 comprising providing a nonce and an attestation integrity key to the remote verifier with the observed boot data values.