# US 11,909,872 B2 · Set up and distribution of post-quantum secure pre-shared keys using extendible authentication protocol

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 11,909,872 B2
- Document ID: US11909872B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 18/054,219
- Filed: 2022-11-10
- Published: 2023-03-09
- Granted: 2024-02-20
- Earliest claimed: 2021-04-27
- Assignees: Cisco Technology, Inc.
- Applicants: Cisco Technology, Inc.
- Inventors: Amjad Inamdar; Lionel Florit; Eric Voit; Sujal Sheth; Chennakesava Reddy Gaddam
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US11909872B2

## CPC

- H04L 9/0852: {Quantum cryptography (transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio waves, e.g. light, infrared H04B10/00; wavelength-division multiplex systems H04J14/02; WDM arrangements H04J14/03)}
- H04L 9/0827: {involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths (network architectures or network communication protocols using different networks H04L63/18)}
- H04L 9/0838: {Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these (network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061)}
- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 9/304: {based on error correction codes, e.g. McEliece}
- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L 63/0869: {for achieving mutual authentication (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273)}
- H04L 63/0892: {by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Systems and methods are provided for quantum-resistant secure key distribution between a peer and an EAP authenticator by using an authentication server. The systems and methods include receiving requests for a COMMON-SEED and a quantum-safe public key from a peer and an EAP authenticator. The COMMON-SEED is encrypted using the quantum-safe public key of the peer and the quantum-safe public key of the EAP authenticator, and the encrypted COMMON-SEED is sent to the peer along with a request for a PPK_ID from the peer to complete authentication of the peer. The PPK_ID is received from the peer, and the encrypted COMMON-SEED and PPK_ID is sent to the EAP authenticator. A quantum-resistant secure channel is established between the peer and the EAP authenticator when the peer and the EAP authenticator share the same COMMON-SEED and the same PPK-ID.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
receiving requests for a COMMON-SEED and a quantum-safe public key from a peer and an extendible authentication protocol (EAP) authenticator;
encrypting the COMMON-SEED using the quantum-safe public key of the peer and the quantum-safe public key of the EAP authenticator;
sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED to the peer along with a request for a Postquantum Preshared Keys ID (PPKID) from the peer to complete authentication of the peer;
receiving the PPK_ID from the peer, wherein the PPK ID is from a key pair obtained from a first Synchronizing Key Server (SKS) server in electrical communication with the peer based upon the encrypted COMMON-SEED;
sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED and PPK_ID to the EAP authenticator; and
establishing a quantum-resistant secure channel between the peer and the EAP authenticator, wherein a message of EAP success is delivered from the EAP authenticator to the peer when the peer and the EAP authenticator share the same COMMON-SEED and the same PPK-ID.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising receiving a peer identity from the EAP authenticator through Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) based transport, wherein the EAP authenticator sends an EAP request to the peer for the peer identity and receives the peer identity from the peer.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the COMMON-SEED is generated by an authentication server.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the COMMON-SEED and the PPK_ID are decrypted using the EAP authenticator's quantum-safe private key by the EAP authenticator, wherein the quantum-safe private key is part of a pair consisting of quantum-safe private key and quantum-safe public key for the EAP authenticator.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the COMMON-SEED is decrypted using the peer's quantum-safe private key by the peer, wherein the quantum-safe private key is part of a pair consisting of quantum-safe private key and quantum-safe public key for the peer.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising generating new session key by adding SKS pre-shared key with an EAP Master Session Key (MSK) derivation technique.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising re-authenticating the peer and the EAP authenticator.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, wherein the re-authenticating the peer and the EAP authenticator comprises: receiving a new PPK_ID from the peer, wherein the new PPKID is generated by the first SKS server in electrical communication to the peer; retrieving the COMMON-SEED by using the new PPKID; sending the COMMON-SEED and the new PPKID to the EAP authenticator; and sending the COMMON-SEED to the peer.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the re-authenticating the peer and the EAP authenticator comprises:
receiving a flag of generating a new COMMON-SEED from the peer or the EAP authenticator; and
generating a new COMMON-SEED.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising refreshing COMMON-SEED by driving a refresh.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the peer is one of a user, a client, or supplicant.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the EAP authenticator comprises one of a wireless access point, a switch, a router, or a remote access server.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the peer is configured to generate a PPK and PPK ID based upon the COMMON-SEED.

### Claim 14 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the EAP authenticator is configured to get a PPK corresponding to the PPK_ID from the peer.

### Claim 15

A system comprising:
one or more processors;
a non-transitory computer readable medium comprising instructions stored therein, the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the processors perform operations comprising:
receiving requests for a COMMON-SEED and a quantum-safe public key from a peer and an extendible authentication protocol (EAP) authenticator;
encrypting the COMMON-SEED using the quantum-safe public key of the peer and the quantum-safe public key of the EAP authenticator;
sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED to the peer along with a request for a Postquantum Preshared Keys ID (PPKID) from the peer to complete authentication of the peer;
receiving the PPK_ID from the peer, wherein the PPK ID is from a key pair obtained from a first Synchronizing Key Server (SKS) server in electrical communication with the peer based upon the encrypted COMMON-SEED;
sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED and PPK_ID to the EAP authenticator;
and establishing a quantum-resistant secure channel between the peer and the EAP authenticator, wherein a message of EAP success is delivered from the EAP authenticator to the peer when the peer and the EAP authenticator share the same COMMON-SEED and the same PPK-ID.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The system of claim 15, wherein the COMMON-SEED is generated by an authentication server.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The system of claim 16, wherein the COMMON-SEED and the PPK_ID are decrypted using the EAP authenticator's quantum-safe private key by the EAP authenticator, wherein the quantum-safe private key is part of a pair consisting of quantum-safe private key and quantum-safe public key for the EAP authenticator.

### Claim 18

A non-transitory computer readable medium comprising instructions, the instructions, when executed by a computing system, cause the computing system to perform operations comprising:
receiving requests for a COMMON-SEED and a quantum-safe public key from a peer and an extendible authentication protocol (EAP) authenticator;
encrypting the COMMON-SEED using the quantum-safe public key of the peer and the quantum-safe public key of the EAP authenticator;
sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED to the peer along with a request for a Postquantum Preshared Keys ID (PPKID) from the peer to complete authentication of the peer;
receiving the PPK ID from the peer, wherein the PPK ID is from a key pair obtained from a first Synchronizing Key Server (SKS) server in electrical communication with the peer based upon the encrypted COMMON-SEED;
sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED and PPK ID to the EAP authenticator; and
establishing a quantum-resistant secure channel between the peer and the EAP authenticator, wherein a message of EAP success is delivered from the EAP authenticator to the peer when the peer and the EAP authenticator share the same COMMON-SEED and the same PPK-ID.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 18, wherein the COMMON-SEED is generated by an authentication server.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 19, wherein the COMMON-SEED is generated by an authentication server.
