# US 11,909,863 B2 · Certificate-based pairing of key fob device and control unit

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 11,909,863 B2
- Document ID: US11909863B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 16/417,876
- Filed: 2019-05-21
- Published: 2019-09-05
- Granted: 2024-02-20
- Earliest claimed: 2012-07-17
- Assignees: Texas Instruments Incorporated
- Applicants: Texas Instruments Incorporated
- Inventors: Eric Peeters; Jin-Meng Ho
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US11909863B2

## CPC

- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- B60K 35/60: Instruments characterised by their location or relative disposition in or on vehicles (arrangements of lighting devices on dashboards B60Q3/10)
- B60K 35/80: Arrangements for controlling instruments
- B60K 35/85: Arrangements for transferring vehicle- or driver-related data
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/061: {for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838)}
- H04W 12/04: Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- B60K 35/213: {Virtual instruments}
- B60K 2360/23: using reflectors
- B60K 2360/25: using filters
- B60K 2360/27: using semi-transparent optical elements
- B60K 2360/31: Virtual images
- B60K 2360/334: Projection means
- B60K 2360/77: Instrument locations other than the dashboard
- B60R 25/24: using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
- B60R 2325/108: Encryption
- G02B 5/30: Polarising elements (light-modulating devices with active elements G02F1/00)
- G02B 26/0833: {the reflecting element being a micromechanical device, e.g. a MEMS mirror, DMD (G02B26/0825 takes precedence; micromechanical devices in general B81B)}
- G02B 27/01: Head-up displays
- G02B 27/0101: {characterised by optical features (G02B27/0172 takes precedence)}
- G02B 2027/0118: {comprising devices for improving the contrast of the display / brillance control visibility}
- G06K 7/10227: {loading programming parameters or programs into the interrogator, e.g. for configuring the interrogator}
- G07C 9/00309: {operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks}
- G07C 2009/00769: {with data transmission performed by wireless means}
- H01S 5/4012: {Beam combining, e.g. by the use of fibres, gratings, polarisers, prisms}
- H01S 5/4093: {Red, green and blue [RGB] generated directly by laser action or by a combination of laser action with nonlinear frequency conversion}
- H04L 9/0838: {Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these (network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061)}
- H04L 9/0844: {with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys}
- H04L 9/0897: {involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB}
- H04L 9/3013: {involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems}
- H04L 9/3066: {involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 2209/24: Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- H04L 2209/805: Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
- H04L 2209/84: Vehicles
- H04N 9/3129: {scanning a light beam on the display screen (scanning a light beam on a screen in displays other than projection devices G09G3/02; scanning systems in general G02B26/10; projectors using laser light sources in general H04N9/3161)}
- H04N 9/3155: {for controlling the light source (light source control per se H05B35/00 – H05B47/00; control of an illumination source for displays in general G09G3/3406)}
- H04N 9/3167: {for polarizing the light beam (polarizing optical systems per se G02B27/28)}
- H04W 12/50: Secure pairing of devices
- H05B 47/11: by determining the brightness or colour temperature of ambient light
- H05B 47/14: by determining electrical parameters of the light source
- Y02B 20/40: Control techniques providing energy savings, e.g. smart controller or presence detection
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- B60K: ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF PROPULSION UNITS OR OF TRANSMISSIONS IN VEHICLES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF PLURAL DIVERSE PRIME-MOVERS IN VEHICLES; AUXILIARY DRIVES FOR VEHICLES; INSTRUMENTATION OR DASHBOARDS FOR VEHICLES; ARRANGEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH COOLING, AIR INTAKE, GAS EXHAUST OR FUEL SUPPLY OF PROPULSION UNITS IN VEHICLES
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)
- B60R: VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G02B: OPTICAL ELEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS
- G06K: GRAPHICAL DATA READING (image or video recognition or understanding G06V); PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G07C: TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- H01S: DEVICES USING THE PROCESS OF LIGHT AMPLIFICATION BY STIMULATED EMISSION OF RADIATION [LASER] TO AMPLIFY OR GENERATE LIGHT; DEVICES USING STIMULATED EMISSION OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION IN WAVE RANGES OTHER THAN OPTICAL
- H04N: PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H05B: ELECTRIC HEATING; ELECTRIC LIGHT SOURCES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTRIC LIGHT SOURCES, IN GENERAL
- Y02B: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO BUILDINGS, e.g. HOUSING, HOUSE APPLIANCES OR RELATED END-USER APPLICATIONS

## Abstract

An electronic device, in disclosed embodiments, includes an antenna, transceiver circuitry coupled to the antenna, a memory configured to store a first operation key and instructions, and a processor coupled to the transceiver and to the memory. The processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory to cause the electronic device to, in response to receiving a first transmission containing an encrypted version of a second operation key that is encrypted by the first operation key, decrypt the encrypted version of the second operation key using the first operation key to recover the second operation key, store the second operation key in the memory, transmitting, by a transmitter of the electronic device, a second transmission that contains the first operation key and a command.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
storing a first key in a memory of a key fob;
executing an authenticated challenge-response protocol with the first key;
receiving, by a receiver of the key fob after storing the first key, a first transmission from a control unit, wherein the first transmission includes an encrypted version of a second key that is encrypted by the first key;
decrypting the encrypted version of the second key using the first key to recover the second key, wherein the second key is a replacement key for the first key;
restoring the second key in the memory of the key fob; and
executing the authenticated challenge-response protocol with the second key.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 further comprising, after decrypting the encrypted version of the second key using the first key, deleting the first key from the memory of the key fob.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising, after decrypting the encrypted version of the second key using the first key, deleting the first key from a second key fob.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the first key is a first random number and the second key is a second random number that differs from the first random number.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method of claim 4, wherein the first and second random numbers are 128-bit random numbers.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the second key is not stored in the memory of the key fob prior to receiving the first transmission.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein executing the authenticated challenge-response protocol with the first key is between the key fob and a pairing device, and wherein executing the authenticated challenge-response protocol with the second key is between the key fob and the control unit.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising providing, from the control unit to a second key fob, a signal including a request to change the first key.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the key fob is associated with a garage door system, hotel entrance system, or home entrance system.

### Claim 10

A key fob comprising:
an antenna;
transceiver circuitry coupled to the antenna;
a memory configured to store a first key and instructions; and
a processor coupled to the transceiver circuitry and to the memory, the processor being configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory to cause the key fob to:
execute an authenticated challenge-response protocol with the first key;
receive, via the transceiver circuitry and the antenna, a first transmission from a control unit, wherein the first transmission includes an encrypted version of a second key that is encrypted by the first key;
decrypt the encrypted version of the second key using the first key to recover the second key, wherein the second key is a replacement key for the first key;
store the second key in the memory; and
execute the authenticated challenge-response protocol with the second key.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The key fob of claim 10, wherein the second key is not stored in the memory prior to receipt of the first transmission.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The key fob of claim 10, wherein the execution of the instructions by the processor further cause the key fob to delete the first key from the memory after recovering the second key.

### Claim 13 (depends on 10)

The key fob of claim 10, wherein the first key is a first random number and the second key is a second random number that differs from the first random number.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The key fob of claim 13, wherein the first and second random numbers are 128-bit random numbers.

### Claim 15 (depends on 10)

The key fob of claim 10, wherein the instructions further cause the key fob to execute the authenticated challenge-response protocol with the first key between the key fob and a pairing device, and to execute the authenticated challenge-response protocol with the second key between the key fob and the control unit.

### Claim 16 (depends on 10)

The key fob of claim 10, wherein the transceiver circuitry is configured to transmit the first key to establish a valid operation with the control unit.

### Claim 17 (depends on 10)

The key fob of claim 10, wherein the control unit is onboard a vehicle.