Secure boot device and process
AssigneeSecurity Platform Inc.
InventorJong Ho Lee
Life of this patent
Estimating the term…
Abstract
Disclosed is an electronic device configured to perform a secure boot. The electronic device according to an embodiment disclosed herein may include: a first memory area for storing a firmware signed with a private key; a second memory area for storing a boot loader configured to verify integrity of the firmware and executing the firmware of which integrity has been verified; and a third memory area for storing a first public key paired with the private key, wherein the second memory area may store a second public key paired with the private key. The boot loader may verify the integrity of the firmware with the first public key when there is the first public key in the third memory area and verify the integrity of the firmware with the second public key when there is no first public key is in the third memory area.
Claims7
An electronic device configured to perform a secure boot, the electronic device comprising:
- a first memory area for storing a firmware signed with a private key;
- a second memory area for storing a boot loader configured to verify integrity of the firmware and executing the firmware of which the integrity has been verified;
- and
- a third memory area for storing a first public key paired with the private key,
- wherein the second memory area stores a second public key paired with the private key, and
- the boot loader verifies the integrity of the firmware with the first public key when there is the first public key in the third memory area and verifies the integrity of the firmware with the second public key when there is no first public key in the third memory area.
A secure boot method performed by an electronic device,
- operating a boot loader of the electronic device by supplying a power;
- checking a predetermined public key storage area to determine whether a first public key for verifying a signature of a firmware is written;
- verifying integrity of the firmware with the first public key when the first public key is written in the public key storage area as a result of the checking;
- and
- verifying the integrity of the firmware with a second public key embedded in the boot loader, when the first public key is not written in the public key storage area as the result of the checking,
- wherein the predetermined public key storage area is a memory area different from a memory area in which the boot loader is stored.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.