Man in the middle attack detection using operating channel validation under protected beacon

#This disclosure generally relates to systems and methods for wireless communications and, more particularly, to operating channel validation under protected beacon.

#Wireless devices are becoming widely prevalent and are increasingly requesting access to wireless channels. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is developing one or more standards that utilize Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) in channel allocation.

#FIG. 1 is a network diagram illustrating an example network environment for operating channel validation, in accordance with one or more example embodiments of the present disclosure.

#FIG. 2 depicts an illustrative schematic diagram for an man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, in accordance with one or more example embodiments of the present disclosure.

#FIG. 3 depicts an illustrative schematic diagram for operating channel validation, in accordance with one or more example embodiments of the present disclosure.

#The following description and the drawings sufficiently illustrate specific embodiments to enable those skilled in the art to practice them. Other embodiments may incorporate structural, logical, electrical, process, algorithm, and other changes. Portions and features of some embodiments may be included in, or substituted for, those of other embodiments. Embodiments set forth in the claims encompass all available equivalents of those claims.

#A new operating channel validation (OCV) mechanism was introduced in 802.11 REVmd. Under this mechanism the access point (AP) includes its operating channel in Message #3 of the 4-way Handshake (mechanism that is applied when the station device (STA) associates with the AP). At this stage the message is protected and cannot be manipulated. Therefore, the STA can compare the channel information in Msg #3 to the actual channel over which it associates with the AP, and disconnect in case of a mismatch. This mechanism require changes in the 4-way Handshake protocol, and therefore is not backward compatible. It is an optional feature that may not be supported by all APs and STAs (its sole purpose is to solve the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, and therefore may not be widely supported).

#Example embodiments of the present disclosure relate to systems, methods, and devices for Operating Channel Validation under Protected Beacon.