US 11,700,130 B2Granted

Methods and arrangements for vehicle-to-vehicle communications

AssigneeTahoe Research, Ltd.

InventorsMohammed Karmoose, Rafael Misoczki, Liuyang Yang, Xiruo Liu, Moreno Ambrosin, Manoj R. Sastry

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Abstract

Logic may implement protocols and procedures for vehicle-to-vehicle communications for platooning. Logic may implement a communications topology to distinguish time-critical communications from non-time-critical communications. Logic may sign time-critical communications with a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm with a hash function such as Keccak MAC or a Cipher-based MAC. Logic may generate a MAC based on pairwise, symmetric keys to sign the time-critical communications. Logic may sign non-time-critical communications with a digital signature. Logic may encrypt non-time-critical communications. Logic may append a certificate to non-time-critical communications. Logic may append a header to messages to create data packets and may include a packet type to identify time-critical communications. Logic may decode and verify the time-critical messages with a pairwise symmetric key. And logic may prioritize time-critical communications to meet a specified latency.

Claims16

Dependent claims

An apparatus, comprising:

wireless communication circuitry;
processing circuitry;
and
a memory device, storing a leader vehicle symmetric encryption key (SEK) associated with a leader vehicle in a platoon of vehicles, a first SEK associated with a first follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles, a second SEK associated with a second follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles, and a third SEK associated with a third follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles, and instructions executable by the processing circuitry, which when executed cause the processing circuitry to:
generate a first message authentication code (MAC) for a data packet with the first SEK;
generate a second MAC for the data packet with the second SEK;
generate a third MAC for the data packet with the third SEK;
transmit the data packet with the first MAC, the second MAC, and the third MAC to the first follower vehicle via the wireless communication circuitry;
determine whether the data packet is time critical;
compute the first MAC, the second MAC, and the third MAC based on a secure hash algorithm (SHA) responsive to a determination that the data packet is time critical;
and
encrypt a payload portion of the data packet responsive to a determination that the data packet is not time critical.

9 more elements

A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable medium, comprising instructions, which when executed by a processor of a leader vehicle of a platoon of vehicles, cause the processor to:

generate a first message authentication code (MAC) for a data packet with a first symmetric encryption key (SEK) associated with a first follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles;
generate a second MAC for the data packet with a second SEK associated with a second follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles;
generate a third MAC for the data packet with a third SEK associated with a third follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles;
transmit the data packet with the first MAC, the second MAC, and the third MAC to the first follower vehicle;
determine whether the data packet is time critical;
compute the first MAC, the second MAC, and the third MAC based on a secure hash algorithm (SHA) responsive to a determination that the data packet is time critical;
and
encrypt a payload portion of the data packet responsive to a determination that the data packet is not time critical.

5 more elements

A method, comprising:

generating, at processing circuitry of a leader vehicle in a platoon of vehicles, a first message authentication code (MAC) for a data packet with a first symmetric encryption key (SEK) associated with a first follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles;
generating, at the processing circuitry, a second MAC for the data packet with a second SEK associated with a second follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles;
generate, at the processing circuitry, a third MAC for the data packet with a third SEK associated with a third follower vehicle in the platoon of vehicles;
transmitting, via wireless communication circuitry of the leader vehicle, the data packet with the first MAC, the second MAC, and the third MAC to the first follower vehicle;
determining, at the processing circuitry, whether the data packet is time critical;
computing, at the processing circuitry, the first MAC, the second MAC, and the third MAC based on a secure hash algorithm (SHA) responsive to a determination that the data packet is time critical;
and
encrypting, at the processing circuitry, a payload portion of the data packet responsive to a determination that the data packet is not time critical.

5 more elements

Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.

Facts

Application: 17/007,598Filed 31 Aug 2020 · continuation
Priority: 20 Dec 2017
Published: US 2020/0403804 A124 Dec 2020
Granted: 11 Jul 2023
Term ends: Not estimatedThe source records don’t support an estimate.

Classification13 codes

H04L 9/3242
Using cryptographic hash functions: involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
G08G 1/22
Traffic control systems for road vehicles: platooning, i.e. convoy of communicating vehicles
H04L 9/0637
Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation: modes of operation, e.g. cipher…
H04L 9/0643
The encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions;…

Family

Application15/848,785Parent of this continuation · filed 20 Dec 2017
US 2020/0403804 A1Pre-grant publication · published 24 Dec 2020
US 10,805,086 B2Parent of this continuation
US 2019/0044728 A1Published application
US 11,700,130 B2This patent

From the US filing history. Foreign family members aren’t listed.