Randomly-modified first network to second network communication
AssigneeThe Government of the United States, as represented by the Secretary of the Army
InventorsMatthew Lazzaro, William Toth
Life of this patent
Estimating the term…
Abstract
Various embodiments are described that relate to random noise addition to a communication. A first secure network can employ a first encryption scheme and a second secure network can employ a second encryption scheme. In order to communicate between the first secure network and the second secure network such that the schemes are not decipherable, random noise can be added to a communication designated to transfer from the first secure network to the second secure network.
Claims20
A system, that is part of a first secure network, comprising:
- a reception component configured to receive a randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication by way of a non-encrypted communication channel;
- an encryption component configured to encrypt, according to a first network encryption scheme, the randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication into an encrypted first secure network voice communication;
- and
- a transmission component configured to transmit the encrypted first secure network voice communication along the first secure network,
- where the randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication is derived from an encrypted second secure network voice communication from a second secure network,
- where the first secure network and the second secure network are distinct networks,
- where the encrypted second secure network voice communication is encrypted in accordance with a second network encryption scheme, and
- where the first network encryption scheme and the second network encryption scheme are different encryption schemes.
A non-transitory computer-readable medium, which is part of a first secure network, configured to store processor-executable instructions that when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform a method, the method comprising:
- receiving a randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication by way of a non-encrypted communication channel;
- encrypting, according to a first network encryption scheme, the randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication into an encrypted first secure network voice communication;
- and
- transmitting the encrypted first secure network voice communication along the first secure network,
- where the randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication is derived from an encrypted second secure network voice communication from a second secure network,
- where the first secure network and the second secure network are distinct networks,
- where the encrypted second secure network voice communication is encrypted in accordance with a second network encryption scheme, and
- where the first network encryption scheme and the second network encryption scheme are different encryption schemes.
An intermediary communications hardware module that includes a non-transitory computer-readable medium and a processor and that links a first secure network with a second secure network, the computer-readable medium is communicatively coupled to the processor and stores a command set executable by the processor to facilitate operation of a component set, the component set comprising:
- a reception component configured to receive a randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication by way of a non-encrypted communication channel;
- an encryption component configured to encrypt, according to a first network encryption scheme, the randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication into an encrypted first secure network voice communication;
- and
- a transmission component configured to transmit the encrypted first secure network voice communication along the first secure network,
- where the randomly-modified second secure network-based non-encrypted voice communication is derived from an encrypted second secure network voice communication from the second secure network,
- where the first secure network and the second secure network are distinct networks,
- where the encrypted second secure network voice communication is encrypted in accordance with a second network encryption scheme, and
- where the first network encryption scheme and the second network encryption scheme are different encryption schemes.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.