Compiling a signature

A vehicle, comprising:

• a hardware security module operable in a secure mode and in a non-secure mode, with only one of the secure mode or the non-secure mode being active at a time, and comprising:
• a cryptographic module comprising at least one processor configured to conduct at least one cryptographic function, including compiling a signature based on input data, a secret key, and a seed value,
• a software module configured with a first software or a first firmware and a second software or a second firmware, wherein the first software or the first firmware is exclusively run during the secure mode and the second software or the second firmware is exclusively run during the non-secure mode, and
• a first secured memory accessible only by the software module via first software or the first firmware, the first secured memory configured to store the secret key,
• wherein, during the secure mode, the first software or the first firmware is configured to read the secret key from the first secured memory and configure the cryptographic module by providing the secret key and the seed value to the cryptographic module for storing therein,
• wherein, during the non-secure mode, the cryptographic module is configured to generate a signature based on the input data utilizing the secret key and the seed value stored in the cryptographic module, and
• wherein, during the non-secure mode, the cryptographic module is configured to generate the signature without granting the second software or the second firmware access to either the secret key or the seed value.

A method for operating a device, wherein the device comprises a cryptographic module, the method comprising:

• operating the device in either a secure mode or a non-secure mode, with only one of the secure mode or the non-secure mode being active at a time, wherein a first software or a first firmware is exclusively run during the secure mode and a second software or a second firmware is exclusively run during the non-secure mode;
• storing a secret key in a first secured memory that is only accessible by the first software or the first firmware;
• configuring, by the first software or a first firmware, the cryptographic module during the secure mode by storing the secret key and a seed value in the cryptographic module,
• wherein, during the secure mode, the first software or the first firmware is configured to read the secret key from the first secured memory and configure the cryptographic module by providing the secret key and the seed value to the cryptographic module for storing therein,
• wherein, during the non-secure mode, generating, by the cryptographic module, a signature based on input data utilizing the secret key and the seed value stored in the cryptographic module, and
• wherein, during the non-secure mode, preventing, by the cryptographic module, the second software or the second firmware access to either the secret key or the seed value stored in the cryptographic module.