Privacy solutions for cyber space
OwnerGideon Samidinventor
Life of this patent
Estimating the term…
Abstract
Developing a cyber security protocol to enable two members of a community to conduct a conversation without revealing neither their identity, nor the fact that a conversation took place. Secret randomized matching is used to allow people to claim certain personal attributes like age, place of residence, having a license, but without exposing their individual identity.
Claims10
A method of enabling members of a community, C, to perform bilateral and multi-lateral communications within the community C without disclosing:
- (i) the content of any message, (ii) the pattern of communications between any two or more members of the community C, and (iii) the fact that a certain member of the community C has participated in communications with a specific other member or specific other members of the community C, the method comprising:
- by a computing device:
- utilizing a camouflage cipher, CC, that discards meaningless bits in a bit flow, the bit flow also containing ciphertext bits for an intended recipient, decrypting only the ciphertext bits intended for the recipient that are found in the bit flow;
- regarding two members of C, i and j, who share a cipher key kij utilized by the camouflage cipher CC:
- (a) member i of C, prepares a message mij for member j of C,
- (b) member i of C using CC encrypts mij to m*ij using kij,
- (c) member i of C using CC concatenates upfront noise (a stream of randomized bits) Nu and backside noise (a stream of randomized bits) Nb to m*ij, creating a bit string Sij:
- Sij=Nu−m*ij−Nb,
- (d) member i of C submits Sij to an untraceable communications website (UCW), where Sij is added to other messages uploaded by other members of C,
- (e) member j of C downloads Sij,
- (f) using the CC member j of C removes Nu and Nb from Sij,
- (g) member j of C decrypts m*ij using kij and reads mij.
A method of establishing a chain of trust agents that are used by individuals to claim personal attributes without revealing their identity;
- the method comprising:
- (i) an individual person, P, associated with n personal attributes:
- A0={a1, a2, . . . an};
- (ii) a first trust-agent, TA1;
- (iii) additional t−1 trust agents TA2, . . . TAt;
- (iv) An entity Q for which P wishes to prove their association with attributes a1, a2, . . . ai for i=1, 2, . . . n, without revealing their identity, Ip;
- the method further comprising the following steps:
- 1′. P presents Ip and A before TA1;
- 2′. TA1 verifies P via Ip, and verifies A as associated with P;
- 3′. TA1 activates a “Decoy Procedure” defined as follows:
- 3′.1 The activating trust agent, TA, defines an entry bit string, x, comprising Ip and A*:
- x={Ip, A*} where A*=A or A*∈A,
- 3′.2 The activating trust agent uses a random number generator, RNG, to build a corresponding exit bit string x′:
- x′=TA(x,RNG)
- wherein the values of A* remains unchanged, but Ip is replaced with a string H1:
- x′={H1, A*},
- 3′.3 The activating trust agent, TA, keeps a record to document the match x↔x′,
- 3′.4 The activating trust agent, TA, transmits to the submitter of x the bit string x′;
- 4′. P receives the output from the Decoy Procedure, x′0=x1 from TA1;
- where x0={Ip, A}, and where x1={H1, A}, where H1 is a randomized match for Ip;
- 5′. P selects an arbitrary subset A1 of A, A1∈A, and modifies string x1 as follows:
- x1={H1, A1};
- 6′. P submits x1 to trust agent TA2;
- 7′. Trust agent TA2 activates the Decoy Procedure, and thereby generates output string x2:
- x2=TA2(x1,RNG)
- and where:
- x2={H2,A1};
- and where P selects an arbitrary subset A2 of A1, A2∈A1, and modifies string x2 as follows:
- x2={H1,A2};
- 8′. where for j=1, 2, . . . t−1:
- 8′.1 P modifies xj from xj={Hj, Aj−1} to xj={Hj, Aj} where Aj∈Aj−1,
- 8′.2 P submits xj to TAj+1,
- 8′.3 TAj+1 activates the Decoy procedure and generates x′j={Hj, Aj−1} xj−1 xj+1={Hj+1, Aj},
- 8′.4 P modifies xj+1 from xj+1={Hj+1, Aj} to xj+1={Hj+1, Aj+1} where Aj+1∈Aj;
- 9′. P submits xj to Q, for j=1, 2, . . . t;
- 10′. Q accepts that P is associated with the set of personal attributes Aj.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.