# US 11,444,965 B2 · Method and system for securing an aircraft against cyberattacks > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 11,444,965 B2 - Document ID: US11444965B2 - Status: Granted - Kind: B2 - Application number: 16/686,880 - Filed: 2019-11-18 - Published: 2020-05-28 - Granted: 2022-09-13 - Earliest claimed: 2018-11-23 - Assignees: Airbus SAS - Applicants: Airbus (S.A.S.) - Inventors: Bernard Rousse; Claude Poli - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US11444965B2 ## CPC - G06F 21/554: {involving event detection and direct action} - B64F 5/60: Testing or inspecting aircraft components or systems - H04L 43/08: Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters - H04L 63/1425: {Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection} - H04L 67/12: specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks - G06F 2221/033: Test or assess software - G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N) - B64F: GROUND OR AIRCRAFT-CARRIER-DECK INSTALLATIONS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH AIRCRAFT; DESIGNING, MANUFACTURING, ASSEMBLING, CLEANING, MAINTAINING OR REPAIRING AIRCRAFT, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; HANDLING, TRANSPORTING, TESTING OR INSPECTING AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR - H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M) ## Abstract Methods and systems for detection of cyberattacks in onboard systems of aircraft. Measurements carried out on these onboard systems are correlated, in case of doubt of one of the measurements, to validate the doubt, (and therefore a cyberattack) or to avert the risk. The correlation can be understood as a coming into correspondence of two or more elements/facts (for example measurements or acquired values) which makes it possible to highlight if there is a dependence of one upon the other and thus to justify modifications of one by those of the other. The correlation, preferably temporal, between identification of a suspect measurement and one or more other (quasi)simultaneous measurements allows dynamic detection, in real time, of the cyberattacks, whether they be already known or not. Thus, there is no dependence on a static protection of the onboard systems developed on the a priori knowledge of the existing cyberattacks alone. ## Claims ### Claim 1 A method for securing an onboard system in an aircraft against cyberattacks, the method comprising: measuring at least a first parameter in the onboard system; detecting an abnormal measurement of the first parameter; determining a correlation between the abnormal measurement of the first parameter and a value of at least a second avionic parameter to identify a cyberattack; and initiating a corrective action in the aircraft as a function of the determined correlation, wherein detecting the abnormal measurement of the first parameter prior to determining the correlation comprises: determining a suspect measurement of the first parameter in the onboard system; comparing the suspect measurement with a redundant measurement of the first parameter in a redundant onboard system at a same or approximate temporal moment, the redundant onboard system being an onboard system redundant with the onboard system; when the suspect measurement and the redundant measurement are different values, setting aside the suspect measurement from determining the correlation; and when the suspect measurement and the redundant measurement are equal values, retaining the suspect measurement for determining the correlation. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The method according to claim 1, wherein the correlation is representative of a temporal correlation between detection of the abnormal measurement of the first parameter and a modification of the second avionic parameter. ### Claim 3 (depends on 2) The method according to claim 2, wherein determining the correlation comprises comparing a measurement of the second avionic parameter, at a time of detection of the abnormal measurement, with another measurement of the second avionic parameter at least at one preceding time. ### Claim 4 (depends on 1) The method according to claim 1, wherein steps of measuring, detecting, determining, and initiating are carried out on board the aircraft. ### Claim 5 (depends on 1) The method according to claim 1, wherein: the abnormal measurement of the first parameter and the value of at least the second avionic parameter are transmitted from the aircraft to a ground station; and determining the correlation is carried out by the ground station. ### Claim 6 (depends on 5) The method according to claim 5, wherein the aircraft receives, from the ground station, the corrective action to be initiated. ### Claim 7 (depends on 5) The method according to claim 5, wherein determining the correlation comprises correlating the abnormal measurement of the first parameter with a datum obtained from at least one other aircraft. ### Claim 8 A system for securing an onboard system in an aircraft against cyberattacks, the system comprising: one or more probes for measuring at least a first parameter in the onboard system; a memory; a processor for detecting an abnormal measurement of the first parameter; a correlation processor configured for determining a correlation between the abnormal measurement of the first parameter and a value of at least a second avionic parameter to identify a cyberattack; and a reaction module configured for initiating a corrective action in the aircraft as a function of the determined correlation; wherein the processor for detecting the abnormal measurement of the first parameter prior to determination of the correlation is configured for: determining a suspect measurement of the first parameter in the onboard system; comparing the suspect measurement with a redundant measurement of the first parameter in a redundant onboard system at a same or approximate temporal moment, the redundant onboard system being an onboard system redundant with the onboard system; when the suspect measurement and the redundant measurement are different values, setting aside the suspect measurement from determining the correlation; and when the suspect measurement and the redundant measurement are equal values, retaining the suspect measurement for determining the correlation. ### Claim 9 (depends on 8) An aircraft comprising an onboard system and a system for securing the onboard system according to claim 8.