# US 11,442,180 B2 · Method and system for verifying integrity of GPS position information

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 11,442,180 B2
- Document ID: US11442180B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 16/699,267
- Filed: 2019-11-29
- Published: 2021-05-20
- Granted: 2022-09-13
- Earliest claimed: 2019-11-19
- Assignees: Industry Academy Cooperation Foundation of Sejong University
- Applicants: Industry Academy Cooperation Foundation of Sejong University
- Inventors: Ji Sun Shin; Byung Woon Park; Shin Cheol Lee; Ye Bin Lee
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US11442180B2

## CPC

- G01S 19/49: whereby the further system is an inertial position system, e.g. loosely-coupled
- H04L 9/0872: {using geo-location information, e.g. location data, time, relative position or proximity to other entities}
- G01S 19/215: {issues related to spoofing}
- G01S 19/421: {by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different satellite radio beacon positioning systems; by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different modes of operation in a single system}
- H04L 9/006: {involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models (network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/1466: {Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks}
- H04W 12/06: Authentication
- H04W 12/104: Location integrity, e.g. secure geotagging
- H04W 12/108: Source integrity
- H04W 12/12: Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W 12/63: Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
- G01S 5/06: Position of source determined by co-ordinating a plurality of position lines defined by path-difference measurements (G01S5/12 takes precedence)
- G01S 5/14: Determining absolute distances from a plurality of spaced points of known location
- G01S: RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

A method and a system for verifying integrity of GPS position information according to a disclosed embodiment is a method performed in an unmanned moving object including one or more processors and a memory for storing one or more programs executed by the one or more processors. The method includes an operation of performing an authentication process for a connected base station, by the unmanned moving object, an operation of measuring a position of the unmanned moving object by performing wireless communication with a plurality of authenticated base stations, and an operation of verifying the GPS position information by comparing a value of the measured position with a position value of the GPS position information received from a satellite.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of verifying integrity of global positioning system (GPS) position information, performed in an unmanned moving object including one or more processors and a memory for storing one or more programs executed by the one or more processors, the method comprising:
an operation of performing an authentication process for a connected base station, by the unmanned moving object;
an operation of measuring a position of the unmanned moving object by performing wireless communication with a plurality of authenticated base stations; and
an operation of verifying the GPS position information by comparing a value of the measured position with a position value of the GPS position information received from a satellite,
wherein, when the authentication process has succeeded, but the verification of the GPS position information fails, the unmanned moving object does not transmit data to the base station,
wherein the operation of the verifying comprises:
an operation of calculating first dynamics of the unmanned moving object for a predetermined time period on the basis of the measured position value;
an operation of calculating second dynamics of the unmanned moving object for a predetermined time period on the basis of the received GPS position information;
an operation of confirming whether a difference between the first dynamics and the second dynamics is within a preset error range by comparing the first dynamics and the second dynamics to determine whether a GPS spoofing attack is performed on the unmanned mobile vehicle,
wherein the operation of calculating the first dynamics includes:
an operation of calculating a moving direction and a moving speed of the unmanned moving object on the basis of the measured position value; and
an operation of calculating measured-position-based dynamics by accumulating the calculated moving direction and moving speed for a predetermined time period; and
the operation of calculating the second dynamics includes:
an operation of calculating a moving direction and a moving speed of the unmanned moving object on the basis of the received GPS position information; and
an operation of calculating GPS-position-based dynamics by accumulating the calculated moving direction and moving speed for a predetermined time period.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method according to claim 1, wherein the operation of performing the authentication process includes:
an operation of transmitting a random number (nonce) to the base station, by the unmanned moving object;
an operation of creating a signature value by signing the random number using a secret key skID corresponding to its own identification information (ID), by the base station; and
an operation of verifying validity of the signature value received from the base station, by the unmanned moving object.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method according to claim 2, wherein the base station transmits the identification information (ID) to an authentication server and receives the secret key skID corresponding to the identification information (ID).

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method according to claim 3, wherein the unmanned moving object verifies validity of the signature value by using a master public key previously issued by the authentication server and stored in the unmanned moving object.

### Claim 5

A system for verifying integrity of global positioning system (GPS) position information of an unmanned moving object, the unmanned moving object comprising:
an authentication unit configured to perform an authentication process for a connected base station, by an unmanned moving object;
a position measurement unit configured to measure a position of the unmanned moving object by performing wireless communication with a plurality of authenticated base stations; and
a position verification unit configured to verify the GPS position information by comparing a value of the measured position with a position value of the GPS position information received from a satellite,
wherein, when the authentication process has succeeded, but the verification of the GPS position information fails, the unmanned moving object does not transmit data to the base station,
wherein the position verification unit is configured to:
calculate a moving direction and a moving speed of the unmanned moving object on the basis of the measured position value, and calculates measured-position-based dynamics by accumulating the calculated moving direction and moving speed for a predetermined time period;
calculate a moving direction and a moving speed of the unmanned moving object on the basis of the received GPS position information, and calculates GPS-position-based dynamics by accumulating the calculated moving direction and moving speed for a predetermined time period; and
confirm whether a difference between the measured-position-based dynamics and the GPS-position-based dynamics is within a preset error range by comparing the first dynamics and the second dynamics to determine whether a GPS spoofing attack is performed on the unmanned mobile vehicle.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The system according to claim 5, wherein the authentication unit transmits a random number (nonce) to the base station, and verifies, when the base station signs the random number using a secret key skID corresponding to its own identification information (ID) and transmits a signature value to the unmanned moving object, validity of the signature value received from the base station.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The system according to claim 6, wherein the base station transmits the identification information (ID) to an authentication server and receives the secret key skID corresponding to the identification information (ID).

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The system according to claim 7, wherein the authentication unit verifies validity of the signature value by using a master public key previously issued by the authentication server and stored in the unmanned moving object.