# US 11,310,622 B2 · Integrated subscriber identity module having a core OS and an application OS

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 11,310,622 B2
- Document ID: US11310622B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 16/320,309
- Filed: 2017-07-27
- Published: 2019-09-05
- Granted: 2022-04-19
- Earliest claimed: 2016-07-28
- Assignees: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
- Applicants: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
- Inventors: Stefan Eckardt
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US11310622B2

## CPC

- H04W 4/00: Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- H04W 4/60: Subscription-based services using application servers or record carriers, e.g. SIM application toolkits
- H04W 8/183: {Processing at user equipment or user record carrier}
- H04W 12/03: Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W 12/069: using certificates or pre-shared keys
- H04W 12/10: Integrity
- H04W 12/37: Managing security policies for mobile devices or for controlling mobile applications
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A chipset for a mobile radio-enabled end device is provided in which an integrated subscriber identity module is arranged in a secure processor of the chipset, and in which an operating system of the secure processor is arranged or arrangeable. The operating system comprises a core OS and an application OS, wherein the application OS comprises a core OS verification apparatus which is arranged to verify the integrity of the core OS upon it being put into operation and to continue the putting into operation at most only in the case of a successful verification of the core OS and to cause a fault measure and/or to interrupt or terminate the putting into operation in the case of an unsuccessful verification.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A Chipset for a mobile radio-enabled end device, in which an integrated subscriber identity module is arranged in a secure processor of the chipset and in which an operating system of the secure processor is arranged or arrangeable, the operating system comprising a core OS and an application OS;
wherein the application OS comprises a core OS verification apparatus which is arranged to verify the integrity of the core OS upon the putting into operation of the application OS and to continue the putting into operation of the application OS at most only in the case of a successful verification of the core OS and to cause a fault measure and/or to interrupt or terminate the putting into operation of the application OS in the case of an unsuccessful verification.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The chipset according to claim 1, further comprising:
a bootloader implemented in the secure processor, which is arranged to directly or indirectly enforce that the application OS applies the core OS verification apparatus upon it being put into operation in order to verify the core OS.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The chipset according to claim 1, further comprising:
an internal secure working memory exclusively assigned to the secure processor;
an external non-volatile memory located in the chipset but outside the secure processor, in which an encrypted memory image of the core OS is stored;
a bootloader implemented in the secure processor, which is arranged to load the core OS from the external non-volatile memory into the internal secure working memory, to decrypt it where applicable, and to put it into operation in the internal secure working memory.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The chipset according to claim 1, further comprising:
an internal secure working memory exclusively assigned to the secure processor;
an external non-volatile memory located in the chipset but outside the secure processor, in which an encrypted memory image of the application OS is stored;
a bootloader implemented in the secure processor, which is arranged to load the application OS from the external non-volatile memory into the internal secure working memory, to decrypt it where applicable, and to put it into operation in the internal secure working memory.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The chipset according to claim 1, wherein the memory image of the core OS or the memory image of the application OS is stored encrypted in the external non-volatile memory and can be brought to execution exclusively by the secure processor.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The chipset according to claim 1, further comprising:
an external non-volatile memory located in the chipset but outside the secure processor, in which an encrypted memory image of the core OS is stored;
wherein the application OS is arranged to verify the memory image of the core OS for integrity.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The chipset according to claim 6, wherein the core OS verification apparatus is arranged to calculate a checksum or hash value over the memory image of the core OS stored in the external non-volatile memory and to verify that it matches or corresponds to a checksum or a hash value from a list of checksums or hash values of admissible core OS.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The chipset according to claim 7, wherein the list is stored:
in the chipset; or
at an external server; or
both in the chipset and at an external server, the lists in the chipset and at the external server being synchronized with each other as needed.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The chipset according to claim 1, wherein the core OS verification apparatus is arranged to verify the integrity of the core OS by means of a certificate issued by a trustworthy external entity, against a list of admissible core OS.
