# US 11,308,240 B2 · Cryptographic circuit and data processing > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 11,308,240 B2 - Document ID: US11308240B2 - Status: Granted - Kind: B2 - Application number: 16/051,775 - Filed: 2018-08-01 - Published: 2019-02-14 - Granted: 2022-04-19 - Earliest claimed: 2017-08-09 - Assignees: Infineon Technologies AG - Applicants: Infineon Technologies AG - Inventors: Alexander Zeh; Viola Rieger; Klaus Scheibert - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US11308240B2 ## CPC - G06F 21/72: in cryptographic circuits - G06F 7/588: {Random number generators, i.e. based on natural stochastic processes} - G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services} - G09C 1/00: Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system (cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00) - H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key} - H04L 9/083: {involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]} - H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols} - H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords} - H04L 9/0877: {using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]} - H04L 2209/84: Vehicles - G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N) - G09C: CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY - H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M) ## Abstract A method for cryptographic data processing by means of a circuit comprises using a first circuit section to perform a first cryptographic operation in order to obtain first cryptographic data. The method further includes transmitting the first cryptographic data to a second circuit section via a transmission area of the circuit that physically separates the second circuit section from the first circuit section and whose resistance to attacks is at most as high as the resistance of the first circuit section. The method includes using the second circuit section to perform a second cryptographic operation using the first cryptographic data in order to obtain second cryptographic data. ## Claims ### Claim 1 A method for cryptographic data processing using a circuit, comprising: using a first circuit section of the circuit to perform a first cryptographic operation on data in order to obtain first cryptographic data, wherein the first circuit section is arranged in a secure area associated with a first resistance to attacks; transmitting the first cryptographic data to a second circuit section of the circuit through a transmission area of the circuit that physically separates the second circuit section from the first circuit section, and wherein the transmission area is in a less secure area with a second resistance to attacks that is less than the first resistance to attacks associated with the first circuit section; and using the second circuit section to perform a second cryptographic operation using the first cryptographic data in order to obtain second cryptographic data; wherein the first cryptographic operation is performed using a long term key that is configured to encrypt and/or decrypt the data. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the second cryptographic operation is also performed using a long term key that is configured to encrypt and/or decrypt data. ### Claim 3 (depends on 1) The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the data comprises a short term key, and wherein the first cryptographic operation comprises encrypting the short term key using the long term key. ### Claim 4 (depends on 1) The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein that circuit section from the first circuit section and the second circuit section whose resistance to attacks is higher controls that circuit section whose resistance to attacks is lower. ### Claim 5 (depends on 1) The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the first cryptographic data comprise a short term key generated using the first cryptographic operation. ### Claim 6 (depends on 1) The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the first cryptographic data are transmitted in unencrypted fashion. ### Claim 7 (depends on 1) The method as claimed in claim 1, comprising: in the first circuit section, generating a public key for the first circuit section, wherein the first cryptographic data comprise the public key for the first circuit section; and in the second circuit section, generating a shared key using the public key for the first circuit section, wherein the second cryptographic data comprise the shared key; and then: in the second circuit section, generating a public key for the second circuit section, wherein the second cryptographic data comprise the public key for the second circuit section; and in the first circuit section, generating a second shared key using the public key for the second circuit section, wherein the first cryptographic data comprise the second shared key. ### Claim 8 (depends on 1) The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the second cryptographic data comprise a signature for other data, the method further comprising: generating the signature of the other data; and transmitting the other data with the signature from the second circuit section to the first circuit section and/or to an interface that is configured for communication with a third party. ### Claim 9 (depends on 8) The method as claimed in claim 8, the method further comprising: checking the signature in the first circuit section; and processing the other data. ### Claim 10 A method for cryptographic data processing using a circuit, comprising: using a first circuit section of the circuit to perform a first cryptographic operation on data in order to obtain first cryptographic data, wherein the first circuit section is arranged in a secure area associated with a first resistance to attacks; transmitting the first cryptographic data to a second circuit section through a transmission area of the circuit that physically separates the second circuit section from the first circuit section, and wherein the second circuit section is in a less secure area with a second resistance to attacks that the first resistance to attacks associated with the first circuit section, and using the second circuit section of the circuit to perform a second cryptographic operation using the first cryptographic data in order to obtain second cryptographic data, wherein the second cryptographic data comprise a signature for other data, the method further comprising: generating the signature of the other data; and transmitting the other data with the signature from the second circuit section to the first circuit section and/or to an interface that is configured for communication with a third party; in the first circuit section, generating a short term third-party key using a shared key, wherein the first cryptographic data contain the short term third-party key; and wherein the short term third-party key is adapted to be applied to the other data that the second circuit section interchanges with the third party. ### Claim 11 (depends on 10) The method as claimed in claim 10, wherein the signature is checked using the short term third-party key. ### Claim 12 (depends on 10) The method as claimed in claim 10, further comprising: in the second circuit section, using the short term third-party key for generating the signature for the other data. ### Claim 13 (depends on 11) The method as claimed in claim 11, the method further comprising: in the second circuit section, receiving the other data from the third party; and generating the signature for the other data using the short term third-party key. ### Claim 14 (depends on 11) The method as claimed in claim 11, further comprising: generating a long term third-party key using a method for agreeing a shared key with the third party; generating the short term third-party key using the long term third-party key; and transmitting the short term third-party key from the first circuit section to the second circuit section. ### Claim 15 A cryptographic circuit configured for cryptographic data processing, comprising: a first circuit section of the cryptographic circuit arranged inside a secure area secured against attacks and configured to use a long term key to encrypt or decrypt data to obtain first cryptographic data, and a second circuit section of the cryptographic circuit arranged outside the secure area and configured to perform a second cryptographic operation using the first cryptographic data in order to obtain second cryptographic data; wherein the cryptographic circuit is configured for use of a shared key in the first circuit section and in the second circuit section. ### Claim 16 (depends on 15) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 15, wherein the cryptographic circuit is configured so that the first circuit section in the secure area controls the second circuit section of the cryptographic circuit outside the secure area. ### Claim 17 (depends on 15) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 15, wherein the first circuit section has a first memory in which the shared key is securely stored and the second circuit section is coupled to a second memory in which the shared key is securely stored. ### Claim 18 (depends on 16) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 16, wherein the first circuit section and the second circuit section are coupled to one another through an unsecured connection in a transmission area whose resistance to attacks is lower than a first resistance of the first circuit section in the secure area. ### Claim 19 (depends on 15) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 15, wherein the cryptographic circuit outside the secure area has an interface for transmitting and/or receiving other data and is configured so that the second circuit section cryptographically processes the other data. ### Claim 20 (depends on 19) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 19, wherein the second circuit section at the interface is configured to: sign data from the first circuit section in order to authenticate the data with respect to their origin from the cryptographic circuit; and/or verify a signature for other data received at the interface from a third party in order to authenticate the other data with respect to their origin from the third party; and/or sign other data from the third party in order to authenticate the other data with respect to their origin from the interface. ### Claim 21 (depends on 15) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 15, wherein the cryptographic circuit is configured to be in a module that has at least two mutually separate circuit elements connected to one another by an unsecured connection. ### Claim 22 (depends on 21) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 21, wherein the first circuit section has a processor and the second circuit section has a state machine. ### Claim 23 (depends on 15) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 15, further comprising: a die having the secure area and having a processor core outside the secure area, wherein the die has a coprocessor that is coupled to the processor core and in which the cryptographic circuit is integrated, and wherein the coprocessor extends beyond boundaries of the secure area. ### Claim 24 (depends on 15) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 15, wherein the secure area is configured to be resistant to a differential power analysis. ### Claim 25 (depends on 24) The cryptographic circuit as claimed in claim 24, wherein the secure area is configured to randomize power consumption.