# US 11,305,665 B2 · Cyber-attack detection and electrical system stability for electric vehicle charging infrastructure

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- Number: US 11,305,665 B2
- Document ID: US11305665B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 16/291,342
- Filed: 2019-03-04
- Published: 2020-09-10
- Granted: 2022-04-19
- Earliest claimed: 2019-03-04
- Assignees: General Electric Company
- Applicants: General Electric Company
- Inventors: Hanchao Liu; Honggang Monten Wang; Philip Hart; Yichao Zhang
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US11305665B2

## CPC

- B60L 53/62: in response to charging parameters, e.g. current, voltage or electrical charge
- B60L 53/11: {DC charging controlled by the charging station, e.g. mode 4}
- B60L 53/63: in response to network capacity
- B60L 53/67: Controlling two or more charging stations
- G06F 21/755: {with measures against power attack}
- H02J 7/02: for charging batteries from AC mains by converters
- H02J 13/10: characterised by displaying of information or by user interaction, e.g. supervisory control and data acquisition [SCADA] systems
- H02J 13/12: Monitoring network conditions, e.g. electrical magnitudes or operational status
- H04L 63/14: {for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic}
- H04L 63/1441: {Countermeasures against malicious traffic (countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002)}
- B60L 2270/20: Inrush current reduction, i.e. avoiding high currents when connecting the battery
- G06F 17/141: {Discrete Fourier transforms}
- Y02E 60/00: Enabling technologies; Technologies with a potential or indirect contribution to GHG emissions mitigation
- Y02T 10/70: Energy storage systems for electromobility, e.g. batteries
- Y02T 10/7072: Electromobility specific charging systems or methods for batteries, ultracapacitors, supercapacitors or double-layer capacitors
- Y02T 90/12: Electric charging stations
- Y02T 90/14: Plug-in electric vehicles
- Y04S 10/126: the energy generation units being or involving electric vehicles [EV] or hybrid vehicles [HEV], i.e. power aggregation of EV or HEV, vehicle to grid arrangements [V2G]
- B60L: PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES (arrangements or mounting of electrical propulsion units or of plural diverse prime-movers for mutual or common propulsion in vehicles B60K1/00, B60K6/20; arrangements or mounting of electrical gearing in vehicles B60K17/12, B60K17/14; preventing wheel slip by reducing power in rail vehicles B61C15/08; dynamo-electric machines H02K; control or regulation of electric motors H02P); SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES (electric coupling devices combined with mechanical couplings of vehicles B60D1/64; electric heating for vehicles B60H1/00); ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL (control or regulation of electric motors H02P); MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H02J: ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS; CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS OR SYSTEMS FOR SUPPLYING OR DISTRIBUTING ELECTRIC POWER; SYSTEMS FOR STORING ELECTRIC ENERGY
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- Y02E: REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02T: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO TRANSPORTATION
- Y04S: SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS

## Abstract

Some embodiments provide a system to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure. An electric vehicle charging site may receive Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles. A sensor spoof observer and controller may receive information from at least two AC current sensors, wherein the observer calculates a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model. A system stability assurance platform may: (i) monitor current and voltage to detect resonance, (ii) identify impedance associated with a detected resonance, and (iii) apply a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm. A user interface platform may then provide information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A system to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure, comprising:
an electric vehicle charging site to receive Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles, including:
a sensor spoof observer and controller to receive information from at least two AC current sensors, wherein the observer calculates a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model;
a system stability assurance platform to: (i) monitor current and voltage to detect resonance, (ii) identify impedance associated with a detected resonance, and (iii) apply a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm; and
a user interface platform to provide information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the sensor spoof observer and controller and the system stability assurance platform are implemented in a hierarchical manner such that the sensor spoof observer and controller is deployed in an individual converter control layer and the system stability assurance platform is deployed in a charging station layer and a substation layer.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the sensor spoof observer and controller utilizes information from a second AC current sensor when it is determined that a first AC current sensor is being cyber-attacked.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the AC filter dynamic model is continuously corrected using a difference between a measured output and an observed output to minimize state-variable divergence.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the grid voltage disturbance is associated with AC unbalance.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the system stability assurance platform detects resonance associated with at least one of: (i) altered control parameters, and (ii) cycling setpoints.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the system stability assurance platform includes an AC system-level stability assurance algorithm and a DC system-level stability assurance algorithm.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the resonance is detected via at least one of: (i) a sliding Discrete Fourier Transform (“DFT”), and (ii) a wavelet analysis.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the impedance associated with the detected resonance is identified using analytical model predictions and a small-signal injection to improve signal-to-noise ratio.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the graphical user interface display includes at least one of: (i) static information regarding the charging site, (ii) a physical location of the charging site, (iii) a topology of the charging site, (iv) a number of charging ports, (v) indications of occupied charging ports, (vi) details regarding a nature of a cyber-attack, (vii) an indication regarding resonance, (viii) a frequency or magnitude of resonance, and (ix) a cyber-attack remediation recommendation.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the electric vehicle charging site is associated with extreme fast charging.

### Claim 12

A computerized method to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure that receives Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles, comprising:
receiving, at a sensor spoof observer and controller, information from at least two AC current sensors;
calculating, by the sensor spoof observer and controller, a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model;
monitoring, by a system stability assurance platform, current and voltage to detect resonance;
identifying, by the system stability assurance platform, impedance associated with a detected resonance;
applying, by the system stability assurance platform, a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm; and
providing, by a user interface platform, information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the sensor spoof observer and controller utilizes information from a second AC current sensor when it is determined that a first AC current sensor is being cyber-attacked.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the AC filter dynamic model is continuously corrected using a difference between a measured output and an observed output to minimize state-variable divergence.

### Claim 15 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the grid voltage disturbance is associated with AC unbalance.

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the system stability assurance platform detects resonance associated with at least one of: (i) altered control parameters, and (ii) cycling setpoints.

### Claim 17 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the system stability assurance platform includes an AC system-level stability assurance algorithm and a DC system-level stability assurance algorithm.

### Claim 18

A non-transitory, computer-readable medium storing program code, the program code executable by a computer processor to cause the processor to perform a method to protect an electric vehicle charging infrastructure that receives Alternating Current (“AC”) power from a power grid and provides Direct Current (“DC”) power to electric vehicles, the method comprising:
receiving, at a sensor spoof observer and controller, information from at least two AC current sensors;
calculating, by the sensor spoof observer and controller, a grid voltage disturbance using a structure based on an AC filter dynamic model;
monitoring, by a system stability assurance platform, current and voltage to detect resonance;
identifying, by the system stability assurance platform, impedance associated with a detected resonance;
applying, by the system stability assurance platform, a result of an analysis of the identified impedance to an adaptive damping control algorithm; and
providing, by a user interface platform, information about a component of the charging infrastructure being cyber-attacked to a distribution system operator via a graphical user interface display.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The medium of claim 18, wherein the resonance is detected via at least one of: (i) a sliding Discrete Fourier Transform (“DFT”), and (ii) a wavelet analysis.

### Claim 20 (depends on 18)

The medium of claim 18, wherein the impedance associated with the detected resonance is identified using analytical model predictions and a small-signal injection to improve signal-to-noise ratio.

### Claim 21 (depends on 18)

The medium of claim 18, wherein the graphical user interface display includes at least one of: (i) static information regarding the charging site, (ii) a physical location of the charging site, (iii) a topology of the charging site, (iv) a number of charging ports, (v) indications of occupied charging ports, (vi) details regarding a nature of a cyber-attack, (vii) an indication regarding resonance, (viii) a frequency or magnitude of resonance, and (ix) a cyber-attack remediation recommendation.

### Claim 22 (depends on 18)

The medium of claim 18, wherein the electric vehicle charging site is associated with extreme fast charging.