Secure vehicle to vehicle communication

A vehicle-to-vehicle key exchange system, comprising:

• a central office server comprising one or more processors configured to:
• receive from a first on-board computer of a first vehicle a first secret random number and a first public key based on the first secret random number;
• and
• receive, from the first on-board computer of the first vehicle, a digitally signed first public key based on a first private key associated with the first on-board computer;
• receive, from a second on-board computer of a second vehicle, a second secret random number and a second public key based on the second secret random number;
• and
• receive from the second on-board computer a digitally signed second public key based on a second private key associated with the second on-board computer;
• authenticate the first public key of the first vehicle based on the first private key associated with the first on-board computer of the first vehicle;
• authenticate the second public key of the second vehicle based on the second private key associated with the second on-board computer of the second vehicle;
• prevent a man-in-the-middle attack, by securing at least one of a first vehicle-to-central office communication, a central office-to-first vehicle communication, or a first vehicle-to-second vehicle, wherein the first vehicle-to-central office communication and the central office-to-first vehicle communication are authenticated based on a determined private key associated with a respective first vehicle on-board computer;
• authenticate the first public key based on a DH modulus, a DH base, and a secret random number, wherein the determined private key includes at least one of a vehicle identifier, a DH modulus, or a DH base;
• and
• send a message, with the central office server, to a vehicle associated with a conditional movement authority.

A computer program product comprising at least one non-transitory computer-readable medium including program instructions that, when executed by at least one processor, receive a first secret random number and a first public key based on the first secret random number;

• and receive a digitally signed first public key to a central office server based on a first private key associated with a first vehicle;
• receive a digitally signed second public key based on a second private key associated with a second vehicle;
• authenticate the first public key of the first vehicle based on the first private key associated with the first vehicle;
• authenticate the second public key of the second vehicle based on the second private key associated with the second vehicle, prevent a man-in-the-middle attack, by securing at least one of a first vehicle-to-central office communication, a central office-to-first vehicle communication, or a first vehicle-to-second vehicle, wherein the first vehicle-to-central office communication and the central office-to-first vehicle communication are authenticated based on a determined private key associated with a respective first vehicle on-board computer;
• authenticating at the central office server, the first public key based on a DH modulus, a DH base, and a secret random number, wherein the determined private key includes at least one of a vehicle identifier, a DH modulus, or a DH base;
• and send a message to a vehicle associated with a conditional movement authority.