# US 10,768,863 B2 · Security monitoring agent for field programmable gate array (FPGA) in-memory controller

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- Number: US 10,768,863 B2
- Document ID: US10768863B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 15/476,693
- Filed: 2017-03-31
- Published: 2018-10-04
- Granted: 2020-09-08
- Earliest claimed: 2017-03-31
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Applicants: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Rajesh Poornachandran; Vincent J. Zimmer; Ned M. Smith; Nadhiya Chandramohan
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US10768863B2

## CPC

- G06F 3/067: {Distributed or networked storage systems, e.g. storage area networks [SAN], network attached storage [NAS]}
- G06F 3/0622: {in relation to access}
- G06F 3/0659: {Command handling arrangements, e.g. command buffers, queues, command scheduling}
- G06F 3/0673: {Single storage device}
- G06F 21/55: Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F 21/76: in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- G06F 12/0292: {using tables or multilevel address translation means (G06F12/023 takes precedence; address translation in virtual memory systems G06F12/10)}
- G06F 12/1408: {by using cryptography (for digital transmission H04L9/00)}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Techniques related to preventing unauthorized access to a computing device are disclosed. The techniques include a machine-readable medium, on which are stored instructions, comprising instructions that when executed cause a device to identify a host hardware configuration, obtain a policy based on the host hardware configuration, monitor two or more memory transactions based on the policy, identify, based on the memory transactions, a memory transaction pattern, wherein the memory transaction pattern is associated with an attempt to obtain unauthorized access to the device, and take one or more actions to interfere with attempts to obtain unauthorized access to the device based on the policy.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A non-transitory machine-readable medium, on which are stored instructions, comprising instructions that when executed cause a device to:
identify a host hardware configuration;
obtain a policy based on the host hardware configuration;
monitor two or more memory transactions based on the policy;
identify, based on the two or more memory transactions, a memory transaction pattern, wherein the memory transaction pattern is associated with an attempt to obtain unauthorized access to the device; and
take an action to interfere with attempts to obtain unauthorized access to the device based on the policy, wherein the action includes reconfiguring circuitry of the device to modify a mapping of a system physical address to a dynamic random access memory (DRAM) physical address.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the instructions further comprise instructions that when executed cause the device to verify the obtained policy within a trusted execution environment.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the host hardware configuration comprises information related to a memory controller and a memory module.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the instructions further comprise instructions that when executed cause the device to:
log information related to the two or more memory transactions; and
transmit the logged information to a server device.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 4, wherein the logging is configured based on at least one of the policy, hot swapping a memory module, or hot adding a memory module.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the policy is obtained using a communications channel between a trusted execution environment and a server device.

### Claim 7

A method for preventing unauthorized access, comprising:
identifying a host hardware configuration of a device;
obtaining a policy based on the host hardware configuration;
monitoring two or more memory transactions based on the policy;
identifying, based on the two or more memory transactions, a memory transaction pattern, wherein the memory transaction pattern is associated with an attempt to obtain unauthorized access to the device; and
taking an action to interfere with attempts to obtain unauthorized access to the device based on the policy, wherein the action includes reconfiguring circuitry of the device to modify a mapping of a system physical address to a dynamic random access memory (DRAM) physical address.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, wherein the host hardware configuration comprises information related to a memory controller and a memory module.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the memory controller comprises a field-programmable gate array memory controller.

### Claim 10 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, further comprising:
obtaining a bit stream for reconfiguring a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) memory controller,
wherein the action comprises verifying the bit stream and applying the bit stream to the FPGA memory controller.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, wherein the bit stream comprises a register transfer level description of a FPGA circuit configuration.

### Claim 12 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, further comprising:
logging information related to the two or more memory transactions; and
transmitting the logged information to a server device.

### Claim 13

A device comprising:
circuitry to:
identify a host hardware configuration;
obtain a policy based on the host hardware configuration;
monitor two or more memory transactions based on the policy;
identify, based on the two or more memory transactions, a memory transaction pattern, wherein the memory transaction pattern is associated with an attempt to obtain unauthorized access to the device; and
take an action to interfere with attempts to obtain unauthorized access to the device based on the policy, wherein the action includes reconfiguring the circuitry of the device to modify a mapping of a system physical address to a dynamic random access memory (DRAM) physical address.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The device of claim 13, wherein the circuitry is further to verify the obtained policy within a trusted execution environment.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The device of claim 13, wherein the host hardware configuration comprises information related to a memory controller and a memory module.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The device of claim 13, wherein the circuitry is further to:
log information related to the two or more memory transactions; and
transmit the logged information to a server device.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The device of claim 16, wherein the logging is configured based on at least one of the policy, hot swapping a memory module, or hot adding a memory module.

### Claim 18 (depends on 13)

The device of claim 13, wherein the policy is obtained using a communications channel between a trusted execution environment and a server device.
