# US 10,484,753 B2 · Securely paired delivery of activation codes from smart card to remote client set-top box

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- Number: US 10,484,753 B2
- Document ID: US10484753B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 15/474,907
- Filed: 2017-03-30
- Published: 2018-06-28
- Granted: 2019-11-19
- Earliest claimed: 2016-12-23
- Assignees: DISH Tchnologies L.L.C.
- Applicants: DISH Technologies L.L.C.
- Inventors: William Michael Beals; John Hamrick
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US10484753B2

## CPC

- G06F 21/85: interconnection devices, e.g. bus-connected or in-line devices
- G06F 21/10: Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material (protection in video systems or pay television H04N7/16) {; Digital rights management [DRM]}
- H04L 9/0897: {involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB}
- H04L 9/3234: {involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853)}
- H04L 9/3236: {using cryptographic hash functions}
- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 63/0464: {using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it}
- H04L 63/062: {for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819)}
- H04L 63/0853: {using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234)}
- H04L 63/123: {received data contents, e.g. message integrity}
- H04N 21/2351: {involving encryption of additional data (arrangements using cryptography for the use of broadcast information or broadcast-related information H04H60/23)}
- H04N 21/25816: {involving client authentication (restricting access to computer systems by authenticating users using a predetermined code G06F21/33; cryptographic authentication protocols H04L9/32; networks authentication protocols H04L63/08; authentication in wireless network security H04W12/06)}
- H04N 21/26613: {for generating or managing keys in general (key distribution for secret or secure communication involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] H04L9/083; network support of key management H04L63/06; key management for network security in communication control or processing H04W12/04)}
- H04N 21/4181: {for conditional access}
- H04N 21/4353: {involving decryption of additional data (arrangements using cryptography for the use of broadcast information or broadcast-related information H04H60/23)}
- H04N 21/443: OS processes, e.g. booting an STB, implementing a Java virtual machine in an STB or power management in an STB
- H04N 21/6543: for forcing some client operations, e.g. recording {(remote booting in general G06F9/4416)}
- H04W 12/06: Authentication
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04N: PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

Described herein are systems and methods for hardware enforcement of hardware functionality in a client television receiver. An activation message containing an activation code for a specific hardware component within the client television receiver can be transmitted from a television service provider system to a host television receiver having an associated smart card. The smart card can decrypt the activation message, identify the client television receiver as the destination of the activation message, security check the activation message, encrypt the activation message with a local key, and transmit the activation message to a security processor on the client television receiver. The security processor can decrypt the activation message, security check the activation message to ensure it is from the smart card and has not been tampered with, and enable the hardware component within the client television receiver based on the activation code within the activation message.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method, comprising
receiving, at a smart card in a host television receiver, an activation message containing an encrypted activation code;
decrypting, by the smart card, the activation message including the activation code in accordance with a global network key stored by the smart card;
determining, by the smart card, in accordance with the activation message, that the activation code is destined for a client television receiver that is communicatively coupled with the host television receiver and having a security processor, and that the activation code is for enabling a hardware component of the client television receiver;
encrypting, by the smart card, the activation message including the activation code with a local key unique to the client television receiver, instances of the local key stored by both the smart card and the client television receiver;
transmitting, by the smart card, the activation message encrypted with the local key to the security processor of the client television receiver;
receiving, by the security processor, the activation message encrypted with the local key;
decrypting, by the security processor, the activation message including the activation code with the local key; and
enabling, by the security processor, the hardware component of the client television receiver based on the activation code.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
receiving, at the smart card, a second activation message;
decrypting, by the smart card, the second activation message;
security checking, by the smart card, the second activation message; and
discarding, by the smart card, the second activation message if the security check of the second activation message failed.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the security checking comprises:
performing, by the smart card, an integrity check comprising:
calculating, by the smart card, a hash of the second activation message using a cryptographic hashing algorithm; and
determining, by the smart card, whether the second activation message was tampered with based on the hash; and
determining, by the smart card, that the security check passed only if the smart card determined that the second activation message was not tampered with.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the security checking comprises:
performing, by the smart card, a signature check comprising determining whether the second activation message was transmitted from a television service provider based on a signature key; and
determining, by the smart card, that the security check passed only if the smart card determined that the second activation message was transmitted from the television service provider.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the hardware component is a first hardware component of a plurality of hardware components of the client television receiver, the method further comprising:
receiving, by the security processor, a second activation message;
decrypting, by the security processor, the second activation message;
security checking, by the security processor, the second activation message; and
disabling, by the security processor, each of the plurality of hardware components if the security check of the second activation message failed.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, wherein the security checking comprises:
performing, by the security processor, an integrity check comprising:
calculating, by the security processor a hash of the second activation message using a cryptographic hashing algorithm; and
determining, by the security processor, whether the second activation message was tampered with based on the hash; and
determining, by the security processor, that the security check passed only if the security processor determined that the second activation message was not tampered with.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the hardware component is selected from the group consisting of a wireless network transceiver, a Bluetooth® transceiver, a digital video recorder, a hard drive, and a universal serial bus connector.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the client television receiver comprises a second hardware component having a second activation code, the method further comprising:
determining, by the security processor, that the activation message does not contain the second activation code; and
disabling, by the security processor, the second hardware component.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
pairing, by the smart card, with the security processor by:
receiving, by the smart card, an authorization message containing the local key unique to the client television receiver from a television service provider; and
storing, by the smart card, the local key in a memory.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, wherein the client television receiver is a first client television receiver of a plurality of client television receivers, and wherein the smart card is configured to pair with a limited number of the plurality of client television receivers.

### Claim 11

A system, comprising:
a host television receiver, comprising an interface for communication with a smart card;
the smart card communicatively coupled with the host television receiver, and comprising:
a smart card processor; and
a smart card memory having stored thereon instructions which, when executed by the smart card processor, cause the smart card processor to:
receive an activation message containing an encrypted activation code;
decrypt the activation message including the activation code in accordance with a global network key stored by the smart card;
determine in accordance with the activation message, that the activation code is destined for a client television receiver that is communicatively coupled with the host television receiver and having a security processor, and that the activation code is for enabling a hardware component of the client television receiver;
encrypt the activation message including the activation code with a local key unique to the client television receiver, instances of the local key stored by both the smart card and the client television receiver; and
transmit the activation message encrypted with the local key to the client television receiver; and
the client television receiver, comprising:
the hardware component;
a security processor; and
a security memory having stored thereon instructions which, when executed by the security processor, cause the security processor to:
receive the activation message encrypted with the local key from the smart card;
decrypt the activation message including the activation code with the local key; and
enable the hardware component based on the activation code.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the smart card memory has stored thereon further instructions which, when executed by the smart card processor, cause the smart card processor to:
receive a second activation message;
decrypt the second activation message;
security check the second activation message; and
discard the second activation message if the security check of the second activation message failed.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The system of claim 12, wherein the instructions in the smart card memory for security checking the second activation message include instructions which, when executed by the smart card processor, cause the smart card processor to:
perform an integrity check comprising:
calculating a hash of the second activation message using a cryptographic hashing algorithm, and
determining whether the second activation message was tampered with based on the hash; and
determine that the security check passed only if the second activation message was not tampered with.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The system of claim 12, wherein the instructions in the smart card memory for security checking the second activation message include instructions which, when executed by the smart card processor, cause the smart card processor to:
perform a signature check comprising determining whether the second activation message was transmitted from a television service provider based on a signature key; and
determine that the security check passed only if the smart card processor determined that the second activation message was transmitted from the television service provider.

### Claim 15 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the hardware component is a first hardware component of a plurality of hardware components of the client television receiver, and wherein the security memory has stored thereon further instructions which, when executed by the security processor, cause the security processor to:
receive a second activation message;
decrypt the second activation message;
security check the second activation message; and
disable each of the plurality of hardware components if the security check of the second activation message failed.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The system of claim 15, wherein the instructions in the security memory for security checking the second activation message include instructions which, when executed by the security processor, cause the security processor to:
perform an integrity check comprising:
calculating a hash of the second activation message using a cryptographic hashing algorithm, and
determining whether the second activation message was tampered with based on the hash; and
determine that the security check passed only if the security processor determined that the second activation message was not tampered with.

### Claim 17 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the hardware component is selected from the group consisting of a wireless network transceiver, a Bluetooth® transceiver, a digital video recorder, a hard drive, and a universal serial bus connector.

### Claim 18 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the client television receiver further comprises a second hardware component, the second hardware component having a second activation code, and wherein the security memory has stored thereon further instructions which, when executed by the security processor, cause the security processor to:
determine that the activation message does not contain the second activation code; and
disable the second hardware component.

### Claim 19 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the smart card memory has stored thereon further instructions which, when executed by the smart card processor, cause the smart card processor to:
pair with the client television receiver by:
receiving an authorization message containing the local key unique to the client television receiver; and
storing the local key in the smart card memory.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The system of claim 19, wherein the client television receiver is a first client television receiver of a plurality of client television receivers, and wherein the smart card is configured to pair with a limited number of the plurality of client television receivers.