# US 10,312,091 B1 · Secure permanent integrated circuit personalization

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 10,312,091 B1
- Document ID: US10312091B1
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B1
- Application number: 15/260,987
- Filed: 2016-09-09
- Granted: 2019-06-04
- Earliest claimed: 2015-10-13
- Applicants: Multibeam Corporation
- Inventors: Michael C. Smayling; David K. Lam
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US10312091B1

## CPC

- H04L 9/32: including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system {or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials}
- G06F 3/0623: {in relation to content}
- G06F 3/0659: {Command handling arrangements, e.g. command buffers, queues, command scheduling}
- G06F 3/067: {Distributed or networked storage systems, e.g. storage area networks [SAN], network attached storage [NAS]}
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F 21/606: {by securing the transmission between two devices or processes}
- G06F 21/72: in cryptographic circuits
- G06F 21/73: by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
- G06F 21/75: by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation
- G09C 1/00: Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system (cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00)
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H10P 34/40: with high-energy radiation
- H10P 50/242: {of Group IV materials}
- H10W 42/40: protecting against tampering, e.g. unauthorised inspection or reverse engineering
- G06F 2221/2143: Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
- H04L 2209/127: Trusted platform modules [TPM]
- H10W 46/00: Marks applied to devices, e.g. for alignment or identification
- H10W 46/106: {digital information, e.g. bar codes}
- H10W 46/401: {for identification or tracking}
- H10W 46/601: {for use after dicing}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- G09C: CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
- H10P: GENERIC PROCESSES OR APPARATUS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR TREATMENT OF DEVICES COVERED BY CLASS H10
- H10W: GENERIC PACKAGES, INTERCONNECTIONS, CONNECTORS OR OTHER CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF DEVICES COVERED BY CLASS H10

## Abstract

Methods, systems and devices for using charged particle beams (CPBs) to write different die-specific, non-volatile, electronically readable data to different dies on a substrate. CPBs can fully write die-specific data within the chip interconnect structure during the device fabrication process, at high resolution and within a small area, allowing one or multiple usefully-sized values to be securely written to service device functions. CPBs can write die-specific data in areas readable or unreadable through a (or any) communications bus. Die-specific data can be used for, e.g.: encryption keys; communications addresses; manufacturing information (including die identification numbers); random number generator improvements; or single, nested, or compartmentalized security codes. Die-specific data and locations for writing die-specific data can be kept in encrypted form when not being written to the substrate to conditionally or permanently prevent any knowledge of said data and locations.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of writing a substrate using a charged particle beam tool, comprising the actions of:
writing multiple cut features to multiple dies on a substrate using one or more charged particle beams, different features being written to different dies, data values permanently stored in interconnects in said dies being at least partially determined by the locations of said cut features, said locations being determined by the charged particle beam tool in dependence on said data values; and
preventing and restricting access to and transmission of said data values and said locations from the tool, wherein said preventing and restricting persist before, during and after said writing, and wherein said preventing applies to unencrypted instances of said data values and said locations and said restricting applies to encrypted instances of said data values and said locations.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein different cut features are written to each different die.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising receiving and/or generating said values prior to said writing; and preventing storage of unencrypted instances of said values and said locations outside the tool after said receiving and/or generating.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein said preventing comprises deleting said unencrypted values and locations from all memories of the tool in which said unencrypted values and said locations are stored, said deleting values being performed after initially calculating said locations using said values and a design layout database, said deleting locations being performed after said writing.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising preventing inspection of said features other than by the tool or by another secure tool.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising the tool generating a “skip areas” file of substrate regions comprising said locations, wherein said “skip areas” file is used to restrict inspection of, or to restrict reporting of potential defects within, said substrate regions.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the tool encrypts said “skip areas” file using a public key, said file not having been transmitted out of said tool prior to said encrypting; and wherein an inspection tool decrypts said file using a private key corresponding to said public key.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein some features written to said dies are the same among different dies, and some features written to said dies are die-specific.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein said writing uses multiple beams, and wherein said features designed to be the same among different dies are written at the same time, by different ones of said beams, as said die-specific features.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising initially generating ones of said values using a local processing unit also used to control said beams to perform said writing, said locations being calculated in at least partial dependence on said values and a design layout database of the substrate, said values and said locations not being transmitted out of said local processing unit between said generating and said writing.

### Claim 11

A method of writing a substrate using a charged particle beam tool, comprising the actions of:
generating a unique or random data value to be written to a substrate using a value-generating integrated circuit (IC);
encrypting said data value with a public key using said value-generating IC, said data value not having been transmitted out of said value-generating IC prior to said encrypting;
decrypting said encrypted data value with a private key corresponding to said public key using a writing-preparation IC;
calculating locations on the substrate to write to embody said data value in interconnects on the substrate as electronically readable data, said data not accessible to any external input/output port of a corresponding IC, in at least partial dependence on said decrypted data value and the design layout database of the substrate;
writing cut features on the substrate in at least partial dependence on said calculated locations using one or more charged particle beams; and
making instances of said data value and said locations stored on said tool permanently inaccessible following said writing.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, wherein said making inaccessible comprises encrypting and/or deleting, from all memories corresponding to a processing unit controlling said beams to perform said writing, said value and said locations.

### Claim 13 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, wherein said calculated locations are encrypted after said calculating, and are decrypted immediately prior to said writing by a writing-control chip that controls one or more of said beams to perform said writing.

### Claim 14 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, wherein unencrypted instances of said value are deleted from memories corresponding to said value-generating IC during and/or after said encrypting.

### Claim 15 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, further comprising preventing said value and said locations from being retained after said writing in an unencrypted form in any memory corresponding to said writing-preparation IC.

### Claim 16 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, further comprising preventing said value and/or said locations from being retained after said writing in any memory in an unencrypted form.

### Claim 17 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, further comprising additionally encrypting said value with a private key of said value-generating IC; and additionally decrypting said value with a public key corresponding to said value-generating IC private key.