Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing detection with carrier phase and inertial sensors

A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a program causing a computer to execute a process to detect spoofing attacks attacks on a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver, the process comprising:

• receiving from the GNSS receiver information indicative of a carrier phase range for a plurality of satellites in view of the GNSS receiver;
• inputting a plurality of corrected-carrier-phase ranges sequentially obtained during a respective plurality of epochs;
• fitting a first curve, determined from corrected-carrier-phase ranges for most or all of the respective epochs, of a selected appropriate order to the sequentially obtained plurality of corrected-carrier-phase;
• outputting information indicative of first-curve parameters associated with the first curve;
• receiving observed inertial measurements;
• inputting a plurality of predicted ranges, based upon the observed inertial measurements, sequentially obtained during the respective plurality of epochs;
• fitting a second curve, determined from inertial-based predicted ranges for most or all of the respective plurality of epochs, to the sequentially obtained plurality of predicted ranges;
• outputting information indicative of second-curve parameters associated with the second curve, the second-curve parameters being same types of parameters as the first-curve parameters;
• and
• comparing the first-curve parameters with the second-curve parameters,
• wherein, if differences between the first-curve parameters and the second-curve parameters exceed a selected-curve-fit threshold, determining that the GNSS receiver was spoofed during the sequential plurality of epochs.

A method to detect spoofing attacks on a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver, the method comprising:

• for a plurality of sequential epochs of a GNSS system received by the GNSS receiver:
• comparing first-curve parameters associated with a first curve, determined from corrected-carrier-phase ranges for most or all of the plurality of sequential epochs, with second-curve parameters, determined from inertial-based predicted ranges for most or all of the plurality of sequential epochs associated with a second curve;
• and
• determining the GNSS receiver was spoofed during the sequential plurality of epochs when differences between the first-curve parameters and the second-curve parameters exceed a selected-curve-fit threshold.